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
**Project TRIAD  
Final Report, Volume II  
BSR 2737**

**August 1970**

Ann Arbor, Michigan

Sino-Soviet Interaction:  
A Quantitative Assessment

**The Office of National  
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
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Ann Arbor, Michigan

Sino-Soviet Interaction:  
A Quantitative Assessment

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PREFACE

(U) This volume contains the results from the quantitative analyses conducted during the research effort. These analyses were aimed at describing the nature and dynamics of Soviet and Chinese relations from 1949 through 1967. A description of the data itself can be found in Volume VI of this report--"Sino-Soviet Interaction: A Quantitative Assessment--Data Codebook."

(U) The work on this volume spanned the period October 1968 through June 1970 and was carried out under the supervision of Mr. Franz J. Mogdis, Principal Investigator. The research itself was primarily conducted by Mrs. Karen Tidwell, Mr. Dennis Hall and Mr. Mogdis. Mrs. Tidwell participated in the development of the research design, the collection and coding of the data, and was primarily responsible for the preparation of the draft of the final report volume. Mr. Hall devised, supervised and helped to interpret the quantitative analyses performed in this research. Mr. Mogdis was primarily responsible for the development of the research design, assisted in the data collection and coding tasks, and had final responsibility for the review and critique of the volume. The valuable assistance and advice provided by Mr. Richard Cady, Bendix, and Dr. Rudolph J. Rummel and Dr. Warren Phillips of the University of Hawaii on the research design, analyses and interpretation are also gratefully acknowledged.

(U) The sources cited in this report indicated the extensive access to classified sources which was obtained via Headquarters, United States Air Force, Doctrine, Concepts and Objectives Directorate. The cooperation of the following offices is gratefully acknowledged in this respect:

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SECTION I

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS<sup>1</sup>

(U) This section summarizes the major findings derived from the quantitative analysis of Sino-Soviet relations for the period 1950-1967. In addition to the findings themselves, several hypotheses are also included. Where these occur, every effort has been made to make them as explicit and concise as possible. Both the findings and the hypotheses are offered with the hope that replication, criticism, and extension of our work will be undertaken by others.

(U) A comprehensive explanation of the procedures and results of the study itself can be found in Sections III through VI of this volume. Section VII concludes the volume with a comparison of the findings derived from this study with some of the prior research and hypotheses dealing with Sino-Soviet relations.

(U) The quantitative analysis consisted of three parts:

1. A delineation of the major patterns of change in Soviet and Chinese attributes from 1950 - 1967 and a measurement of primary shifts in their attribute differences over this period (Section IV).
2. A quantitative definition of the major patterns in Sino-Soviet interactions from 1950 - 1967 (Section V).
3. The relationship of shifts in Sino-Soviet interactions to changes in cultural, military and economic differences between them (Section VI).

(U) The major findings from each of these analyses are presented in the following paragraphs.

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<sup>1</sup> Because this section is a summary of findings, the terms and variables mentioned will of necessity not be defined or explained. The reader should refer to the appropriate section of the report for an explanation of the particular analysis in question.

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A. PATTERNS OF SOVIET AND CHINESE NATIONAL ATTRIBUTES AND THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THESE PATTERNS

1. Industrialization is the most significant dynamic attribute pattern for both the Soviets and Chinese. It occurs in each analysis as the first and strongest factor and is always characterized by growth and development over time.
2. Nuclear Transition appears as the second strongest pattern for the Soviets. It is characterized by diplomatic and conventional military behavior--for example, increasing numbers of bilateral treaties signed and rising fighter aircraft production--until 1960 when both proceed to fall off. Coupled with the decrease in Soviet conventional development after 1960 is an increase in their strategic development priorities as indexed by missile submarine and ICBM production and deployment.
3. In the analyses of the absolute differences between the Soviets and Chinese on each of the national attribute variables, several important patterns emerged. These patterns (factors) confirmed the existence of gaps between the two Communist powers in three areas: industrialization, nuclear capability, and in their perceptions of the United States. The gaps in two of these areas--industrialization and nuclear capability have been steadily and rapidly increasing since 1957. On the other hand, the analyses identified that the gap between Moscow's and Peking's perceptions of the United States as indexed by the active and threat variables exhibit no consistent trend. Rather, its values exhibit considerable variance over time. This latter finding calls into question much of the traditional literature which assumes the gap has been a consistently increasing one.

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<sup>2</sup>The use of the word perception should be clarified. As used throughout this study it refers to the articulated position of the Soviet Union and Communist China vis à vis the United States and vis à vis each other. That is to say that it represents the perceptions these two countries communicate via their state controlled press and radio to their masses and to the world as a whole. Because it is communication via a controlled media, it is possible in theory that at times the articulated perceptions may not represent the "real" or "probable" perceptions of the two countries. Such massive distortions of a general attitudinal position, however, are highly unlikely over a long period of time; that is, it is perhaps possible to distort or mislead via media communications on a single issue or in response to a single event during a short time-period, but such distortions are not possible over a longer time-period, particularly when one is talking only about generalized, latent attitudes. Thus in fact, we are suggesting that as used in this study, articulated perceptions probably can also be equated to "real" perceptions, although we refrain from explicitly making this equation.

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B. SINO-SOVIET PERCEPTIONS OF AND BEHAVIOR TOWARD EACH OTHER

1. The dominant factor derived from an analysis of the 45 variables used to measure direct interactions between China and the Soviet Union delineates a pattern of decreasing Soviet and Chinese cooperation and increasing Soviet and Chinese hostility. This pattern is indexed or best described by those Soviet and Chinese interactions which have been labelled by many as the major manifestations of the Sino-Soviet dispute, e. g., decreasing trade and increasing border incidents and negative perceptions of each other.
2. The analyses also confirmed that measures of Chinese trade dependency on the Soviet Union are negatively and highly related to measures of Soviet and Chinese hostility. This seems to confirm the hypothesis that as Chinese economic independence from the Soviet Union increased so did Sino-Soviet hostility.
3. A second pattern of Soviet-Chinese interaction also appeared. It describes a rise in cooperative Soviet-Chinese behavior until 1957, a transition period lasting until 1959, and then a trend which exhibits increasing hostile Soviet behavior toward Peking through 1967.
4. When Soviet perceptions of the Chinese (derived from content analysis) were combined with Soviet national attributes, a new pattern emerged. This new pattern evidenced a changing Soviet view of the Chinese as indexed by the weak, active, negative and threat variables. Moscow's perceptions of the Chinese were generally of a decreasing magnitude or intensity as measured by these variables until about 1957 when a transitional period lasting until 1960 occurs. In the post-1960 period a sharp upswing in magnitude is evidenced by all the variables. This factor might well be labelled the paper tiger syndrome. This pattern contradicts the hypothesis that as one nation perceives another nation as negative, he will also perceive that nation as stronger and more active--this being an interactive result of his negative feelings. The results of this study indicate that while the Soviets did perceive the Chinese as more negative and more active they did not at the same time perceive them as stronger but indeed perceived them as weaker.
5. A similar "paper tiger" pattern also appears in the analyses of the Chinese national attributes and perceptions of the Soviet Union. The Chinese simultaneously perceived the Soviets as negative, threatening and weak. An interesting divergence in the two patterns is that while 1959 marked the point at which the Chinese perceptions of the USSR increased in magnitude, the Soviets did not exhibit a similar pattern

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toward China until 1960. This would seem to indicate that the Soviets, at least during this period of the dispute, were responding to increasingly negative Chinese verbal initiatives rather than initiating such behavior themselves.

6. A major area of divergence between the two Communist powers in their interactive behavior was noted. Chinese perceptions were found to be highly related to their physical behavior, while in the Soviet case such a relationship does not appear to exist. Chinese perceptions of the Soviets as threatening and negative correlated positively to increasing Chinese deployment of troops to the Sino-Soviet border. However, over the same period, the Soviet deployment of troops to the border was found to be independent of Moscow's changing perceptions of the Chinese as negative and threatening. When the Soviets initiated measures to strengthen their force levels along the border with China they concurrently reduced rather than increased the intensity of their verbal pronouncements about the Chinese. The Soviets thus appear to have consciously refrained from attacking the Chinese in public perhaps in hope that the problems causing the increased tension might be solved.

C. SINO-SOVIET PERCEPTION OF THE US

1. The difference between the Soviets and the Chinese in their perceptions of the United States was found to be related to certain patterns of Sino-Soviet interactions. A difference in their perception of the US on the active dimension related to a changing pattern of Soviet responses to China. The increase in the gap between their perceptions of the US as active is correlated with a decrease in Soviet cooperative behavior towards China and an increase in Soviet hostile actions.
2. The difference analysis and the 36 case analysis revealed that generally Soviet perceptions of the United States are independent of--that is, not related to--Chinese perceptions of the US across identical time frames. Furthermore the attribute analyses revealed that changing Soviet perceptions of the CPR (Chinese Peoples Republic) formed a pattern through the years quite unrelated to Soviet perceptions of the US. It should be noted that this finding contradicts an application of Newcomb's model of interactive behavior which when applied to the Sino-Soviet relationship would predict that the Soviet perception of China on the positive-negative dimension should be related--either positively or negatively--to their view of the United States. A reason for the lack of support for the Newcomb model may be due to the fact that we aggregated perceptual values annually over an 18-year period. We did not examine Soviet perceptions of the US and China at critical points in time and at

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different levels of tension--e.g., during periods of détente as compared to periods of high crisis. This caveat notwithstanding, it is significant that at least within the generality of annual observations over 18 years there was little relationship between changes in Soviet and Chinese perceptions of each other and shifts in their perceptions of the US.

3. The differences in Sino-Soviet perceptions of the US as negative and threatening was found to relate to China's perception of the Soviet Union as strong. Here for the first time we have a difference in perceptions of the US relating to China's perception of the Soviet Union. It has often been suggested that the increasing differences in Soviet and Chinese perceptions of the US were a major element in escalating the Sino-Soviet dispute. The results of this study, however, do not seem to support this contention. The Soviet and Chinese difference in perception of the US as active is related to Soviet behavior vis-à-vis China but it is not associated with the major pattern of Sino-Soviet cooperation and hostility. The same is true of their difference in perceptions of the US as indexed by the negative and threat variables. These two perceptions of the US which one would most expect to relate to their increasing mutual hostility instead relate only to the Chinese perception of the Soviet Union as being strong.

An examination of the data from the content analysis indicates that Sino-Soviet perceptions of the US were equally shared on all dimensions except the negative-positive dimension. Here the Chinese consistently viewed the US as more negative than did the Soviets. This, of course, could be an idiosyncrasy of the Chinese to verbalize in this manner, but it is interesting to note that if this is the case, it occurs only on this dimension. However, even though the Chinese consistently viewed the US as more negative than the Soviets, shifts in this negative attitude were unrelated to the increasing Sino-Soviet hostility.

D. NATIONAL ATTRIBUTES AS PREDICTORS OF SINO-SOVIET INTERACTIONS

1. The differences between the Soviets and Chinese in the patterns of their national attributes from 1950 through 1967 predict with a high degree of accuracy their interaction patterns.
2. From 1950 through 1967, about 97 percent of the variation in Sino-Soviet cooperation and conflict is differences in their economic development; that is, the differences on the economic attributes were the best predictor variables to the pattern of Sino-Soviet cooperation and conflict. This should not be construed as an economic interpretation of the Sino-Soviet dispute but only as an observation that changes in the

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gap between Soviet and Chinese industrial capability had a high relationship to changes in the hostility level between the two Communist powers. This finding supports the general belief held by many scholars that the Chinese were not only aware that they were having serious industrial problems, but that the percipient withdrawal of Soviet aid and technicians in 1960 intensified the trend toward mutual hostility. The Chinese perceived the Soviets as a revisionist, status quo power more concerned with establishing a détente with the West than in helping the development of a fellow Communist country.

3. The strongest pattern of changing Sino-Soviet interaction--1950-1967--involved decreasing cooperation and increasing mutual threat perception and border hostility. This pattern is consistently related to changes in perceptions and economic and political-military differences between the two countries, with changes in economic differences being the most important. The pattern probably best describes that phenomenon which has become known as the Sino-Soviet dispute. It is made up of those interactions which indicate a steady trend of decreasing cooperation and increasing hostility. Soviet and Chinese interactions were highly dependent upon the six military national attributes. The Sino-Soviet gap in nuclear capability was highly related to the decrease in Soviet and Chinese cooperation and the increase in their hostility.

The gap between the Soviets and Chinese in percentage of GNP allocated for defense is also highly related to the changing Soviet military and cultural responses to China. This pattern suggests a trend in which as the defense allocation gap widens, the Soviets decrease cooperative behavior and increase military measures.

E. "USEFULNESS OF TECHNIQUES" APPLIED IN STUDY FOR POLICY PLANNERS

The application of factor analysis, canonical regression, content analysis and other analytical techniques to Sino-Soviet interactions and differences, 1950-1967, is but one example of the wide range of policy relevant questions for which systematic and empirical findings can be found using these and other methods. With regard to our application of these techniques, we have found them efficient in untangling some of the complex relationships in the changing Sino-Soviet relationship and in clearly bringing out their patterns through the years. Moreover, and most important, within the confines of our data these techniques have precisely determined the relationship between changes in Sino-Soviet interactions, perceptions, and economic, and politico-military differences in a way meaningful to policy makers and for forecasting.

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SECTION II

PRIOR RESEARCH

(U) Since the founding of the Chinese People's Republic (CPR) in 1950 the Soviet Union and China have participated in a dynamic relationship, the course of which has almost totally defied either the assumptions or predictions of US foreign policy decision-makers. This growing conflict between Moscow and Peking may well be the most important development in contemporary international relations. The dispute has resulted in world-wide competition between the Communist giants and has influenced almost every component of the international system.

(U) Although a great deal of conventional wisdom has been written and spoken about the conflict, most of it has been incomplete in both scope and analysis and at best has offered only a useful chronology of the major external manifestations of the dispute itself. More importantly, as the past has shown, these efforts have provided little guidance or insight to the military and policy planners who must prepare for and be prepared for any contingency. Our goal is to provide an analysis more directly relevant and responsive to the planners needs with the hope that by doing so additional guidance and insights will be given into present and future Sino-Soviet behavior.

(U) It is felt that in order to make the analysis more relevant--that is, to project patterns of Sino-Soviet relations into the future and to predict the outcome of such patterns--one must begin with an understanding of the situation at hand and that such an understanding must be based on a body of theory and a broad base of empirical data.

(U) This volume reports the results of a quantitative study of the Sino-Soviet dispute aimed at providing such an understanding. It is an examination of the dyadic relationship between Communist China and the Soviet Union from a systematic and quantitative perspective. Hopefully, we have identified indicators which account for changes over time in the relationship and which point to the possible range of future developments.

(U) There are many determinants and manifestations of a nation's behavior toward another nation. As noted by Robert North in a recent study,<sup>3</sup> whenever

<sup>3</sup>Robert C. North, The Chinese Communist Politburo and its Operational Code: A Feasibility Study, Palo Alto: Stanford University, 1967.

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two individuals or interpersonal organizations--including nations--interact, they have a choice of behaving in a number of ways: they can interact verbally; their behavior can be essentially affirming or contradicting or damaging; they can negotiate, bargain, or try to coerce; they can compete in comparative advantage or essentially zero-sum terms; and they may act symmetrically or asymmetrically toward each other. In other words, there are many dimensions affecting the relations between two nations which may be examined and all or only part of these dimensions may be important in determining--and so also understanding--that nation's behavior.

(U) The literature existing on the various approaches one might use to measure and analyze interactions between nations is voluminous. It shows that one must be concerned not only with the direct interactions between such states but also with the peculiar and unique characteristics of the individual nations themselves.

(U) As previously stated, our primary objective in this research is to systematically examine Sino-Soviet relations across time with the hope of discovering patterns and determinants of their behavior. The various theories and hypothesis of, and approaches to, the study of inter-nation behavior and Sino-Soviet interactions in particular were examined in the light of their utility and their relevance to the achievement of this objective. (See Figure 1.)

(U) The survey of prior research indicated that at least three general types of measurable nation-state behavior should be included in the study if we hope to consider the major factors influencing Sino-Soviet relations. These three categories were (1) national development--that is, the national attributes or characteristics of the Soviet Union and Communist China; (2) direct Sino-Soviet interaction; (3) Soviet and Chinese perceptions of each other and of the United States. The following pages are organized into three sections, each representing a type of behavior as mentioned above, with categories one and two (attributes and interactions) included together in the first section. Each section will summarize the relevant prior research that supports its inclusion in the overall study.

#### A. NATIONAL ATTRIBUTES AND INTERACTIONS

(U) Our research design was shaped to a great extent by the work of Rudolph Rummel and his associates at the Dimensionality of Nations Project (DON), University of Hawaii. The research effort draws heavily both on his social field theory--his theoretical justification--and on the results of his research.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>4</sup>R. J. Rummel, The DON Project: A Five Year Research Program, Honolulu: The Dimensionality of Nations Project (DON), Department of Political Science, University of Hawaii, Research Report No. 9, March 1967.

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


FIGURE 1

SCOPE AND METHODS OF ANALYSIS FOR TIME-SERIES  
STUDY OF SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

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Rummel himself draws to some extent from the works of Talcott Parsons<sup>5</sup> Kurt Lewin<sup>6</sup> and Quincy Wright.<sup>7</sup> Wright, for example, in his "theory" of war is specifically concerned with the attributes of nations and their influence on the behavior of other nations. Rummel's major contribution is that he has operationalized his theory and made it applicable to systematic social science research.

(U) The basic concept of Rummel's social field theory is that the differences between nations on their attributes are functionally related to their behavior towards each other.<sup>8</sup> These nation differences are conceived of as social distances that act like physical forces on behavior, affecting both their nature and magnitude of behavior.

(U) Rummel factor-analyzed 236 characteristics--that is, variables or measures of behavior--for 82 nations for the year, 1955. He found that nations vary in their national characteristics along seven major dimensions:<sup>9</sup> economic development, size, political orientation, population density, Catholic culture, foreign conflict behavior, and domestic conflict behavior.<sup>10</sup>

(U) These seven dimensions have little correlation with each other; that is, a nation's value on one dimension is largely independent or unrelated to its values on the other dimensions. Rummel also found that over half of the total variation of nations on their diverse characteristics can be described by these seven major dimensions.

<sup>5</sup>Talcott Parsons and Edward Shils, eds., Toward a General Theory of Action, New York: Harper and Row, 1951.

<sup>6</sup>Kurt Lewin, Field Theory in Social Science, New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1964.

<sup>7</sup>Quincy Wright, The Study of International Relations, New York: Appleton, Century-Crafts, 1955.

<sup>8</sup>This summary of Rummel's social field theory is taken from R. J. Rummel, A Social Field Theory of Foreign Conflict Behavior, Honolulu: DON Reprint Series, No. 4, Department of Political Science, University of Hawaii, September 1967.

<sup>9</sup>A dimension is a cluster of highly intercorrelated characteristics (variables) which form orthogonal factors.

<sup>10</sup>See the following published materials by R. J. Rummel: "Some Attributes and Behavioral Patterns of Nations," Journal of Peace Research, no. 2, 1967, pp. 196-206; "Delineating International Patterns and Profiles," in Davis Bobrow, ed., The Computer and the Policy-Making Community, New York: Prentice-Hall, 1968; and "Indicators of Cross-National and International Patterns," American Political Science Review, LXII, no. 1, March 1969, pp. 127-147.

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(U) Rummel was also concerned with the behavior of nations towards one another-- that is, their dyadic relationships. He analyzed a sample 164 dyads and found that the behavior of nations toward each other varies along eight major dimensions: salience, emigration and communication, UN voting, exports, foreign students, international organizations, official conflict behavior and diplomatic representation.<sup>11</sup>

(U) The theory is elaborated mathematically, drawing upon the theorems of n-dimensional spaces and linear algebra. These function to link Phases I (attributes) and II (dyadic behavior) of DON together so that the research results and design have continuity that they would otherwise lack. Simply put, the theory states that nations are social units interacting in a social field (in some ways analogous to an electromagnetic field), and that this field can be analytically divided into two spaces, a space of behavior and a space of attributes.

Within the attribute space nations are located in terms of their characteristics; within the behavior space, dyads (such as US-USSR) are located in terms of their behavior. Now, a distance vector between nations in attribute space can be measured and this vector can be treated as a force acting on the origin of behavior space. In other words, the location of dyads in behavior space can be treated as a function (resolution) of the distances (forces) between nations on their attributes. Mathematically,

$$W_{A \rightarrow B} = \sum_{j=1}^p \alpha_j d_j, \quad A-B,$$

where  $W_{A \rightarrow B}$  = location (as a vector) of dyad A-B in behavior space,

$d_j$  = distance vector between nations A and B on attribute dimension j of an attribute space of p dimensions.

$\alpha_j$  = a parameter for dimension j.

(U) Leaving mathematical considerations aside, the field theory says simply that nations will behave towards each other in terms of their socio-economic, cultural, geographic, and political differences and similarities. Tests of the theory thus far have been encouraging. In particular, one analysis of the linkage of behavior between nations to their differences carried out at Hawaii showed different levels

<sup>11</sup>See Rummel, "Indicators of Cross-National and International Patterns," op. cit., and "Common Dimensions of International Behavior and Attribute Spaces," DON Chart No. 1, 1966.



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of economic development to be an especially important force influencing both the direction and the magnitude of behavior.

(U) Rummel's position thus strongly suggested the need to examine both the national attributes and interactions of a dyadic relationship. This we did as we examined the relationship between the Soviet Union and China. In our analysis of the attributes, moreover, we also chose to follow Rummel's method of measuring the differences between the Soviets and Chinese on their attributes and comparing these differences to their interactions. Decisions then had to be made on what attributes and interactions were important and would best describe the fluctuations and patterns in Sino-Soviet relations across time.

(U) Because the number of national attributes and behaviors of a nation is large, a selection process was undertaken to choose the most relevant indicators. Much of the qualitative and quantitative literature concerned with the international behavior and development of nations and with the Sino-Soviet conflict itself was surveyed for suggestions.

(U) Rummel's work, was again a major factor, this time in the selection of the indicators to be used. His research has identified several dimensions of national characteristics (attributes) and behavior (interaction) and the indexing variables for each of these dimensions;<sup>12</sup> i. e., those variables which most closely correlated or corresponded to the dimension itself. In factor analysis terms, the measure would be among those characteristics correlating most highly with the factor-dimension. This work was used as a starting point in our variable selection process.

(U) There also have been many efforts specifically concerned with identifying the important elements in the Sino-Soviet dispute. This research has been concerned largely with such divisive elements as ideological issues, foreign policy issues, national interest issues, and stages of growth.<sup>13</sup> The greatest difficulty, however,

<sup>12</sup>See R. J. Rummel, "Some Empirical Findings on Nations and Their Behavior," World Politics, Vol. XXI, no. 2, January 1969, pp. 230 and 236 and "Indicators of Cross-National and International Patterns," op. cit.

<sup>13</sup>Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1967.

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is in operationalizing these issues. The 20th Communist Party Congress in 1956, for example, has been mentioned by many scholars as a turning point in Sino-Soviet relations.<sup>14</sup> It was here that Khrushchev advanced his theoretical premises on peaceful coexistence, the noninevitability of war and the peaceful transition to socialism. The impact of these pronouncements and the resultant bitter polemics which developed over them are often cited as one of the major causes of the dispute. Yet factors such as these are difficult to make concrete and measurable. While considering these and similar issues, e. g., the struggle for supremacy in the world communist movement, as important, our immediate concern rested more with explicit and operational hypotheses offered about the Sino-Soviet dispute.<sup>15</sup> The most useful of the latter are summarized in the following paragraphs.

(U) In his article, "A National Interest Analysis of Sino-Soviet Relations,"<sup>16</sup> Thomas Robinson discusses Hans Morgenthau's conception of national interest and its relationship to power in the context of Sino-Soviet relations during the period 1949 to 1963. Robinson examines: (1) the national interests of the Soviet Union and Communist China during this period and attempts to identify the changes which occurred within the course of Soviet-Chinese relations during the same time frame; (2) whether Morgenthau's hypothesized relationship between power and interest is borne out in the case under consideration; (3) the Sino-Soviet alliance in terms of each country's respective "national interests"; and (4) the impact of nuclear weapons on Soviet and Chinese national interests.

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<sup>14</sup>See, for example, Harold Hinton, Communist China in World Politics, Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Co., 1966, pp. 129-130; Donald Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956-61, New York: Atheneum, 1964, p. 7; William Griffith, The Sino-Soviet Rift, Cambridge Mass.: MIT Press, 1964, p. 16; and David Floyd, Mao Against Khrushchev, New York: Praeger, 1963, pp. 32-45.

<sup>15</sup>Because these verbal theories are difficult to test, an alternative strategy was adopted. If the quantitative analysis validly tapped attributes, perceptions, and behavior, then the verbal theories would "emerge" from the data.

<sup>16</sup>Thomas Robinson, "A National Interest Analysis of Sino-Soviet Relations," International Studies Quarterly, Volume XI, no. 2, June 1967.

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(U) Clearly, Robinson views the element of "power" as an important factor in Soviet-Chinese interactions. He points out that

...the most singular change in Sino-Soviet relations has been a relative increase in Chinese power. This rose from a point of almost complete dependence on Soviet Russia in 1950 (symbolized by the introduction into the Chinese body politic of the favorite Soviet control device of 'joint stock companies') to a point in 1964 of competition for power on fairly equal terms within the Communist bloc and throughout the world (signified on the one hand by the Chinese declaration of ideological independence in the 1960 tract "Long Live Leninism," and, on the other hand, by the Chinese nuclear explosion late in 1964). Although Soviet power also increased during the period and in absolute terms is probably much greater than Chinese power, it is the relative increase that matters.<sup>17</sup>

Robinson--like most commentators on international relations--is ambiguous in his use of the word "power." It is not clear in his discussion just exactly what is meant by this concept. Indeed, at least two definitions can be derived from his discussion. The first implies that "power" is the degree of Chinese "independence" of the Soviet Union. The second equates "power" to nuclear and/or industrial capability. However "power" is defined, Robinson asserts that the Chinese have experienced a relative increase in it over time and that this has had a profound effect on Sino-Soviet relations.

(U) In order to test empirically the Robinson conjecture that the changing relative power of the Soviet Union and Communist China had a profound effect on Sino-Soviet relations, we developed measures of Soviet and Chinese "power." Because of the ambiguities in the operationalization of "power" mentioned above, measures for both definitions were included. Variables measuring the industrial and nuclear capabilities of the Soviets and Chinese were included in the national attribute study. Variables measuring the relative dependence of the Chinese on the Soviets were included in the interaction study.

(U) Robinson also states that nuclear weapons are a discordant issue between the Soviet Union and China. He bases this on Morgenthau's theory on the nature of changes in alliances in the nuclear age and on the situation existing between the

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<sup>17</sup>Ibid.

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Soviets and Chinese. Robinson states "...the mechanics of the Sino-Soviet alliance and the presence of nuclear weapons in the hands of the Soviet Union and the United States, if not also China, tend to push the two allies apart."<sup>18</sup> Geoffrey Hudson also assigns great significance to the uneven development of nuclear weapons. He states that "it is impossible to estimate exactly what weight should be given to each of the various factors which have contributed to the conflict between the Communist regimes of Russia and of China, but there can be no doubt that Russia's refusal to assist China to become a nuclear power was one of the most important."<sup>19</sup>

(U) Considering the importance credited to nuclear weapons and their effect on Sino-Soviet relations, variables measuring the strategic nuclear capabilities of the two powers were included in the study.

(U) George Kennan, on the other hand, has stated that one of the major forces causing the split between the Soviets and the Chinese Communists has been their demands on each other.<sup>20</sup> Kennan believes the demands made by the Chinese on Moscow were primarily economic and military. The Chinese economy was in great difficulty and needed a tremendous infusion of foreign capital which they naturally hoped would come in the form of direct gifts from the Soviet Union. The Chinese also wanted greater Soviet military support than Moscow seemed willing to give. Because of Kennan's emphasis on Soviet economic and military aid to China, measures of Soviet aid are also incorporated in the study.

(U) The issue of territorial claims has been another factor mentioned by many as an element contributing to the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations.<sup>21</sup> The Chinese have territorial claims arising out of old treaty settlements with the Russian Tsarist regimes. Although these claims have existed for many years, only recently have

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<sup>18</sup>Ibid.

<sup>19</sup>Geoffrey Hudson, "Paper Tigers and Nuclear Teeth," The China Quarterly, No. 39, July-September 1969, p. 64.

<sup>20</sup>George Kennan's testimony as reported in Sino-Soviet Conflict, the United States Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, 89th Congress, 1st Session, House Document No. 237, May 14, 1965, p. 67.

<sup>21</sup>Zbigniew Brzezinski's testimony in ibid., p. 3R.

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they been pushed by the Chinese. Soviet and Chinese responses to increasing border tensions, caused at least in part by these renewed territorial claims have resulted in the concentration of troops along the Sinkiang frontier. The variable used as an indirect measure of these increasing tensions was the number of military units deployed by the Soviets and by the Chinese in the border area by year. It may be argued however, that this measure is probably a better indicator of Soviet and Chinese hostile behavior than it is of their concern with territorial claims.

B. PERCEPTIONS AND CONTENT ANALYSIS

(U) Besides examining the physical dimensions existing within and between nations, many scholars have stressed the importance of their verbal and written communication. In fact, many believe that the perceptions of a nation may be more important than a host of other variables--including national and dyadic attributes--in influencing their behavior. "In the last analysis--the perceptual orientation of a nation's leadership may well be the most significant determinant of a state's actions."<sup>22</sup> Perception, in this case, being defined as the process of becoming cognizant of, and evaluating, an environment. It refers to the cognitive, evaluative and affective awareness of various inputs from the external environment.<sup>23</sup> Explicitly, many scholars have gone so far as to state that the difference between Soviet and Chinese perceptions of the US is one of the key factors in determining the direction and intensity the Sino-Soviet dispute has taken.<sup>24</sup>

(U) If we accept the importance of perceptions in analyzing interactive phenomena, the case of the Sino-Soviet relationship poses many problems. Clearly, many standard methods of social science research--the personal interview, the questionnaire or the participant observer of decision-makers in action--to measure such perceptions or attitudes can rarely be used.<sup>25</sup> An instrument for measuring perceptions at a

<sup>22</sup>Nazli Choucri, "The Perceptual Base of Nonalignment," The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Volume XIII, No. 1, March 1969, p. 57.

<sup>23</sup>David Krech and Richard Crutchfield, "Perceiving the World" in Wilder Schramm, ed., The Process and Effect of Mass Communication, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1965.

<sup>24</sup>See for example, P. Terrance Hopmann, "International Conflict and Cohesion in International Political Coalitions: NATO and the Communist System During the Postwar Years," Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford, May 1969; Brzezinski, "The Sino-Soviet Conflict," op. cit., pp. 397-411; and Hinton, China in World Politics, op. cit., p 491.

<sup>25</sup>Ole Holsti, "External Conflict and Internal Consensus: The Sino-Soviet Case," in Philip J. Stone, Dexter Dunphy, Marshall Smith and Daniel Ogilvie, eds., The General Inquirer: A Computer Approach to Content Analysis, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1966.

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distance is thus needed. For this purpose many have turned to content analysis in an effort to derive the approximate attitudinal consensus held by actors toward each other at specified time intervals. Content analysis has been defined jointly by Holsti and Stone as "any research technique for making inferences by systematically and objectively identifying specified characteristics of messages."<sup>26</sup>

(U) Holsti has demonstrated the utility of content analysis in the study of problems in international relations.<sup>27</sup> He examined the hypothesis that "a high level of inter-coalition conflict tends to increase intracoalition unity and more relaxed relations between blocs tend to magnify differences within the alliance" in the context of Sino-Soviet relations.<sup>28</sup> Holsti operationalized this hypothesis on the basis of research done by social psychologists in the area of cognitive balance. His hypothesis is restated as follows: "Chinese and Soviet attitudes toward the US will tend to be similar in periods of high interbloc conflict, whereas during periods of decreasing tensions, attitudes toward American policy will diverge." The major underlying theoretical assumption is that consensus can be defined as the "existence on the part

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<sup>26</sup>Ole Holsti and Joanne Loomba, "Content Analysis," in Gardner Lindzey and Elliot Aronson, eds., The Handbook of Social Psychology, Reading, Mass.: Addison Wesley, 1968, p. 601; and Stone, et.al., The General Inquirer, op. cit., p. 5.

<sup>27</sup>Holsti, The General Inquirer, op. cit.

<sup>28</sup>Holsti, ibid. Zbigniew Brzezinski, on the other hand, believes that quite the opposite is true of the Sino-Soviet alliance. He states that the Sino-Soviet rift has a tendency to widen as a result of international crises. "The Quemoy-Matsu crisis of 1958, the U-2 crisis of 1960, the Cuban confrontation of 1962, and the American bombing of North Vietnam in 1965, all were followed by intensified polemics, mutual accusations and by accentuated suspicions concerning each other's motives and good faith. This sequence of events seemed to suggest that conditions of stress tended to drive further apart the Chinese and Soviet national interests and ideological assessments; while in a setting in which either or both could pursue their goals without endangering or negatively affecting each other's interest, the latent Communist interest in preventing a total split tended to be reawakened." (emphasis added) Zbigniew Brzezinski, op. cit., p. 429.

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of two or more persons of similar orientations toward something." This assumption is supported by the literature dealing with cognitive balance, and especially the work done by Theodore Newcomb and Fritz Heider.<sup>29</sup> Newcomb's A-B-X model is a simple model of interpersonal communication which is used as the basis for the measurement of cohesion.<sup>30</sup>

(U) This model is composed of two actors, A and B, who are interdependent and hence who have simultaneous orientations toward an external object X. Furthermore, the three parts of this model are interrelated in a system which is characterized by a balance of forces. Therefore, there are always present "strains" toward preferred states of equilibrium.<sup>31</sup> Based on this postulate, the model assumes that the co-orientation or consensus between A and B can be measured on the basis of the similarity of their perceptions of X.

(U) The fact that A and B are interdependent means that they may have simultaneous orientations toward X. By orientations we refer to attitudes in both their affective and cognitive senses. There are thus four possible joint orientations by A and B toward X. The key relationship from the point of view of cohesion is the symmetrical one in which A and B have similar orientations toward X.


(U) Bonds which connect the three points of the A-B-X triangle may carry a charge, either positive or negative. Balance among the three points is achieved only when the number of negative points connecting them is even or zero. Hence if both A and B have a symmetrical orientation--either positive or negative--toward X, then for the system to be in balance, the relationship between A and B tends to be positive; if their orientations differ--that is, if one has a positive attitude and the other is negative--their relationship tends to be negative. These four possible balanced configurations are shown in Figure 2.

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<sup>29</sup>See T. M. Newcomb, "Communication Behavior," in Roland Young, ed., Approaches to the Study of Politics, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1958; T. M. Newcomb, "An Approach to the Study of Communicative Acts," in A. P. Hare, et al., eds, Small Groups, New York: Alfred Knopf, 1955; Fritz Heider, "Attitudes and Cognitive Organizations," The Journal of Psychology, Vol. XXI, 1946, pp. 107-112, and by the same author, The Psychology of International Relations, New York: John Wiley, 1958.

<sup>30</sup>Holsti, op. cit., and Hopmann, op. cit.

<sup>31</sup>Hopmann, op. cit., p. 152.



THE MODEL SUGGESTS THAT THE RELATIONS BETWEEN TWO ACTORS

(USSR, CPR) MAY BE TREATED IN TERMS OF THEIR CO-

ORIENTATION TOWARD A COMMON EXTERNALLY SALIENT

OBJECT (US).

FIGURE 2

MODIFIED NEWCOMB MODEL - POSITIVE AND  
NEGATIVE CONFIGURATION



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(U) In summary, the A-B-X model suggests that the relations between two actors-- or more than two actors when treated in graph-theoretical terms as the relations within multiple dyads or semi-cycles--may be treated in terms of their co-orientation or consensus toward a common external object. This triangular--or multiple triangular--relationship may be characterized by a strain toward balance in which either two or no relations are negative if three conditions are also met: (1) the members of the dyad must be highly salient to one another; (2) the object of reference must be important to both; and (3) the object must have joint relevance to both. If these three conditions are met, and balance may be assumed to exist, then the A-B-X model suggests that similar evaluations by A and B of the same object X tend to produce a positive relationship between A and B, and dissimilar evaluations of X produce a negative relationship between A and B.

(U) In Holsti's study, he chose the United States as the attitude object (X) for the Soviet Union and China as A and B. Certainly the US is an object of importance and relevance to both nations and both nations are highly salient to one another. Eighty-two documents written by leading Chinese and Soviet decision-makers at seven points in time during the years 1950-1965 were content analyzed using the Stanford version of the "General Inquirer." The results indicated that during the peak period of the crises over Korea, Cuba, and Vietnam, both Chinese and Soviet perceptions of American policy were at the extremes of the negative, strong and active ends of the evaluative, potency, and activity dimensions. During the three periods of lower East-West tension, however, differences between Chinese and Soviet perceptions of the US increased on all three dimensions.

(U) The inclusion of perceptual variables derived from content analysis in this study allows us to further test the importance of perceptions in interstate relations; and, in particular, it will allow us to identify the relationship of changing Soviet and Chinese perceptions of the US to changes in their direct interaction patterns. That is, are Soviet and Chinese perceptions of each other and of the United States important factors in understanding the dynamics of the Sino-Soviet dispute?

(U) The concept of cognitive dimensions was mentioned earlier in the discussion of Holsti's work. This reference refers to the way the material selected for content analysis is evaluated. That is, what type of dictionary is used to reduce the written or spoken material to meaningful quantitative categories or dimensions of cognition. The dictionary used both in the Holsti study and in this study was primarily derived from the work of Charles Osgood. Osgood's research led him to try and determine empirically those dimensions which seemed to be the most basic to human cognition in many cultures.<sup>32</sup> A series of 50 bipolar scales were factor

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<sup>32</sup>Charles Osgood, George Suci and Percy Tannenbaum, The Measurement of Meaning, Urbana: The University of Illinois Press, 1959.

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analyzed, and those scales which tended to cluster together were extracted and identified to be the primary dimensions underlying the cognitive structure. The result was as follows:

In every instance in which a widely varied sample of concepts had been used, or the concept variable eliminated as a forced-choice among the scales, the same three factors have emerged in roughly the same order of magnitude. A pervasive evaluative factor in human judgment regularly appears first and accounts for approximately half to three-quarters of the extractable variance. Thus the attitudinal variable in human thinking..., based as it is on the bedrock of rewards and punishments, appears to be primary... The second dimension of the semantic space to appear is usually the potency factor and this typically accounts for about half as much variance as the first factor--this is concerned with power and the things associated with it, size, weight, toughness, and the like. The third dimension, usually about equal to or a little smaller in magnitude than the second, is the activity factor--concerned with quickness, excitement, warmth, agitation, and the like. And when other factors can be extracted and identified they typically, again, account for no more than half the amount of variance attributable to the second and third factors.<sup>33</sup>

(U) The identification of these three basic dimensions of human communication--the evaluative, the potency and the activity dimension--was then used as the basis for the construction of a dictionary to be used to evaluate written or spoken messages in terms of these three dimensions.

(U) The first step in any dictionary construction is to determine the dimensions into which the dictionary items will be coded. The content analysis program itself is capable of accommodating any set of dichotomous dimensions. This project, as noted earlier, employed the dimensions of Osgood's semantic differential. Therefore, all words in the dictionary are coded on a seven-point scale from +3 to -3 on all three of Osgood's dimensions; of course, many words in the dictionary are considered to be neutral with respect to one or more of these dimensions and are thus scored zero.

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<sup>33</sup> Charles Osgood, George Suci and Percy Tannenbaum, The Measurement of Meaning, Urbana: The University of Illinois Press, 1959, pp. 72-73.

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The dictionary thus reflects the assumption that when decision-makers perceive themselves, other nations, events--or any stimulus--the most relevant discriminations are made in a space defined by these three factors.<sup>34</sup>

(U) Once the dimensions for the dictionary were selected, it was necessary to select word entries for the dictionary. The original selection process was carried out at Stanford by Robert North, Richard Brody and Ole Holsti and consisted of the 3,000 most frequently used words in the English language plus the addition of words frequently used in political documents. This resulted in a dictionary of 3521 words. After running several documents dealing with the nine members of the Communist system,<sup>35</sup> leftover lists consisting of words in the text which were not picked up by the dictionary were examined. All major leftover words, other than prepositions, articles and conjunctives, were tagged and added to the dictionary. These totaled 434 new words, bringing the dictionary size up to 4,062. An additional 440 words were added from the leftover lists of this project, bringing the final dictionary size up to 4,502 words.<sup>36</sup>

(U) One of the major problems with dictionary construction is that the word entries are tagged in isolation and out of context. This problem may be at times severe because words which appear most frequently in text are often those words which have the most varied meanings. Some problems resulting from words having multiple meanings in different contexts are extremely difficult to solve, and we have had to assume that errors caused by analyzing text with a dictionary based on isolated words out of context are random and, hence, tend to cancel one another out.

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<sup>34</sup>Ole Holsti, "An Adaptation of the 'General Inquirer' for the Systematic Analysis of Political Documents," Behavioral Science, No. 9, 1964, p. 383.

<sup>35</sup>P. Terry Hoppmann, "Internal Conflict and Cohesion in the Communist System," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 11, No. 3, September 1967.

<sup>36</sup>It should be noted that the content analysis program itself automatically chops the endings of all words. Thus the figure 4,502 words means 4,502 root or basic words. Thus while "war," for example, is counted as only one entry in the dictionary, the dictionary will pick up all of its derivatives--e.g., wars, warring, warred.

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(U) All of the words in the dictionary were tagged on three dimensions by three judges working independently. For the original dictionary these scores were averaged and then distributed in a 30%-40%-30% distribution across the three degrees of intensity in each direction according to their average distance from zero. For the words added later, the rounded averages were used as the final taggings for each. Inter-coder reliability scores have generally been high; for the most recent set totaling 440 words reliability scores across three judges were:

<u>Dimension</u>	<u>Between Judges</u>			<u>Composite</u>
	<u>1 and 2</u>	<u>1 and 3</u>	<u>2 and 3</u>	
Evaluative	.76	.75	.79	.91
Potency	.60	.53	.63	.81
Activity	.49	.47	.70	.78

(U) A score for a pair of judges of .70 or better or a composite of .85 is generally considered to be very good.

(U) The above procedure means that discrepancies between coders are minimized, so that the errors caused by the idiosyncrasies of one individual coder cannot have too great of an effect on the results. It does not account for another source of error, however, namely cultural bias. It is doubtful that such assignments of weights always accurately reflect the intensity attached to certain individuals in Communist China and the Soviet Union, for example. Although this would be a serious problem if we were attempting to assign absolute values to the attitudes of any country, it is not a major problem with comparative studies over time as any distortion in the dictionary would generally remain unchanged from one document to the next. This makes the dictionary a reliable instrument for time series analysis because any systematic error will at least be consistent.

(U) A further problem is that computer content analysis requires that all documents be rendered into English inasmuch as the dictionary for the content analysis program is in English. This means that some distortion can enter into the analysis from translation. This problem, hopefully, is minimized in the case of the Soviet Union and Communist China by taking all translated documents from one source (when possible) and by using the Soviets or Chinese own English translations whenever that was possible. Because we are primarily interested in making comparisons using several documents rather than in obtaining absolute values for any single document, this procedure should minimize the extent to which differences among individual documents could cause great distortion to the translations used. Again we assume that any remaining source of translation error is random, and that, over the entire set of documents, individual errors will tend to cancel one another out.

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(U) Another problem to be aware of is that of cultural variance in communication behavior. That is, do the Chinese and the Russians verbalize in the same manner? Does, for example, the word "hate" when used by both the Soviets and the Chinese have the same meaning? This, unfortunately, is an area in which little research has been done to guide us. That which has been done, however, would suggest that Osgood's three dimensions of human communication are valid across cultures.<sup>37</sup>

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<sup>37</sup> A recent study in this area, for example, noted that, "It seems fair to conclude that some marginal aspects of perception have been shown to differ in a manner which relates them to cultural contexts. But "culture" in the abstract cannot be considered as a sui generis determinant of these differences." Henri Tajfel, "Social and Cultural Factors in Perception," in Gardner Lindzey and Elliot Aronson, eds., The Handbook of Social Psychology, Vol. III, Reading, Mass: Addison Wesley, 1969, p. 379.

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### SECTION III

#### INTRODUCTION TO DATA ARRAYS AND METHODS OF ANALYSIS

##### A. DATA ARRAYS

(U) The research goals outlined in the preceding section dictated the nature of the data collected on Soviet and Chinese relations. These data basically were divisible into two sets: (1) measures of Soviet and Chinese national attributes; and (2) measures of direct Sino-Soviet interactions.

(U) In order to describe Soviet and Chinese internal development, data were collected on 17 of their national attributes. These measures include economic, military, political and demographic variables. The data were collected annually for the years 1950-1967. (See Volume VI, Data Codebook for a complete listing of all variables, definitions, scalings and sources used in study).

(U) In order to examine direct Sino-Soviet relations, data were collected on 31 Sino-Soviet interactions. These measures include aid and assistance, treaties, exchanges of personnel, trade and border activity. Again the data were collected annually for the years 1950-1967.

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(U) In addition to the variables already mentioned, several perception variables<sup>38</sup> derived from the content analysis of Soviet and Chinese statements are included in the attribute and interaction matrices (See Table 1). Seven variables measuring changing Soviet perceptions of the United States are included with the 17 Soviet national attributes and seven variables measuring Chinese perceptions of the United States are added to the 17 Chinese national attributes, a total, therefore, of 24 Soviet attributes and 24 Chinese attributes. Seven variables measuring Soviet perceptions of China and seven variables measuring Chinese perceptions of the Soviet Union are added to the 31 Sino-Soviet interaction variables, thus bringing the number of variables in this set to a total of 45.

<sup>38</sup> The primary source for the statements used in the content analysis were Jen-min Jih-pao (Peoples Daily) and Hung-chi (Red Flag) for the Chinese and Pravda and Izvestia for the Soviets. All statements considered for inclusion were made by the President, Party Chairman, Defense Minister or Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union or China or were official government notes of these two countries. The assumption being made here of course is that to a very great degree these officials define and articulate official policy and thus their statements represent each government's official position as it is being articulated to the rest of the world and to the masses within their own country. In addition to the above criteria, each statement to be considered for inclusion also had to be primarily concerned with Soviet or Chinese relations with the other or with the U.S. From the total set of statements which met the above criteria, six to eleven articles were sampled yearly (circa 10000 words) for both the Soviet Union and China toward each other and toward the U.S. with no more than two articles being selected from any one month within a given year. As Choucri has previously noted, however, and it also holds true for this study, the nature of the sample presents something of a problem in terms of the use of statistical tests. Strictly speaking, these statements have not been drawn at random. The population has been initially restricted, yet there is no reason to suspect that it is not normally distributed. A very severe problem would have arisen in terms of theoretical orientation and research procedures if we had adhered strictly to more conventional practice and introduced complete randomness in our sampling. References to issues and countries other than those of concern would have loaded our sample with non-relevant data. The cost of coding and processing such data would have far outweighed its minimal contribution. Hence, it was considered necessary to direct our sampling and focus only on those statements which fit our definition. Basically, then, we argue that the use of parametric tests are justifiable given the nature of the data. Yet in view of the unorthodox procedure the results of our statistical analyses should be interpreted with caution. (Choucri, Conflict Resolution, op. cit., p. 62).

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TABLE 1

PERCEPTUAL (CONTENT) VARIABLES

SOVIET, CHINESE PERCEPTIONS OF THE U.S. AS:

<u>Dimension</u>	<u>Variable</u>	
Potency	Strong	
	Weak	
Activity	Active	Threat Index (Strong x Active x Negative = Threat Index)*
	Passive	
Evaluative	Positive	4 1 1
	Negative	

SOVIET, CHINESE PERCEPTIONS OF EACH OTHER AS:

Potency	Strong	
	Weak	
Activity	Active	Threat Index (Strong x Active x Negative = Threat Index)*
	Passive	
Evaluative	Positive	4 1 1
	Negative	

\* The underlying assumption in the threat index is that threat is a combination of A's perception of B's strength, B's willingness to use it (their activeness) and their negativeness towards A. Thus the greater the product in absolute terms of a combination of these three variables the greater is A's perceptions of a threat from B.

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(U) The steps in the analysis of the national attributes and the interactions are presented in Figure 3. A matrix containing the differences between the Soviets and Chinese on their attributes is derived from the national attribute sets. In all cases, the difference was derived by subtracting the Chinese value from the Soviet value. Factor analysis was then performed separately on the three data sets--the national attributes, the differences, and the interactions. Factor scores were calculated and plotted over time and the factor dimensions of each correlation matrix were interpreted. The steps in each factor analysis carried out in this study are depicted in Figure 4. For each of these analyses, the descriptive statistics, correlation matrix, eigenvalues, orthogonally rotated factors and factor scores are included. Section IV contains the factor analyses and interpretation of the attribute data and the difference matrix. Section V contains the factor analyses and interpretation of the interaction data.

(U) A canonical regression and correlation was then performed on the factor scores from the attributed difference matrix and the factor scores from the interaction data in order to examine whether the differences between the Soviets and the Chinese on their national attributes relate to the interactions between them. The results of the canonical regression analysis is presented in Section VI.

(U) A variety of sources were utilized in the data collection. During the data collection effort conflicting values for the same variable were often discovered in different sources. When this occurred, we selected what was thought to be the most reliable source. When classified data were available, it was generally accepted as being the most reliable. There are no missing data because one of the primary requirements of the study was to obtain exact factor scores of the Soviets and Chinese on the dimensions of attributes and interactions. If data were missing, that variable was eliminated. This made it impossible to include all the variables that originally had been deemed important.<sup>39</sup> Hopefully, the attributes and interactions which have been retained are sufficient to describe the Sino-Soviet relationship.

(U) Very little coding was involved because the data was simply transcribed from secondary or tertiary sources. Checks of intercoder reliability were, therefore, irrelevant and unnecessary. However, several checks for clerical error were made.

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<sup>39</sup>See "Second Quarterly Report for Project TRIAD, " BSR 2581, Bendix Aerospace Systems Division, under Contract F44620-68-C-0083 for AFXDOC, USAF, January 6, 1969 (Confidential) for original list of variables selected for analysis.

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Soviet & Chinese  
National Attribute Data

Direct Sino-Soviet  
Interaction Data




FIGURE 3  
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF SINO-SOVIET NATIONAL ATTRIBUTES AND  
INTERACTIONS

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


FIGURE 4  
STEPS IN THE FACTOR ANALYSIS OF SINO-SOVIET NATIONAL ATTRIBUTE  
AND INTERACTION DATA

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B. METHODS OF ANALYSIS

(U) Two methods of analysis were used in this study; component factor analysis and canonical regression and correlation analysis. A brief description of each is given below.

1. Component Factor Analysis<sup>40</sup>

(U) Component factor analysis is a model which delimits independent patterns of interrelationships. Component factor analysis was used in this study for two primary reasons: the need for parsimony of description, and the need for independent predictive variables. The need for parsimony of description is widely accepted as one of the primary functions of any science, no less so in the behavioral sciences where parsimony is a difficult ideal to achieve. It is also essential for policy planners if they are to work with a manageable number of concepts. Since component factor analysis extracts factors in the order of their relative importance, we were also able to eliminate those dynamic patterns which were of little consequence. In fact, among all of our studies, the maximum number of factors retained was six while the minimum percent of variance explained by these delineated factors never fell below 75 percent of the total variance for all observed measures.

(U) The purposes of this study went far beyond description of dynamic patterns and here again we find factor analysis to be an important tool. With the increased interest in predictive or dynamic modeling involving simple linear regression techniques, we find increased concern over the difficult problem of multicollinearity the problem of correlated or interrelated predictor variables. Multicollinearity is a vexing problem in regression analysis, for if it is present the regressions (prediction equations) can lead to false inferences and poor predictions. Component factor analysis determines a minimum set of statistically independent dimensions (patterns) which retain the information in the original data. In place of the original data for regression analysis, we can then use these more parsimonious dimensions as predictors, and since they are uncorrelated we sidestep the problem of multicollinearity all together.

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<sup>40</sup> For a good description of factor analysis see, Harry Harman, Modern Factor Analysis, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967; Raymond Gattell, Factor Analysis, New York: Harper and Brothers, 1952; R.J. Rummel, Applied Factor Analysis, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1969; and Jack Vincent, "Factor Analysis as a Research Tool in International Relations," paper presented at the Sixty-fifth Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York City, September 2-6, 1969.

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## 2. Canonical Regression and Correlation<sup>41</sup>

(U) Canonical regression and correlation is relatively new in its application to this type of work. The canonical model as developed by Hotelling, Horst and others is a particular type of factor analysis where the criteria of factoring is that the factors, called canonical variates, be derived so that they maximize the linear relationships between observed variables from two sets of data (that is, maximize the prediction of one set of data from another set). Another way of looking at canonical regression is as an extension of the multiple regression model. In multiple regression, one considers the dependence of a single variable on a set of variables, usually called the independent variables or predictors. In canonical regression, one is now concerned with the dependence of two or more variables on some other set of variables, called the independent set. Since the variables in both the dependent and independent sets of variables may vary along more than one dimension, in canonical regression we determine the dimensions of variation within each set first, and then the relationships between the dimensions of each set are found. Since the determination of the dimension within each set is in effect a component factor analysis, we have the analogy of canonical regression to factor analysis used previously.

(U) Canonical correlation and regression is thus a transformation, simultaneously, of two sets of factor scores to a new solution which relates the two sets maximally. The new rotation results in an orthogonal inter-set correlation matrix with the canonical correlations in the diagonals of the correlation matrix. Thus each association between patterns is a partial relationship since the derived variates are related only to that one variate from the other set. That the sum of squares over the original factors in the canonical beta weight matrices are unity demonstrates that the canonical solution is a true rotation, just as varimax was a true rotation of the unrotated factor loading matrix. Knowing this, and knowing the canonically derived factor scores--which are rotations of the original varimax factor scores--we can derive the new canonically rotated factor loading matrix by inversely rotating the varimax factor loading matrix using the beta regression weights as the matrix of rotation.

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<sup>41</sup> For a more detailed discussion of canonical regression see Donald F. Morrison, Multivariate Statistical Methods, New York: McGraw Hill, 1967; J. W. Hooper, "Simultaneous Equations and Canonical Correlation Theory," Econometrica, Vol. XXVII, 1959, pp. 245-256, and Warren Phillips and Dennis Hall, The Importance of Governmental Structure as a Taxonomic Scheme for Nations, DON Report, No. 18, University of Hawaii, January 1969

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## SECTION IV

### SOVIET AND CHINESE NATIONAL ATTRIBUTE ANALYSIS

#### A. DESCRIPTION OF DATA

(U) As discussed in Section II, R. J. Rummel in his research on the Dimensionality of Nations Project<sup>42</sup> and as part of his field theory of social action<sup>43</sup> devised two analytical categories to indicate the domains in which variables function. These two categories are the behavioral system (space) and the attribute system (space). The behavioral system encompasses the behavior of governments and sub-national groups in nations toward each other. The attribute system comprises those characteristics of a nation that distinguishes it from other nations. The theory is that the Euclidean distance between two nations in the space of their attributes are forces acting on the location of the dyad in the behavior space.

(U) In this section we report the results of the attribute space analysis for the Soviet Union and China across the time span 1950-1967. In Section V, Soviet and Chinese interactions are examined. Because one of our goals is to predict from Soviet and Chinese national attributes to the interactions between these two nations, it is necessary first to identify patterns in their attributes.

(U) Since the characteristics of a nation are too numerous and diffuse to allow the inclusion of all possible measures in the study, a selection process was undertaken to choose the most important and relevant indicators. Much of the traditional and quantitative literature was surveyed for suggestions on important indicators.<sup>44</sup>

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<sup>42</sup>See R. J. Rummel, The DON Project: A Five Year Research Program, op. cit.,

<sup>43</sup>See R. J. Rummel, "A Social Field Theory of Conflict," Peace Research Society Papers, IV, 1965, pp. 131-150. See also R. J. Rummel, "Indicators of International Behavior," paper presented at 1969 American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, New York, September, 1969.

<sup>44</sup>See Section II of this volume for a discussion of past research surveyed and utilized in the selection of variables and methods of analysis for this study.

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(U) Although the work done by Rummel<sup>45</sup> and others<sup>46</sup> was useful in the identification of the important "physical" attributes of nations, all of the variables deemed to be important by them were not included in this study. The closed nature of the Chinese and Soviet systems causes severe problems in the availability of data thus eliminating the use of several variables. Moreover, some of the suggested variables such as descriptors of the political system of a country were basically irrelevant to the study. The attributes finally selected are generally considered as adequate indicators of the physical characteristics of a nation.

(U) Although not included in previous works, perceptual variables were added to this study, first because of the importance that both the Soviets and Chinese place on verbal and written communication, and secondly because there is strong support for the view that the perceptions of a nation influence the behavior of that nation.<sup>47</sup> With the inclusion of the perception variables, we can discover if the perceptions of the Soviets and Chinese relate to changes in their interactive behavior or if their perceptions are isolated on their own dimensions with no relationship to "reality." The perception variables in this study were obtained from a content analysis of selected Soviet and Chinese official statements about each other.

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<sup>45</sup>See R. J. Rummel, "Some Attributes and Behavioral Patterns of Nations," Journal of Peace Research, No. 2, 1967, pp. 196 -206; and "Indicators of Cross-National and International Patterns," op. cit.

<sup>46</sup>See, for example, Jack Sawyer, "Dimensions of Nations: Size, Wealth and Politics," American Journal of Sociology, Vol. LXXIII, September, 1967 pp. 145-172.

<sup>47</sup>See, for example, the work by Ole Holsti, David Findlay, and Richard Fagen, Enemies in Politics, Chicago: Rand McNally, 1967; Richard Brody, "Cognition and Behavior: A Model of Inter-State Relations," in O. Harvey, ed., Experience, Structure and Adaptability, New York: Springer Publishing Co., 1966; Ole Holsti, Richard Brody and Robert North, Theory and Measurement of Interstate Behavior: A Research Application of Content Analysis, Stanford, California: Studies in International Conflict and Integration, 1964; P. Terrence Hopmann, International Conflict and Cohesion in International and Political Coalitions, Stanford University, 1969, unpublished Ph. D. dissertation; and Nazli Choucri, "The Perceptual Base of Nonalignment," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. XIII, No. 1, March 1969, pp. 55-74.

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(U) Within the space of all national attributes, we finally selected a subspace of 48 attributes to measure the Soviet Union and China. This sub-space is composed of two sets of 24 variables each: one set describes national attributes of the Soviet Union, the other set describes national attributes of Communist China (See Figure 5).

(U) Each set contains two groups of variables, 17 "physical" variables and 7 perception variables. The 17 physical variables include economic, military, demographic, and political measures. Data were collected for the Soviets and the Chinese on each of these variables by year, for the period 1950-1967. The 7 perception variables are measures of Soviet and Chinese publicly and officially stated perceptions of the United States by year, for the period 1950-1967. Table 2 lists the names for the set of 24 Soviet variables and Table 3 lists the names for the set of 24 Chinese variables. Also included are the eight character computer code names.

(U) As previously discussed, Rummel defines one property of the attribute space as the distance vector<sup>48</sup> between points in the space. In this analysis, the Euclidean distances between each point in the set of Soviet attributes and each corresponding point in the set of Chinese attributes are calculated and presented as the Difference Matrix. Table 4 lists the names for the variables contained in the Difference Matrix.

(U) Besides the perception variables mentioned above, 14 other perception variables were derived from the content analysis. Seven of these variable measure Soviet perceptions of the Chinese and 7 measure Chinese perceptions of the Soviets. By combining the 7 Soviet perception variables with the set of Soviet attributes we created an enhanced set of 31 Soviet variables, and in a similar manner by combining the 7 Chinese perception variables with the set of Chinese attributes we created an enhanced set of 31 Chinese variables. (See Figure 5.) The variable names and computer acronyms for these additional perception variables are presented in Table 5.

## B. ANALYSIS OF SOVIET AND CHINESE NATIONAL ATTRIBUTES

(U) Component factor analysis was used to examine Soviet and Chinese national attributes. Factor analysis has been defined as a "means by which the regularity and order in phenomena can be discerned." It can take almost any number of measurements and observations and resolve them into their distinct patterns of occurrence. It is therefore most appropriate for our purpose in this section to use factor analysis to systematically discover the patterns of Soviet and Chinese attributes across time.

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<sup>48</sup> It is this distance vector between two points which is theorized to predict the interactions between those two nations.



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	<u>SOVIET UNION</u>	<u>COMMUNIST CHINA</u>
PHYSICAL ATTRIBUTES	17 VARIABLES	17 VARIABLES
PERCEPTIONS OF EACH OTHER	of CC: 7 VARIABLES	of SU: 7 VARIABLES 1
PERCEPTIONS OF UNITED STATES	7 VARIABLES	7 VARIABLES

FIGURE 5  
SUB-SPACE OF NATIONAL ATTRIBUTES

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TABLE 2

SOVIET NATIONAL ATTRIBUTES: ACRONYM TABLE

<u>Variable Name</u>	<u>Eight Character Computer Code Name</u>
Soviet Economic Aid to Less Developed Countries	SEAIDLDC
Soviet Gross National Product	SOV GNP
Soviet Exports	SOV EXPT
Soviet Imports	SOV IMPT
Soviet Imports/GNP	SIMP/GNP
Soviet Exports/GNP	SEXP/GNP
Soviet Energy Consumption	SENY CON
Soviet Agricultural Production	SAGR PRO
Soviet Steel Production	SSTL PRO
Soviet Population	SOV POPN
Soviet Defense Budget	SDEF BUD
Soviet Defense Budget/GNP	SDEF/GNP
Soviet Fighter Aircraft	SFGT AIR
Soviet Armed Forces	SARM FOR
Soviet Submarines	SOV SUBS
Soviet ICBM's Deployed	SICBM DP
Soviet Treaties	SOV TRET
The United States Perceived as Strong	SU ST US
The United States Perceived as Weak	SU WK US
The United States Perceived as Active	SU AC US
The United States Perceived as Passive	SU PA US
The United States Perceived as Positive	SU PO US
The United States Perceived as Negative	SU NG US
Perceived Threat from the United States	SU TP US

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TABLE 3

CHINESE NATIONAL ATTRIBUTES: ACRONYM TABLE

<u>Variable Name</u>	<u>Eight Character Computer Code Name</u>
Chinese Economic Aid to Less Developed Countries	CEAIDLDC
Chinese Gross National Product	CPR GNP
Chinese Exports	CPR EXPT
Chinese Imports	CPR IMPT
Chinese Imports/GNP	CIMP/GNP
Chinese Exports/GNP	CEXP/GNP
Chinese Energy Consumption	CENY CON
Chinese Agricultural Production	CAGR PRO
Chinese Steel Production	CSTL PRO
Chinese Population	CPR POPN
Chinese Defense Budget	CDEF BUD
Chinese Defense Budget/GNP	CDEF/GNP
Chinese Fighter Aircraft	CGFT AIR
Chinese Armed Forces	CARM FOR
Chinese Submarines	CPR SUBS
Chinese ICBM's Deployed*	CPR TRET
Chinese Treaties	CC TRET
The United States Perceived as Strong	CC ST US
The United States Perceived as Weak	CC WK US
The United States Perceived as Active	CC AC US
The United States Perceived as Passive	CC PA US
The United States Perceived as Positive	CC PO US
The United States Perceived as Negative	CC NG US
Perceived Threat from the United States	CC TP US

\* Deleted for attribute analysis because of zero variance but included in Difference Matrix.

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TABLE 4

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE SOVIETS AND CHINESE ON 24  
ATTRIBUTES: ACRONYM TABLE

<u>Variable Name</u>	<u>Eight Character Computer Printout Name</u>
Economic Aid to Less Developed Countries	ECONAID
Gross National Product	GNP
Exports	EXPORTS
Imports	IMPORTS
Imports/GNP	IMPT/GNP
Exports/GNP	EXPT/GNP
Energy Consumption	ENERGY
Agricultural Production	AGRICPRO
Steel Production	STEEL PR
Population	POPULTN
Defense Budget	DEFNCBUD
Defense Budget/GNP	DEFC/GNP
Fighter Aircraft	FIGHTERS
Armed Forces	ARMFORCE
Submarines	SUBMARIN
ICBM's Deployed	ICBMS
Treaties	TREATIES
The United States Perceived as Strong	STRG US
The United States Perceived as Weak	WEAK US
The United States Perceived as Active	ACTV US
The United States Perceived as Passive	PASS US
The United States Perceived as Positive	POST US
The United States Perceived as Negative	NEG US
Perceived Threat from the United State	TPER US

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TABLE 5

PERCEPTION VARIABLES FROM INTERACTION SET:  
ACRONYM TABLE

<u>Variable Name</u>	<u>Eight Character Computer Printout Name</u>
The Soviet Union Perceived as Strong by China	CC ST SU
The Soviet Union Perceived as Weak by China	CC WK SU
The Soviet Union Perceived as Active by China	CC AC SU
The Soviet Union Perceived as Passive by China	CC PA SU
The Soviet Union Perceived as Positive by China	CC PO SU
The Soviet Union Perceived as Negative by China	CC NG SU
Perceived Threat from the Soviet Union by China	CC TP SU
China is Perceived as Strong by the Soviet Union	SU ST CC
China is Perceived as Weak by the Soviet Union	SU WK CC
China is Perceived as Active by the Soviet Union	SU AC CC
China is Perceived as Passive by the Soviet Union	SU PA CC
China is Perceived Positively by the Soviet Union	SU PO CC
China is Perceived Negatively by the Soviet Union	SU NG CC
Perceived Threat from China by the Soviet Union	SU TP CC

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(U) The analysis of Soviet and Chinese attributes is divided into four sections. The first section, "Soviet National Attributes," contains the results from two factor analyses; analysis of the enhanced set of 31 Soviet variables and the analysis of a part of that set, the group of 17 Soviet physical attributes. The second section, "Chinese National Attributes," contains the results from two factor analyses: the analysis of the enhanced set of 30 Chinese variables<sup>49</sup> and the analysis of a part of that set, the group of 16 Chinese physical attributes.<sup>49</sup> In the third section, we report the results of a factor analysis performed on the sub-space of Soviet and Chinese attributes as a whole, i.e., on the sets of Soviet and Chinese attributes combined. Section 4 is divided into four parts. The Difference Matrix is partitioned into 3 sub-matrices; the difference in the 17 physical variables comprise one sub-matrix; the differences in just the nine economic variables comprise another sub-matrix and the differences in the six military variables form the third submatrix. Factor analyses were then performed separately on the complete Difference Matrix and on each of the three sub-matrices.

(U) Component factor analysis of the Soviet and Chinese attributes has revealed that the most significant attribute pattern for both countries between 1950 and 1967 has been industrialization. Industrialization is found in every attribute analysis as the first and strongest factor, always characterized by growth and change across time. The other factors revealed by the analysis are much less stable and refer to defense postures, agricultural production, and such things as the perception of an American threat. Each analysis resulted in an extremely parsimonious description-- only three or four factors were needed to explain at least 75% of the variance.

1. Soviet National Attributes

(U) Statistics for the 31 Soviet national attribute variables are presented in Table 6. Most of the measures were distributed normally across time from 1950 to 1967, although the values for "treaties signed" (Variable 17), "economic assistance to the

<sup>49</sup>The national attribute variable measuring ICBM's deployed was dropped from the set of Chinese physical attributes as it exhibited no variance over time-- that is, the value was zero (0) for all years.

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TABLE 6

17 SOVIET NATIONAL ATTRIBUTES AND 14 PERCEPTION VARIABLES 1950 - 1967

## STATISTICS

VARIABLE NO. NAME	MEAN	SE	ST DEV	SE	SKEW	KURTOSIS
1 SLAIDLUC	350.944	89.094	377.996	302139.187	1.151*	0.154
2 SCV GNP	239.444	15.935	67.606	28218.543	0.198	0.106
3 SUV EXPT	5225.887	553.355	2303.988	32773520.000	C.322	0.099
4 SUV TPT	4523.719	513.007	2170.506	29247164.000	0.113	0.091
5 SUMP/GRP	19.503	0.944	4.003	98.955	-C.316	0.119
6 SFXP/GRP	25.611	0.886	3.759	87.219	-C.236	0.102
7 SCNY CUN	577436.375	46857.168	198790.125	243996785536.000	C.210	0.109
8 SAGP PRO	102376.750	3859.335	16373.773	1655238400.000	0.534	0.134
9 SSTL HEN	61081.941	5348.051	22687.859	317853120.000	C.299	0.191
10 SUV PDP4	208093.312	4307.905	18270.473	2062281983.000	-C.130	0.104
11 SUVF AUD	16172.219	395.946	1679.856	17422352.000	-C.363	0.195
12 SUVF/GRP	715.853	36.580	155.194	148701.562	5.653	0.112
13 SFGT AIR	9216.664	631.059	2880.990	51547240.000	-C.463	0.112
14 SARR FUR	4283.219	200.176	1103.832	7522624.000	0.628	0.082
15 SOVSURS	23.503	4.726	28.535	5637.137	C.951	0.119
16 SICRM DP	155.556	45.214	191.825	227182.250	2.586**	0.378
17 SUV TRF	12.944	2.271	9.635	573.129	1.232*	0.181
18 SU ST US	3815.943	100.575	425.702	1124119.000	-1.416**	0.268
19 SU WK US	410.667	60.000	293.124	530475.250	2.216**	0.347
20 SU AC US	3933.278	119.870	568.684	1547565.000	2.196**	0.421
21 SU PA US	915.111	74.719	338.220	706256.125	0.319	0.099
22 SU PD US	1611.278	99.483	422.094	1094972.000	0.655	0.120
23 SU NG US	2574.803	99.850	381.243	597302.812	-0.021	0.274
24 SU TP US	3857.632	2579.465	10943.875	739443712.000	1.031	0.253
25 SU ST CC	3844.222	81.073	343.962	739441.187	C.476	0.130
26 SU WK CC	219.556	22.318	96.807	57859.691	0.776	0.147
27 SU AC CC	3134.885	70.120	331.437	678212.312	0.363	0.129
28 SU PA CC	377.000	40.006	169.730	177859.750	1.619**	0.284
29 SU PD CC	3036.833	149.487	634.219	2683370.000	-0.808	0.127
30 SU NG CC	966.000	123.534	524.112	1695942.000	0.779	0.106
31 SU TP CC	11739.164	1581.034	6710.305	27800192000.000	0.867	0.121

SE - SKEW = 0.536  
 SE - KURTOSIS = 1.028  
 \* SIGNIFICANT AT .05 LEVEL  
 \*\* SIGNIFICANT AT .01 LEVEL

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ninety less developed nations" (Variable 1), "number of ICBM's deployed" (Variable 16), and several of the perception variables were outliers for certain years. Table 7 shows the Pearson product moment correlations between these 31 measures.<sup>50</sup> The fact that the economic variables are highly intercorrelated indicates that a steady and balanced pattern of industrialization may emerge for the Soviets.

a. Seventeen Soviet Attributes

(U) The correlations presented in Table 7 were factored twice; first, factoring only the 17 physical variables and second factoring all 31 variables (the 17 plus the 14 perception variables). The table of positive eigenvalues for the 17 variables is shown in Table 8. Two factors are sufficient to explain 87.4 percent of the total variance in these 17 variables. These two factors were then rotated to an orthogonal simple structure.<sup>51</sup> The rotated factor matrix is shown in Table 9. The predominant factor, which we named Industrialization accounts for almost seventy percent of total variance. This factor is a clustering of the variables, Soviet "GNP," "trade," "energy consumption," and "steel production." Since this pattern exhibits steady growth, "population" also appears as a high loading variable. Noteworthy is the fact that "Soviet defense budget as a percent of GNP" and "Soviet men under arms" are inversely related to industrialization. This when seen in the light of the positive loadings of "submarines with a nuclear launch capability" and number of "ICBM's deployed" would indicate a changing defense stature for the Soviets during the period 1950-1967. That is, as time passed the Soviets decreased their dependence and expenditures on conventional military forces and increased their capability in strategic nuclear delivery systems. The plot of scores for this factor is presented in Figure 6. The slight drop in the pattern between 1966 and 1967 is due to increased Soviet defense expenditures, an increase in the size of the armed forces, and a slight fall in agricultural production in 1967.

(U) The second orthogonally rotated factor from Table 9 accounts for about twenty percent of total variance. This factor named Nuclear Transition indicates that the total number of "Soviet treaties signed" and the number of "Soviet fighter

<sup>50</sup> The coefficient of correlation expresses the degree of relationship between the row and column variables of the matrix. The closer the coefficient is to zero the less the relationship; the closer to  $\pm 1.0$ , the greater the relationship. A negative sign indicates the variables are inversely related.

<sup>51</sup> Orthogonal as used here means independent. Thus, the aim of the orthogonal rotation is to obtain a set of factors which has the property that any given factor will be highly correlated with some of the variables but uncorrelated with the rest.



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TABLE 7

17 SOVIET NATIONAL ATTRIBUTES AND 14 PERCEPTION VARIABLES 1950 - 1967

## CORRELATIONS

NO. VARIABLE	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
1 SEADLOC	SEAIDLOC	SOV GNP	SOV EXPT	SUV IMPT	STMP/GNP	SEXP/GNP	SENY CON	SAGR PRQ	SSTL PRQ	SOV POPN	SDEF BUD	SDEF/GNP
2 SOV GNP	0.6329	1.0000										
3 SOV EXPT	0.6158	0.9911	1.0000									
4 SOV IMPT	0.6556	0.9852	0.9898	1.0000								
5 STMP/GNP	0.6300	0.9210	0.9134	0.9052	1.0000							
6 SEXP/GNP	0.5980	0.9279	0.9567	0.9623	0.9729	1.0000						
7 SENY CON	0.6428	0.9949	0.9861	0.9792	0.9170	0.9195	1.0000					
8 SAGR PRQ	0.5910	0.7409	0.6834	0.6619	0.5715	0.5748	0.7443	1.0000				
9 SSTL PRQ	0.6219	0.9968	0.9968	0.9907	0.9282	0.9412	0.9407	0.7051	1.0000			
10 SOV POPN	0.6432	0.5925	0.9853	0.9909	0.9537	0.9512	0.9878	0.7159	0.9900	1.0000		
11 SDEF BUD	0.4038	0.8382	0.8559	0.8887	0.8042	0.8448	0.8281	0.6083	0.8520	0.8290	1.0000	
12 SDEF/GNP	-0.6581	-0.9193	-0.8398	-0.9093	-0.8603	-0.8307	-0.9165	-0.6758	-0.9024	-0.9288	-0.5786	1.0000
13 SFGT AIR	-0.2000	-0.4878	-0.5350	-0.4838	-0.3172	-0.3912	-0.4758	-0.2409	-0.5289	-0.4109	-0.4668	0.2986
14 SARM FUR	-0.6627	-0.8749	-0.8554	-0.8727	-0.8523	-0.8244	-0.8929	-0.6999	-0.8576	-0.8971	-0.5473	0.9444
15 SOVSUBS	0.5138	0.9257	0.9507	0.9270	0.8221	0.8627	0.9186	0.5849	0.9450	0.8980	0.8173	-0.7888
16 SICM DP	0.3223	0.7813	0.7867	0.7157	0.5483	0.6229	0.7058	0.6014	0.7872	0.7085	0.7545	-0.5801
17 SGV TRFT	0.0126	-0.0453	-0.1241	-0.0985	-0.0425	-0.1080	-0.0158	0.3631	-0.0992	0.0054	-0.1861	-0.1261
18 SU ST US	0.0847	-0.0213	0.0016	0.0256	0.0317	-0.0079	0.0004	-0.0606	-0.0066	-0.0417	0.0639	0.1202
19 SU WK US	-0.2634	-0.4175	-0.4802	-0.4602	-0.4283	-0.5138	-0.3920	-0.0140	-0.4410	-0.4003	-0.2746	0.3911
20 SU AC US	-0.1346	-0.1477	-0.1163	-0.1094	-0.0705	-0.0730	-0.1736	-0.2534	-0.1250	-0.1508	0.0164	0.2483
21 SU PA US	-0.0949	-0.1966	-0.2620	-0.2345	-0.2132	-0.2646	-0.1911	-0.0532	-0.2179	-0.1726	-0.2309	0.0581
22 SU PU US	0.6804	0.6700	0.6867	0.7203	0.7209	0.7218	0.6779	0.2680	0.6755	0.6969	0.4692	-0.6934
23 SU HS US	-0.5157	-0.2335	-0.2135	-0.2302	-0.2799	-0.2686	-0.2687	-0.2847	-0.2007	-0.2703	-0.1658	0.2508
24 SU TP US	-0.2893	-0.2184	-0.1810	-0.1776	-0.1752	-0.1887	-0.2387	-0.3290	-0.1857	-0.2481	-0.0658	0.3130

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TABLE 7 - cont'd -

17 SOVIET NATIONAL ATTRIBUTES AND 14 PERCEPTION VARIABLES 1950 - 1967													
CORRELATIONS													
NO.	VARIABLE	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
	SEAIDLC	SIV GNP	SIV EXPT	SIV IMPT	SIMP/GNP	SEXP/GNP	SENY CON	SAGR PRO	SSTL PRO	SUV POPN	SDEF	BUD	SDEF/GNP
25	SU SF CC	-0.2788	-0.6543	-0.6433	-0.6235	-0.5304	-0.5571	-0.6534	-0.5384	-0.6522	-0.6577	-0.3640	0.7164
26	SU WK CC	0.2505	0.7107	0.7413	0.7053	0.6135	0.6611	0.7361	0.4747	0.7260	0.6805	0.6501	-0.5713
27	SU AC CC	0.1866	0.4589	0.4350	0.4429	0.3166	0.3493	0.4502	0.3282	0.4922	0.3930	0.6112	-0.1991
28	SU PA CC	0.1060	0.5803	0.6103	0.6062	0.6008	0.6445	0.5573	0.3037	0.5935	0.6002	0.4813	-0.5555
29	SU PT CC	-0.3554	-0.6662	-0.6935	-0.6531	-0.5469	-0.5563	-0.6762	-0.4453	-0.6854	-0.6252	-0.6755	0.4874
30	SU US CC	0.2934	0.7002	0.7391	0.7095	0.5992	0.6158	0.7044	0.3649	0.7295	0.6572	0.6142	-0.5552
31	SU TP CC	0.3097	0.6786	0.7119	0.6842	0.5652	0.5838	0.6842	0.3748	0.7089	0.6264	0.6427	-0.4946

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TABLE 7 - cont'd-

17 SOVIET NATIONAL ATTRIBUTES AND 14 PERCEPTION VARIABLES 1960 - 1967												
CORRELATIONS												
NO. VARIABLE	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24
	SFGT AIR	SARM FOR	SOVSUNS	SICRM DP	SUV TRFT	SU S1	SU WK	SU AC	SU PA	SU PO	SU NG	SU TP
13 SFGT AIR	1.0000											
14 SARM FOR	0.2073	1.0000										
15 SOVSUNS	-0.7632	-0.7160	1.0000									
16 SICRM DP	-0.7739	-0.5170	0.8765	1.0000								
17 SUV TRFT	0.4773	-0.2579	-0.3473	-0.3194	1.0000							
18 SU S1	-0.1474	0.0509	0.0510	0.1076	-0.1680	1.0000						
19 SU WK	0.4778	0.3357	-0.5340	-0.3993	0.5834	-0.0700	1.0000					
20 SU AC	-0.1250	0.2495	-0.0489	-0.0644	-0.3499	0.2589	-0.3715	1.0000				
21 SU PA	0.3909	0.1361	-0.3114	-0.3211	0.2610	-0.6799	0.4913	-0.5879	1.0000			
22 SU PO	-0.1721	-0.6645	0.5935	0.5772	-0.1427	0.1903	-0.4730	-0.2819	-0.1628	1.0000		
23 SU NG	-0.3465	0.3372	-0.0137	-0.0018	-0.3591	0.0764	-0.0081	0.2961	-0.1680	-0.5028	1.0000	
24 SU TP	-0.2797	0.3314	-0.0301	-0.0016	-0.4516	0.5918	-0.2487	0.7854	-0.6530	-0.3150	0.6711	1.0000
25 SU ST	0.3704	0.7129	-0.6194	-0.4826	-0.2599	0.3021	0.1630	0.1714	0.1021	-0.2559	0.0184	0.2628
26 SU WK	-0.6479	-0.5340	0.7026	0.7319	-0.1811	0.0670	-0.2954	-0.2335	-0.2042	0.4033	-0.0958	-0.1556
27 SU AC	-0.0455	-0.1124	0.6672	0.7295	-0.5177	0.1212	-0.1097	0.1381	-0.2512	0.0094	0.2799	0.2432
28 SU PA	-0.2558	-0.5159	0.5076	0.4392	0.0477	0.0117	-0.3225	-0.2626	-0.1077	0.4681	-0.0656	-0.1855
29 SU PO	0.7202	0.4205	-0.7722	-0.7607	0.2906	-0.0728	0.1287	0.1115	0.1481	-0.3362	0.0741	0.0821
30 SU NG	-0.8242	-0.4945	0.8560	0.7630	-0.4005	0.1433	-0.3222	-0.1826	-0.1939	0.4232	0.0695	-0.0200
31 SU TP	-0.8640	-0.4305	0.8515	0.8020	-0.4581	0.1981	-0.3045	-0.1423	-0.2322	0.3921	0.0688	0.0241

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TABLE 7 -cont'd

1/ SOVIET NATIONAL AFFINITIES AND 16 PERCEPTION VARIABLES 1958 - 1967													
CORRELATIONS													
NO.	VARIABLE	25	26	27	28	29	30	31					
		SU ST CC	SU ST CC	SU WK CC	SU AC CC	SU PA CC	SU PO CC	SU NG CC	SU TP CC				
25	SU ST CC	1.0000											
26	SU WK CC	-0.6669	1.0000										
27	SU AC CC	-0.2969	0.6420	1.0000									
28	SU PA CC	-0.5813	0.7227	0.1992	1.0000								
29	SU PO CC	0.5553	-0.8577	-0.0456	-0.4037	1.0000							
30	SU NG CC	-0.5609	0.8774	0.7370	0.5891	-0.8787	1.0000						
31	SU TP CC	-0.4703	0.8525	0.8110	0.4919	-0.8956	0.9862	1.0000					

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TABLE 8

17 Soviet National attributes

TABLE OF POSITIVE EIGENVALUES

NO.	EIGENVALUE	PERCENT OF COMMUNALITY	
		ALL ( 17 ) FACTORS	Each Cumulative
1	12.712	74.8	74.8
2	2.167	12.6	87.4
3	6.786	4.6	92.0
4	0.642	3.8	95.8
5	0.427	2.5	98.3
6	0.119	0.7	99.0
7	0.071	0.4	99.4
8	0.052	0.3	99.7
9	0.025	0.1	99.9
10	0.012	0.1	100.0
11	0.004	0.0	100.0
12	0.002	0.0	100.0
13	0.001	0.0	100.0
14	0.001	0.0	100.0
15	0.000	0.0	100.0
16	0.000	0.0	100.0
17	0.000	0.0	100.0

TRACE OF ORIGINAL MATRIX =

COMMUNALITY OVER 17 FACTORS = 17.030

17.000

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TABLE 9

17 SOVIET NATIONAL ATTRIBUTES		1950 - 1967	
VARIABLE NO.	NAME	ROTATED FACTOR MATRIX	
		1*	2**
SUM SQUARES OVER VARIABLES		11.534	3.322
PERCENT OF TOTAL VARIANCE		67.861	19.542
COMMUNALITY			
2 FACTORS			
1	SEATCLDC	0.501	-0.021
2	SUV GNP	0.952	0.303
3	SCV EXPT	0.593	0.372
4	SCV IMPT	0.582	0.316
5	SIMP/GNP	0.881	0.196
6	SEXP/GNP	0.889	0.286
7	SENY CUN	0.929	0.281
8	SAGR PKO	0.841	0.069
9	SSIL PRO	0.932	0.355
10	SCV POPN	0.980	0.231
11	SOLF HUD	0.743	0.450
12	SDEF/GNP	0.735	-0.056
13	SFGT AIK	0.940	-0.894
14	SARM FOR	-0.236	0.066
15	SGV SUBS	0.940	0.614
16	SICM DP	0.761	0.058
17	SUV TRET	0.556	-0.888
		0.224	

Factor Names:

\* Industrialization

\*\* Nuclear Transition

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High Loading Variables

Soviet GNP .95  
 Soviet Energy .95  
 Consumption .93  
 Soviet Steel Production .93  
 Soviet Armed Forces -.95

Factor Scores  
 3  
 2  
 1  
 0  
 -1  
 -2




FIGURE 6

SEVENTEEN SOVIET ATTRIBUTES: FACTOR 1  
SOVIET INDUSTRIALIZATION

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aircraft" varied together across time. The plot of scores for this factor is presented in Figure 7. Both treaties and fighter aircraft continued to increase in number until 1957-1959 -- note that their signs are negative -- and then fell off. This reduction corresponded to an increase in missile-launching submarines and ICBM's deployed during the post 1957 period. Because there were no missile submarines and ICBM's prior to this time, these variables loaded only moderately on the factor.

b. Thirty-One Soviet Attributes

(U) When the analysis of Soviet attributes is expanded to include both their perceptions of the US and Communist China, a more complex factor structure is obtained. The table of positive eigenvalues (Table 10) indicates that five or even six factors are now needed to explain the same amount of variance (87.4%) as was previously explained by only two factors. It was discovered, however, that most of the high loadings on the fourth, fifth, and sixth factors consisted of Soviet perceptions that had already loaded on the first three factors. We felt justified, therefore, in dropping the additional factors in the interest of parsimony.

(U) Table 11 shows the rotated factor matrix for a three factor solution. The first factor accounting for a little over 40 percent of total variance in the 31 measures, is our familiar Industrialization pattern. (Recall that it accounted for almost 68 percent of the total variance in the previous analysis.) The plot of scores for this factor is presented in Figure 8. Note that the Soviets viewed the US more positively as they developed industrially. This would seem to lend empirical support to those who suggest that as the Soviets have become more prosperous (i. e., industrialized) they also have become more of a status-quo power and are less bellicose in their behavior.

(U) The second factor is similar to the 17 Soviet attributes' Soviet Nuclear Transition factor, but it has interesting loadings on the Soviet perceptual variables of China. We labeled this factor Soviet Nuclear Transition and Perception of China as a Paper Tiger. The pattern is plotted in Figure 9. Soviet perceptions of Peking as "weak," "active," "negative," and simultaneously as a potential "threat" describe a pattern of generally decreasing magnitude until about 1957 when a transition seems to have taken place. This lasted until 1960 when a sharp upswing occurred. What is surprising about this factor is the fact that the Soviets perceived the CPR as negative and active at the same time as they perceived them as weak. This is contrary to expected behavior if one accepts the Newcomb model's

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


FIGURE 7

SEVENTEEN SOVIET ATTRIBUTES: FACTOR 2  
SOVIET NUCLEAR TRANSITION

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14-20

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TABLE 10  
31 Soviet Attributes and Perception Variables  
FACTS OF RELATIVE EIGENVALUES

NO.	EIGENVALUE	PERCENT OF COMMUNALITY	
		ALL ( 14 ) FACTORS	Each Cumulative
1	10.857	34.5	34.5
2	9.726	15.2	49.7
3	7.561	11.3	61.0
4	1.476	4.8	65.8
5	1.343	4.5	70.3
6	1.259	3.9	74.2
7	0.776	2.5	76.7
8	0.672	2.1	78.8
9	0.559	1.6	80.4
10	0.497	0.9	81.3
11	0.427	0.7	82.0
12	0.192	0.3	82.3
13	0.105	0.3	82.6
14	0.075	0.1	82.7
15	0.029	0.1	82.8
16	0.020	0.1	82.9
17	0.010	0.0	83.0
18	0.000	0.0	83.0

TRACE OF ORIGINAL MATRIX = 31.000  
COMMUNALITY OVER 14 FACTORS = 31.000

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TABLE 11

17 SOVIET ATTITUDES & 14 COUNTRY ANALYSIS VARIABLES 3 FACTORS ROTATED

ROTATED FACTOR MATRIX

FACTOR NUMBER  
SUM SQUARES OVER VARIABLES 1\* 2\*\* 3\*\*\*  
PERCENT OF TOTAL VARIANCE 12.829 7.688 3.602  
41.354 24.799 11.814

VARIABLE COMMUNALITY  
NO. NAME 3 FACTORS

1	SEATTLE	0.956	-0.018	0.004
2	SLV GNP	0.889	0.431	-0.017
3	SUV EXPT	0.918	0.462	0.044
4	SUV IMPT	0.923	0.403	0.054
5	SLPP/GRP	0.904	0.252	0.072
6	SEAP/GRP	0.918	0.304	0.094
7	SENY CUN	0.892	0.423	-0.034
8	SIGR PRO	0.572	0.247	-0.275
9	SSIL PRO	0.875	0.465	0.021
10	SUV PUPN	0.921	0.359	-0.033
11	SUPF HUD	0.764	0.507	0.094
12	SEFF/GRP	0.864	-0.218	0.130
13	SFGT AIR	0.853	-0.875	-0.326
14	SARM FOR	0.923	0.116	0.134
15	SUNSUBS	0.915	0.070	0.151
16	SIGR DP	0.791	0.734	0.114
17	SUV TRET	0.613	-0.493	-0.587
18	SU ST US	0.394	0.013	-0.627
19	SU PK US	0.512	-0.126	-0.509
20	SU AC US	0.557	-0.151	0.793
21	SU PA US	0.711	-0.076	-0.011
22	SU PJ US	0.657	-0.114	0.083
23	SU NG US	0.478	-0.001	0.339
24	SL TP US	0.851	0.357	0.856
25	SU ST CC	0.542	0.122	0.262
26	SU PK CC	0.666	-0.420	-0.095
27	SU AC CC	0.854	0.756	0.170
28	SU PA CC	0.408	0.064	-0.109
29	SU PU CC	0.854	0.330	0.068
30	SU NG CC	0.857	-0.871	0.028
31	SU TP CC	0.917	0.855	0.079
		0.364	0.882	

Factor Names:

\* Industrialization

\*\* Soviet Nuclear Transition and Perception of China as a Paper Tiger

\*\*\* Soviet Perception of US as a Threat

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


FIGURE 8

THIRTY-ONE SOVIET ATTRIBUTES: FACTOR I  
SOVIET INDUSTRIALIZATION

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High Loading Variables

Soviet Fighter Aircraft	-.87
Soviet ICBM's	.73
Soviet Perception of Chinese as Active	.91
Soviet Perception of Chinese as Negative	.85
Soviet Perception of Chinese as Weak	.76

Factor Scores

3

2

1

0

-1

-2




FIGURE 9

THIRTY-ONE SOVIET ATTRIBUTES: FACTOR 2  
SOVIET NUCLEAR TRANSITION AND PERCEPTION OF CHINA AS PAPER TIGER

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ability to predict cognitive balance when related to international behavior.<sup>52</sup> This model predicts that if a nation perceives another nation as negative he will also perceive that nation as active and strong--these latter two perceptions being a rationalization of his negative feelings. In this Soviet case, however, there seemed to be a conscious Soviet effort to present the Chinese in highly negative and aggressive terms while concurrently belittling their strength. Whether the Soviet leadership actually perceived the Chinese to be as weak as their statements would indicate is at least questionable. It may be that the Soviets wanted others to view the Chinese as negative and aggressive but they also wanted it firmly established that they themselves did not fear Peking. Thus, we have the "Paper Tiger" syndrome; that is, a set of perceptions which imply that China is bellicose and aggressive but that this makes little difference because of China's weakness and resulting inability to implement her negative and active intentions with concrete actions.

(U) The regularities exhibited in Factor 2 of Figure 7 as contrasted with the irregularities of Factor 2 of Figure 9 also would indicate that Soviet perceptions of Communist China did not change in a regular pattern but rather shifted quite markedly from one year to the next. However, the period after 1958 is quite similar for the two patterns.

(U) The third factor in this analysis is the most irregular of all as can be seen from Figure 10. This pattern is almost exclusively concerned with Soviet perceptions of the US and thus has been named Soviet Perception of US as a Threat Factor. The upward trend in the pattern of Figure 10 from 1961 until 1965 indicates that the Soviets viewed the US as more active and stronger and in more threatening terms during this period. It is interesting to note firstly that since 1965 this trend has reversed itself, and secondly that the Soviet views of the US were independent across time of Soviet views of China. Moscow's perceptions of Peking, for the most part, loaded on a different factor (i. e., were independent of) than did their perceptions of the US. This again does not seem to correspond to the expected behavior hypothesized by Newcomb's model which would suggest that the Soviet view of China should be related---either positively or negatively---to their views of the United States. It also, does not support the conventional wisdom which has stated that changes in Sino-Soviet relations can be explained by changes in their

<sup>52</sup> See Theodore Newcomb, "An Approach to the Study of Communicative Acts", Psychological Review, Vol. VX, 1953, pp. 393-404. Newcomb, himself, only applied his model to inter-personal relations. Its utility in the realm of interstate behavior has been suggested, however, by several authors. See for example, Ole Holsti, "External Conflict and Internal Consensus," in Philip Stone, et.al, eds., The General Inquirer, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1966, pp. 343-358; and Hopmann, International Conflict and Cohesion, op. cit.

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High Loading Variables  
Soviet Perception of US as Threat .86  
Soviet Perception of US as Passive -.81




FIGURE 10

THIRTY-ONE SOVIET ATTRIBUTES: FACTOR 3  
SOVIET PERCEPTION OF US AS THREAT

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views of the United States. It must be kept in mind, however, that our findings apply only to sampled Soviet perceptions aggregated annually over an 18 year period. The 18 annual observations were forced by the fact that data on the selected attributes and interactions were available only for annual periods. The result is that we did not examine shifts in Moscow's perceptions of the US and China for specific high crisis or low crisis time points within this period. Under such conditions the model may not hold true.<sup>53</sup> Nevertheless, it would seem to be highly significant that over the long run since 1950, Soviet perceptions of the US were independent of their perceptions of the Chinese.

2. Chinese National Attributes

(U) The statistics and correlations for 30 Chinese attribute and perception variables are given in Tables 12 and 13. The Chinese had no ICBMs deployed at any time during the eighteen year period; consequently, this variable has been deleted from this section of the study.

(U) Distributions for a few of the measures, such as, "aid to less developed countries," "defense budget," "armed forces" and "submarines," in addition to two Soviet perception variables are skewed.

(U) A scanning of the correlation coefficients revealed that the Chinese did not exhibit the same balanced and stable pattern of industrialization found for the Soviets. The measures of economic growth for the Chinese appear to have relatively varied patterns across time.

a. Sixteen Chinese Attributes

(U) As was the case in the analysis of the Soviet attributes, we ran two separate factor analyses with the sixteen "physical" measures taken first. The positive eigenvalues presented in Table 14 indicate that either a two factor (accounting for 76 percent of the variance) or a three factor solution (accounting for almost 85 percent of the variance) best explain the dynamic of Chinese attributes. The two and three factor solutions are presented in Tables 15 and 16. The three factor solution was finally rejected because the additional nine percent of variance added by the third factor decomposed the simple structured pattern of industrialization found in the two-factor solution. The two factor structure is more readily comparable to the Soviet patterns and so is interpreted here.

<sup>53</sup> Holsti's work on Sino-Soviet behavior during periods of high crisis, for example, would indicate that it does not. See Holsti, "External Conflict," op. cit.



TABLE 12

16 CHINESE NATIONAL ATTRIBUTES AND 14 PERCEPTION VARIABLES 1950 - 1967

## STATISTICS

VARIABLE NO. NAME	MEAN	SE	ST DEV	SE	SKEW	KURTOSIS
1 CEALDLC	59.444	19.552	83.375	4.2917.320	2.454**	0.399
2 CPR GNP	68.273	3.773	16.006	1581.774	-0.733	0.130
3 CPR EXPT	1548.500	112.982	479.343	1410586.000	-0.593	0.117
4 CPR INPT	1439.500	106.193	450.537	1253212.000	-0.104	0.129
5 CIMP/GRP	20.611	0.677	2.870	50.861	0.551	0.202
6 CEXP/GRP	22.167	0.557	2.363	34.474	-0.691	0.136
7 CENY GUN	12780.000	18649.363	79000.125	38609863130.000	-0.256	0.079
8 CACK PKJ	173269.437	3950.911	16762.297	1734723072.000	-0.848	0.188
9 CSTL P40	5860.867	770.697	3307.974	67559600.000	-0.437	0.093
10 CPR P40N	650551.625	16469.399	69873.750	3014334054.000	0.125	0.102
11 CDEF RUD	5683.332	221.003	937.636	5427893.000	-1.578**	0.334
12 CDEF/GRP	5.833	0.307	1.302	10.461	0.910	0.166
13 CFFT AIR	1292.722	136.175	586.229	2121763.000	-0.494	0.151
14 CARM FCR	3163.444	107.555	795.642	3908394.000	1.568**	0.173
15 CPR SUBS	0.167	0.088	0.373	0.857	2.131**	0.233
16 CPR TART	66.056	5.273	22.394	3096.235	-0.850	0.143
17 CC ST US	3865.033	104.906	444.654	1220696.000	0.257	0.093
18 CC KK US	440.889	27.847	118.146	86179.375	0.112	0.131
19 CC AC US	3874.667	113.402	481.125	1429151.000	0.160	0.148
20 CC PA US	698.222	42.783	181.511	203408.250	0.266	0.151
21 CC PU US	1235.773	95.857	364.261	819197.875	-0.477	0.173
22 CC NG US	2791.111	143.257	607.786	2280683.000	-0.052	0.125
23 CC TP US	42553.664	3279.436	13913.469	1195161824.000	0.129	0.096
24 CC ST SU	3768.611	76.936	326.411	657797.125	0.100	0.139
25 CC KK SU	281.633	32.865	139.520	120180.312	0.764	0.125
26 CC AC SU	2598.278	94.150	357.018	786945.125	-0.590	0.125
27 CC PA SU	817.389	35.061	148.753	136614.375	-0.335	0.104
28 CC PU SU	3066.500	198.459	749.564	3947018.000	-0.799	0.160
29 CC NG SU	590.544	157.183	666.873	2745672.000	1.525**	0.185
30 CC TP SU	11293.441	1833.817	7780.227	373721088.000	1.546**	0.204

---\* SIGNIFICANT AT .05 LEVEL  
 ---\*\* SIGNIFICANT AT .01 LEVEL

SE - SKEW = 0.536  
 SE - KURTOSIS = 1.029

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TABLE 13

16 CHINESE NATIONAL ATTRIBUTES AND 14 PERCEPTION VARIABLES 1950 - 1967

## CORRELATIONS

NO. VARIABLE	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
1 CEALDLC	1.0000											
2 CPR GNP	0.4658	1.0000										
3 CPR EXPT	0.4035	0.9844	1.0000									
4 CPR IMPT	0.2757	0.9272	0.9289	1.0000								
5 CIMP/GNP	-0.1244	0.4619	0.4814	0.7351	1.0000							
6 CEXP/UNP	0.2455	0.8507	0.9201	0.8054	0.4191	1.0000						
7 CENY CON	0.6220	0.8338	0.8306	0.8822	0.1618	0.7479	1.0000					
8 CAGR PRO	0.1389	0.6390	0.6263	0.6081	0.4545	0.6336	0.3736	1.0000				
9 CSTL PRO	0.5253	0.8533	0.8391	0.7486	0.2521	0.7030	0.9279	0.3432	1.0000			
10 CPR POPN	0.5826	0.8357	0.8419	0.7591	0.2160	0.7663	0.9481	0.4842	0.7080	1.0000		
11 CDEF BUD	0.2702	0.6148	0.6153	0.6508	0.6128	0.5955	0.6240	0.6121	0.5571	0.8831	1.0000	
12 CDEF/GNP	-0.2251	-0.3684	-0.3401	-0.0931	0.3990	-0.3161	-0.2770	-0.1440	-0.2648	-0.0733	0.2162	1.0000
13 CFUT AIR	0.4639	0.8448	0.6544	0.7787	0.3925	0.8209	0.8917	0.6770	0.8109	0.9468	0.7629	-0.0695
14 CARM FOR	-0.4704	-0.8468	-0.8597	-0.7535	-0.3570	-0.7900	0.7549	-0.7132	-0.7058	-0.7737	-0.7289	0.2991
15 CPR SUBS	0.1871	0.4486	0.4694	0.5701	0.3722	0.4101	0.4772	0.2418	0.5358	0.6655	0.3895	0.4008
16 CPR TRET	0.5549	0.5968	0.5334	0.3362	-0.1362	0.4502	0.5224	0.4270	0.4887	0.3666	0.3027	-0.7334
17 CC ST US	-0.1089	-0.0595	-0.0880	-0.2133	-0.3208	0.0647	0.1794	0.0493	0.0324	0.0138	0.2051	-0.1936
18 CC WK US	-0.0147	-0.1793	-0.1099	-0.1372	0.0369	-0.2001	-0.2793	-0.0169	-0.2305	-0.2235	-0.1472	0.1075
19 CC AC US	-0.1041	0.0945	0.0473	0.0501	0.1123	0.0060	0.0827	0.1245	-0.0699	-0.0826	0.3463	-0.1940
20 CC PA US	0.1045	-0.1617	-0.1063	-0.0422	0.0448	-0.0672	-0.1189	-0.3324	-0.1881	-0.0304	-0.3101	0.3298
21 CC PU US	0.5507	0.5432	0.5135	0.3806	-0.0874	0.3992	0.4993	0.2934	0.5725	0.4843	0.0933	-0.4124
22 CC NG US	-0.2796	-0.0543	-0.0799	-0.0515	-0.4307	-0.6554	-0.3600	-0.6088	-0.3458	-0.4388	-0.4133	0.2020
23 CC TP US	-0.2377	-0.3537	-0.4000	-0.4362	-0.3378	-0.3786	-0.0798	-0.2799	-0.1723	-0.2556	-0.0356	-0.0302
24 CC ST SU	-0.2408	-0.2029	-0.1920	-0.3167	-0.3446	-0.0919	-0.1185	-0.1750	-0.2223	-0.3070	-0.2423	-0.3278

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TABLE 13 -cont'd-

10 CHINESE NATIONAL ATTRIBUTES AND 14 PERCEPTION VARIABLES 1990 - 1967

## CORRELATIONS

NO. VARIABLE	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
	CE4DLDC	CPR GNP	CPR EXPT	CPR IMPT	CIMP/GNP	CEXP/GNP	CENY CON	CAGR PRO	CSTL PRO	CPR POPN	CDEF BUD	CDEF/GNP
25 CC HK SU	0.6144	0.4860	0.4996	0.5063	0.2806	0.4790	0.5739	0.3480	0.5118	0.7463	0.5146	0.2605
26 CC AC SU	0.4970	0.8193	0.8312	0.8064	0.5370	0.8103	0.7212	0.7297	0.6719	0.8015	0.7764	-0.0440
27 CC PA SU	0.3641	0.2630	0.2385	0.2937	0.2060	0.2590	0.2054	0.2110	0.2494	0.3762	0.1977	0.0899
28 CC PU SU	-0.4879	-0.5826	-0.6255	-0.6231	-0.3279	-0.6094	-0.6242	-0.3060	-0.6417	-0.7946	-0.4263	-0.1860
29 CC NG SU	0.5377	0.4483	0.4617	0.4737	0.2186	0.4241	0.6180	0.2322	0.5984	0.7833	0.4509	0.2809
30 CC TP SU	0.5767	0.4957	0.5141	0.5079	0.2692	0.4892	0.6754	0.3051	0.6281	0.8308	0.5323	0.2630

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TABLE 13 - cont'd-

16 CHINESE NATIONAL ATTRIBUTES AND 14 PERCEPTION VARIABLES 1951 - 1967

## CORRELATIONS

NO. VARIABLE	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24
CGFT AIR	1.0000											
CARM FOR	-0.8126	1.0000										
CPR SUBS	0.6207	-0.3236	1.0000									
CPR TRET	0.3905	-0.6389	-0.1409	1.0000								
CC ST US	0.0968	0.0074	-0.2587	0.2624	1.0000							
CC WK US	-0.2603	0.2210	-0.2910	-0.2248	-0.1222	1.0000						
CC AC US	0.0532	-0.1874	-0.2866	0.3809	0.5293	-0.3188	1.0000					
CC PA US	-0.1435	0.2839	0.1218	-0.5299	-0.3145	0.3523	-0.5088	1.0000				
CC PU US	0.4470	-0.4177	0.2327	0.4252	-0.2004	-0.1126	-0.4041	-0.0099	1.0000			
CC NG US	-0.5098	0.7358	-0.3086	-0.4406	0.4627	0.1144	-0.0444	0.1842	-0.1964	1.0000		
CC TP US	-0.2117	0.3723	-0.3731	-0.0194	0.8555	-0.1083	0.5246	-0.2264	-0.2935	0.7742	1.0000	
CC ST SU	-0.2314	0.2059	-0.5959	-0.0170	0.4846	0.4084	0.1880	0.0944	-0.0854	0.3661	0.4784	1.0000
CC WK SU	0.0579	-0.5205	0.7271	0.1471	-0.2367	-0.0931	-0.2667	0.2216	0.2221	-0.4550	-0.4787	-0.6431
CC AC SU	0.0638	-0.8589	0.5020	0.4835	-0.0923	-0.0523	0.0792	-0.1031	0.3492	-0.7097	-0.4244	-0.2517
CC PA SU	0.2740	-0.2939	0.4007	-0.0028	-0.4967	-0.2045	-0.4045	0.0638	0.2831	-0.3870	-0.5822	-0.7754
CC PU SU	-0.6784	0.5083	-0.8068	-0.0782	0.3534	0.0547	0.4343	-0.2616	-0.3033	0.5063	0.5983	0.5815
CC NG SU	0.4622	-0.3081	0.8166	0.0021	-0.1808	-0.1530	-0.3595	0.2410	0.3451	-0.2106	-0.3210	-0.5939
CC TP SU	0.7244	-0.4577	0.7386	0.0356	-0.1427	-0.0979	-0.3291	0.2542	0.3468	-0.2300	-0.3025	-0.5260

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TABLE 13 - cont'd -

10 CHINESE NATIONAL ATTRIBUTES AND 14 PERCEPTION VARIABLES 1950 - 1967																									
		CORRELATIONS																							
		13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24												
NO.	VARIABLE	CFGT AIR	CARM FOR	CPR SUBS	CPR TRET	CC ST	US CC	WK US CC	AC US CC	PA US CC	PD US CC	NG US CC	TP US CC	ST SU											
13	CFGT AIR	1.0000																							
14	CARM FOR	-0.8126	1.0000																						
15	CPR SUBS	0.6207	-0.3236	1.0000																					
16	CPR TRET	0.3905	-0.6389	-0.1409	1.0000																				
17	CC ST US	0.6588	0.0074	-0.2587	0.2624	1.0000																			
18	CC WK US	-0.2603	0.2210	-0.2910	-0.2248	-0.1222	1.0000																		
19	CC AC US	0.0532	-0.1874	-0.2866	0.3809	0.5293	-0.3188	1.0000																	
20	CC PA US	-0.1435	0.2839	0.1218	-0.5299	-0.3145	0.3523	-0.5088	1.0000																
21	CC PD US	0.4470	-0.4177	0.2327	0.4252	-0.2004	-0.1126	-0.4041	-0.0099	1.0000															
22	CC NG US	-0.5098	0.7358	-0.3086	-0.4406	0.4627	0.1144	-0.0444	0.1842	-0.1964	1.0000														
23	CC TP US	-0.2117	0.3723	-0.3731	-0.0174	0.8555	-0.1083	0.5246	-0.2264	-0.2935	0.7742	1.0000													
24	CC ST SU	-0.2314	0.2059	-0.5959	-0.0170	0.4846	0.4084	0.1880	0.0944	-0.0854	0.3661	0.4784	1.0000												
		13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24												
25	CC WK SU	0.6519	-0.5205	0.7271	0.1471	-0.2367	-0.0931	-0.2667	0.2216	0.2221	-0.4550	-0.4787	-0.6431												
26	CC AC SU	0.8638	-0.8589	0.5020	0.4835	-0.0923	-0.0523	0.0792	-0.1031	0.3492	-0.7097	-0.4244	-0.2517												
27	CC PA SU	0.2740	-0.2939	0.4007	-0.0028	-0.4967	-0.2045	-0.4045	0.0638	0.2831	-0.3870	-0.5822	-0.7754												
28	CC PD SU	-0.6784	0.5083	-0.8068	-0.0782	0.3534	0.0547	0.4343	-0.2616	-0.3033	0.5063	0.5983	0.5815												
29	CC NG SU	0.5622	-0.3081	0.8166	0.0021	-0.1808	-0.1530	-0.3595	0.2410	0.3451	-0.2106	-0.3210	-0.5939												
30	CC TP SU	0.7244	-0.4577	0.7386	0.0356	-0.1427	-0.0979	-0.3291	0.2542	0.3468	-0.2300	-0.3025	-0.5260												

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TABLE 13 - cont'd -

16 CHINESE NATIONAL ATTRIBUTES AND 14 PERCEPTION VARIABLES		1950 - 1967									
		CORRELATIONS									
NO.	VARIABLE										
		25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34
25	CC WK SU	1.0000									
26	CC AC SU	0.6756	1.0000								
27	CC PA SU	0.6184	0.1984	1.0000							
28	CC PU SU	-0.9229	-0.6650	-0.6115	1.0000						
29	CC NG SU	0.9145	0.5404	0.6045	-0.8977	1.0000					
30	CC TP SU	0.5160	0.6125	0.5856	-0.8868	0.9804	1.0000				

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TABLE 14

16 Chinese Attributes  
TABLE OF POSITIVE EIGENVALUES

NO.	EIGENVALUE	PERCENT OF COMMUNALITY	
		ALL ( 16 ) FACTORS	Each Cumulative
1	9.653	60.6	60.6
2	2.476	15.5	76.1
3	1.417	8.9	84.9
4	0.915	5.1	90.0
5	0.539	3.4	93.4
6	0.415	2.6	96.0
7	0.237	1.5	97.5
8	0.164	1.0	98.5
9	0.124	0.8	99.3
10	0.055	0.3	99.6
11	0.030	0.2	99.8
12	0.022	0.1	99.9
13	0.007	0.0	100.0
14	0.003	0.0	100.0
15	0.001	0.0	100.0
16	0.000	0.0	100.0
TRACE OF ORIGINAL MATRIX =		16.000	
COMMUNALITY OVER 16 FACTORS =		16.000	

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TABLE 15

## Two Factor Solution

## 16 CHINESE NATIONAL ATTRIBUTES

VARIABLE NO. NAME	COMMUNALITY 2 FACTORS	ROTATED FACTOR MATRIX	
		1 *	2 **
SUM SQUARES OVER VARIABLES		5.164	3.203
PERCENT OF TOTAL VARIANCE		57.287	18.770
1 CEALDLOC	0.426	C.380	<u>-0.531</u>
2 CPR GNP	0.936	<u>C.902</u>	<u>-0.351</u>
3 CPR EXPT	0.928	<u>C.915</u>	<u>-0.301</u>
4 CPR IMPT	0.859	<u>C.927</u>	<u>-0.008</u>
5 CIMP/GNP	0.650	<u>C.632</u>	<u>C.539</u>
6 CEXP/GNP	0.773	<u>C.843</u>	<u>-0.249</u>
7 CENY CON	0.834	<u>C.819</u>	<u>-0.405</u>
8 CAGR PRO	0.457	<u>C.765</u>	<u>-0.096</u>
9 CSTL PRQ	0.784	<u>C.618</u>	<u>-0.339</u>
10 CPR PUPN	0.864	<u>C.911</u>	<u>-0.118</u>
11 CCRF BUD	0.671	<u>C.811</u>	<u>C.907</u>
12 CCRF/GNP	0.823	<u>C.918</u>	<u>-0.142</u>
13 CFCT AIR	0.900	<u>C.938</u>	<u>C.367</u>
14 CARM FOR	0.829	<u>-C.833</u>	<u>0.371</u>
15 CDD SURS	0.580	<u>C.665</u>	<u>-0.034</u>
16 CPR IQET	0.516	<u>C.337</u>	<u>-0.934</u>

Factor Names:

\* Industrialization

\*\* Portion of Chinese GNP Allocated to Defense

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TABLE 16

Three Factor Solution  
14 CHINESE NATIONAL ATTRIBUTES

VARIABLE O. NAME	COMMUNALITY 3 FACTORS	ROTATED FACTOR MATRIX		
		1	2	3
1 CCAIDLOC	0.663	-0.074	-0.291	-0.757
2 CPE GNP	0.947	-0.718	-0.267	-0.503
3 CDR FLOT	0.941	-0.743	-0.224	-0.582
4 CDR TROT	0.998	-0.825	0.031	-0.554
5 CIMP/GNP	0.941	-0.802	0.440	0.244
6 CEXP/GNP	0.812	-0.746	-0.210	-0.462
7 CNY TON	0.944	0.380	-0.190	-0.874
8 CAGP P23	0.721	0.624	-0.192	-0.078
9 CSTL P20	0.973	0.408	-0.120	-0.831
10 CDR P20Y	0.976	0.490	0.024	-0.862
11 CDEF Q10	0.585	0.718	0.157	-0.382
12 CDEF/GNP	0.891	0.624	0.031	0.192
13 CEST A10	0.915	-0.638	0.207	-0.719
14 C3W F04	0.860	-0.470	0.314	-0.513
15 CDR SUBS	0.780	0.203	0.569	-0.603
16 CDR T2T	0.952	0.268	-0.512	-0.345

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(U) The first factor in the two-factor solution, Industrialization, although weaker than the comparable Soviet pattern, still accounts for 57 percent of total variance. This pattern, shown in Figure 11 however, does not exhibit as strong a pattern of growth in industrialization as the comparable Soviet pattern. Interestingly the variable "Chinese armed forces" loaded negatively on this factor and, as in the Soviet pattern, it is inversely related to industrialization. A further analysis of the pattern reveals a positive growth rate in Chinese industrialization until 1959--that is, until the effect of the economic chaos caused by Great Leap policies became pervasive. The steady growth rate until this time, due in part to the consolidation efforts of the new Communist regime in the early fifties and later to their successful implementation of the first five-year plan, corresponds closely to the periodization of Chinese economic growth presented by most economists who have dealt with China.<sup>54</sup> The decline in the growth of industrialization continued after 1959 until the 1961-1962 period when it leveled off and began a rapidly increasing rise lasting until at least 1967. This again corresponds closely to the economists' periodization called "recovery and readjustment."<sup>55</sup> Noteworthy is the fact that through at least the end of 1967, there was no indication of any adverse effect on China's overall industrialization drive resulting from the disruption caused by the Great Cultural Revolution. This result is contrary to much that has been written. It may be, however, that just as the effect of Great Leap policies introduced in late 1957 and early 1958 had no noticeable effect until 1959 so, too, the effects of the Cultural Revolution may have no noticeable effect on industrialization rates until 1968 or 1969. That is, there may be a one or two year lag between new policies, political disorder, and reorganization and the observable effects on China's industrialization.

(U) The second pattern which we characterized as the Portion of Chinese GNP Allocated to Defense shows a slow decline through 1964 followed by a sharp upswing. (See Figure 12). It accounts for almost nineteen percent of the variance. Of interest on this factor is the negative correlation of "treaties signed" which shows a general increase to 1964 and then falls sharply after that. If "total number of treaties signed by the Chinese" taps Chinese involvement with and willingness to participate in the international system then, since 1964 Peking has exhibited a strong isolationist and withdrawal behavior. Moreover, coinciding with this withdrawal has been ever increasing military expenditures. Such behavior

<sup>54</sup> See, for example, Arthur Ashbrook, "Main Lines of Chinese Economic Policy," in An Economic Profile of Mainland China, Washington: GPO 1967; T. C. Lin and K. C. Yeh, The Economy of the Chinese Mainland, 1933-1959, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965, and Alexander Eckstein, Communist China's Economic Growth and Foreign Trade, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967.

<sup>55</sup> Ibid.

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


FIGURE 11

SIXTEEN CHINESE ATTRIBUTES: FACTOR 1  
CHINESE INDUSTRIALIZATION

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High Loading Variables  
Chinese Defense Budgets as a  
Ratio of GNP .91  
Chinese Treaties -.84




FIGURE 12

SIXTEEN CHINESE ATTRIBUTES: FACTOR 2  
PORTION OF CHINESE GNP ALLOCATED TO DEFENSE

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supports the view that a precursor to the Cultural Revolution was the attempted consolidation of power at home by use of external threats, primarily from the US and the Soviet Union, to China's continued existence. That is, the attempt to consolidate control at home was justified by the increasing threat from the international system which in turn justified greater military expenditures.

b. Thirty Chinese Attributes

(U) When the perception variables are added to the analysis, it is no longer possible to maintain the highly parsimonious solutions we had before. The positive eigenvalues of Table 17 suggest a pattern of five factors which explain almost eighty-five percent of the total variance. The five factor solution is shown in Table 18. The plot of scores for these factors are present in Figures 13 through 17.

(U) The first pattern in this analysis is again the familiar Industrialization factor which accounts for 31.5% of the total variance. In addition to the high loading variables previously noted on this factor, we have in this analysis two new variables loading highly: "Chinese fighter aircraft" and "Chinese perception of the Soviets as more active." Although these additional loadings make for a slightly more erratic growth pattern, one which peaks in 1959 and then drops off until 1963, it still has the same basic characteristics as its counterpart in the previous analysis. The second and fifth patterns are quite erratic and are primarily defined by changing Chinese perceptions of the US; the second being defined by changing Chinese perceptions of the US as a threat and as strong, and the fifth by Chinese perceptions of the US as weak and passive. The fourth pattern is quite similar to factor two in the previous analysis. The major difference between the two being the inclusion of a new variable, "Chinese perceptions of the US as positive," on the dimension. The new loading would seem to add additional support to our previous interpretation of the pattern. In this case, the more the Chinese perceived the US positively, the more they participated in the international system (as measured by treaties signed) and the less they increased their military expenditures. On the other hand, the less positively they perceived the US, the less they participated in interstate negotiations and the more they increased their own military expenditures.

(U) Perhaps the most interesting of these patterns is factor three "Chinese Perception of Soviets as Paper Tiger", in which the Chinese perceive the Soviets in weak, negative, and threatening terms. The loadings here are quite consistent with the year 1959 being the break point where the Chinese perceptions of the Soviets are reversed (See Figure 15). A comparison of this pattern with the second factor of the Soviet 31 variable analysis, the Soviet Nuclear Transition and Perception of China as a Paper Tiger (Figure 9), reveals that although the turning point in

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TABLE 17

30 Chinese Attributes

TABLE OF POSITIVE EIGENVALUES

NO.	EIGENVALUE	PERCENT OF COMMUNALITY ALL ( 18 ) FACTORS	Each Cumulative
1	13.802	46.0	46.0
2	4.774	15.9	61.9
3	2.574	8.6	70.5
4	2.504	8.3	78.8
5	1.801	6.0	84.8
6	1.147	3.8	88.7
7	0.782	2.6	91.3
8	0.685	2.3	93.6
9	0.521	1.7	95.3
10	0.471	1.6	96.9
11	0.336	1.2	98.1
12	0.194	0.6	98.7
13	0.139	0.4	99.2
14	0.122	0.4	99.6
15	0.085	0.3	99.8
16	0.029	0.1	99.9
17	0.014	0.1	100.0
18	0.000	0.0	100.0

TRACE OF ORIGINAL MATRIX = 30.000  
COMMUNALITY OVER 18 FACTORS = 30.000

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TABLE 18

## 16 CHINESE NATIONAL ATTRIBUTES AND 14 PERCEPTION VARIABLES 1950 - 1967

VARIABLE NO. NAME	COMMUNALITY 5 FACTORS	ROTATED FACTOR MATRIX				
		1*	2 **	3 ***	4 ****	5 *****
SUM SQUARES OVER VARIABLES		9.467	3.508	6.879	3.328	2.273
PERCENT OF TOTAL VARIANCE		31.558	11.592	22.930	11.092	7.575
1 CEALDLC	0.647	0.187	0.062	-0.494	-0.56031	0.006
2 CPR GNP	0.942	0.861	0.077	-0.251	-0.342	-0.040
3 CPR EXPT	0.945	0.880	0.104	-0.262	-0.301	-0.015
4 CPR IMPT	0.881	0.879	0.183	-0.275	-0.016	0.014
5 CIMP/GNP	0.839	0.601	0.236	-0.083	-0.582	0.051
6 CEXP/GNP	0.819	0.845	0.065	-0.223	-0.227	0.021
7 CENY CON	0.946	0.636	-0.245	-0.531	-0.432	-0.076
8 CAGR PRD	0.634	0.710	0.124	-0.005	-0.301	-0.159
9 CSIL PRD	0.831	0.619	-0.108	-0.510	-0.417	-0.052
10 CPA POPN	0.975	0.664	-0.075	-0.677	-0.261	-0.016
11 COLF HUD	0.847	0.753	-0.204	-0.347	0.229	-0.256
12 COEF/GNP	0.884	0.183	0.038	-0.430	0.281	0.154
13 CFCT AIR	0.937	0.780	-0.117	-0.530	-0.163	-0.087
14 CAMM FOR	0.884	0.839	-0.095	0.200	0.287	0.220
15 CPR SUBS	0.762	0.305	0.188	-0.772	0.193	-0.019
16 CPR TREI	0.871	0.456	-0.069	0.125	-0.678	-0.428
17 CC ST US	0.870	0.013	-0.895	0.089	-0.069	-0.237
18 CC WK US	0.615	-0.011	0.011	0.239	0.066	0.742
19 CC AC US	0.796	0.258	-0.473	0.362	0.163	-0.590
20 CC PA US	0.727	-0.211	0.127	-0.272	0.116	0.761
21 CC PU US	0.665	0.248	0.176	-0.249	-0.702	0.131
22 CC NG US	0.880	-0.596	-0.598	-0.015	0.130	0.167
23 CC TP US	0.960	-0.304	-0.894	0.146	0.070	-0.205
24 CC ST SU	0.933	-0.018	-0.593	0.581	-0.180	0.457
25 CC WK SU	0.369	0.340	0.256	-0.829	-0.018	-0.009
26 CC AC SU	0.891	0.873	0.087	-0.337	-0.082	-0.010
27 CC PA SU	0.753	0.043	0.640	-0.542	-0.069	-0.206
28 CC PO SU	0.428	-0.409	-0.334	-0.789	0.065	-0.145
29 CC NG SU	0.967	0.227	0.118	-0.947	-0.046	0.046
30 CC TP SU	0.955	0.314	0.066	-0.917	-0.053	0.092

## Factor Names:

\* Chinese Industrialization and Perception of Soviets as Active

\*\* Chinese View of US as Strong and a Threat

\*\*\* Chinese Perception of Soviets as a Paper Tiger

\*\*\*\* Chinese Defense Commitment

\*\*\*\*\* Chinese Perception of US as Weak and Active

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


FIGURE 13

THIRTY CHINESE ATTRIBUTES: FACTOR 1  
CHINESE INDUSTRIALIZATION AND PERCEPTION OF SOVIETS AS ACTIVE

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High Loading Variables  
Chinese Perception of US as Strong .89  
Chinese Perception of US as a Threat .89




FIGURE 14

THIRTY CHINESE ATTRIBUTES: FACTOR 2  
CHINESE VIEW OF US AS STRONG AND A THREAT

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High Loading Variables  
 Chinese Perception of the Soviets .95  
 as Negative  
 Chinese Perception of the Soviets .92  
 as a Threat  
 Chinese Perception of the Soviets .83  
 as Weak




FIGURE 15

THIRTY CHINESE ATTRIBUTES: FACTOR 3  
 CHINESE PERCEPTION OF SOVIETS AS PAPER TIGER

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High Loading Variables  
 Chinese Defense Budget as Ratio to GNP .82  
 Chinese Perception of US as Positive -.70




FIGURE 16

THIRTY CHINESE ATTRIBUTES: FACTOR 4  
 CHINESE DEFENSE COMMITMENT

High Loading Variables  
Chinese Perception of US  
as Weak .74  
Chinese Perception of US  
as Passive .76

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


FIGURE 17

THIRTY CHINESE ATTRIBUTES - FACTOR 5:  
CHINESE PERCEPTION OF US AS WEAK AND ACTIVE

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Soviet threat perception of the Chinese occurred a year later in 1960, the overall correlation between these patterns is still in excess of .85. Although these patterns will merge later in the interaction analysis it is interesting to note that here the Chinese seem to have taken the initiative in the perception pattern.

(U) It should also be noted that Chinese views of the US were quite independent across time of Chinese views of the Soviet Union. Their perceptions of the Soviets for the most part loaded on different factors than did their perceptions of the US. The same phenomena was discovered about Soviet perceptions in the factor analysis of 31 Soviet attributes. The Soviet perceptions of China were quite independent across time of Chinese views of the US.

### 3. Soviet and Chinese Attribute Study - 36 Cases

(U) The attribute factor structures for the Soviets and Chinese have been shown to be quite different. This difference in the patterns of change in the Soviet Union and Communist China have been cited by several scholars as a definite influence impinging on their relations with each other. We are, therefore, interested in comparing the attributes of the Soviets with the attributes of the Chinese to discover whether differences will shed light on the two nations' interaction patterns between 1950 and 1967. A joint attribute analysis was therefore conducted to define those patterns of attribute variation common to both nations.

(U) We considered the two nations as cases for which data have been collected for a period of 18 years giving a sample size of  $18 \times 2$  or 36 cases for each attribute variable. Thus, for example, we have the GNP of the Soviets in 1950 through 1967 followed by the Chinese GNP in 1950 through 1967:

Sino-Soviet 36 Case Matrix

		Twenty-four Variables				
		GNP	TRA DE	EC AID	...	TREA TIES
Soviet Union (18 years or cases)	1950					
		.	.	.	...	.
		.	.	.		.
China (18 years or cases)	1968					
	1950					
		.	.	.	...	.
		.	.	.		.
	1968					

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TABLE 19

36 CASES 1950 - 1967

17 SOVIET AND CHINESE NATIONAL ATTITUDES AND 7 US PERCEPTION VARIABLES

STATISTICS

VARIABLE NO. NAME	MEAN	SE	ST DEV	SE	SKEW	KURTOSIS
1 EUGENIO	205.194	51.083	310.095	827511.562	2.060**	0.160
2 SGP	152.861	16.447	96.601	53800.875	0.655	0.055
3 FPHRFS	3397.194	413.113	2479.878	52922944.000	1.116**	0.077
4 IIPRIS	3181.361	391.075	2346.453	47381312.000	1.040**	0.070
5 IPI/GRP	20.050	0.509	3.527	107.069	-0.237	0.081
6 CAPT/GRP	21.305	0.519	3.234	90.015	-0.613	0.067
7 EVOXOY	352608.187	45213.002	271401.025	633882083328.000	0.647	0.060
8 ARIICPRD	137223.502	6521.215	39127.359	13174779900.000	-0.000	0.041
9 STELPP	33479.514	5335.832	32015.008	9820645185.000	0.741	0.058
10 REPULTN	429325.000	37643.861	227044.012	443615477760.000	0.142	0.033
11 UPRN/GRP	10927.777	502.404	5417.908	252607998.000	0.090	0.035
12 UPR/GRP	300.833	61.929	371.576	1149168.000	0.294	0.039
13 FPHRFS	5234.651	793.532	4521.312	175919136.000	0.512	0.045
14 ARIICPRD	3723.333	195.530	1113.179	10863034.000	0.933*	0.065
15 SUPRATV	11.822	3.485	23.309	4675.442	2.025**	0.141
16 ICHRS	52.774	24.258	145.547	182301.500	3.730**	0.405
17 FACATIES	35.500	5.277	31.000	6025.561	0.437	0.045
18 STPO US	3340.305	72.733	436.597	1638861.000	-0.468	0.090
19 STPO US	4294.718	37.291	223.749	430828.625	2.160**	0.247
20 STPO US	3406.472	82.080	490.679	2117790.000	1.160**	0.156
21 FASS US	404.501	40.501	291.364	730558.000	0.828*	0.077
22 PRST US	1473.528	72.777	436.662	1640870.000	0.311	0.001
23 NEG US	2483.000	80.452	518.709	2315430.000	0.241	0.085
24 TPRN US	43745.250	2107.360	12444.166	1375825926.000	0.491	0.071

SE - SKEW = 0.592  
 SE - KURTOSIS = 0.769

\* SIGNIFICANT AT .05 LEVEL  
 \*\* SIGNIFICANT AT .01 LEVEL

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## CORRELATIONS

NO.	VARIABLE	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
1	EQUAND	1.0000											
2	GDP	0.6822	1.0000										
3	EXPORTS	0.7077	0.9735	1.0000									
4	IMPORTS	0.7209	0.9715	0.9943	1.0000								
5	IMPT/GNP	0.3481	0.2520	0.4132	0.4485	1.0000							
6	EXPT/GNP	0.3347	0.2112	0.4031	0.3966	0.8041	1.0000						
7	ENERGY	0.7016	0.9054	0.9745	0.9682	0.2696	0.2713	1.0000					
8	ASRIPROD	-0.2670	-0.6573	-0.5129	-0.5192	0.3576	0.4568	-0.6147	1.0000				
9	STEEL PR	0.6812	0.9970	0.9759	0.9733	0.2481	0.2067	0.9870	-0.0690	1.0000			
10	POPULTN	-0.4023	-0.7568	-0.6006	-0.6641	0.2366	0.3649	-0.7373	0.9267	-0.7975	1.0000		
11	DEFENCPRO	0.5376	0.9372	0.8513	0.8488	0.0322	-0.0429	0.9134	-0.8148	0.9331	-0.9147	1.0000	
12	DEFC/GNP	0.2785	0.6965	0.5350	0.5333	-0.4538	-0.4318	0.6528	-0.9247	0.6902	-0.9466	0.8874	1.0000
13	FIGHTLMS	0.2472	0.6717	0.5068	0.5252	-0.2341	-0.3198	0.6422	-0.8173	0.6508	-0.8563	0.8212	0.8876
14	BRADFOCE	-0.2793	0.0388	-0.0875	-0.0796	-0.6627	-0.8022	0.0147	-0.7101	0.1063	-0.6110	0.3576	0.6765
15	SUBMARIN	0.6190	0.8246	0.9125	0.8588	0.4947	0.4957	0.8285	-0.3028	0.8437	-0.4418	0.6401	0.2766
16	ICBMS	0.4295	0.6672	0.7505	0.7067	0.3530	0.3608	0.6804	-0.1627	0.6803	-0.3157	0.5052	0.1868
17	TREATIES	-0.2391	-0.6576	-0.6030	-0.6138	0.2656	0.2990	-0.6443	0.8477	-0.7161	0.8572	-0.8022	-0.8103
18	STRG US	0.0092	-0.0607	-0.0495	-0.0509	-0.1066	0.0107	-0.0197	0.0491	-0.0489	0.0551	-0.0265	-0.0293
19	WEAK US	-0.2367	-0.4381	-0.3388	-0.3234	-0.3027	-0.4179	-0.2508	0.0392	-0.2539	0.0091	-0.1106	0.0597
20	ACTV US	-0.0676	0.0111	-0.0055	-0.0000	-0.0068	-0.0568	-0.0003	-0.0866	0.0063	-0.0810	0.0937	0.1141
21	PASS US	0.1125	0.2550	0.1327	0.1413	-0.1864	-0.2812	0.2098	-0.3867	0.2179	-0.3653	0.2937	0.3618
22	POST US	0.6647	0.6515	0.6686	0.6727	0.2981	0.4237	0.6576	-0.2829	0.6268	-0.3297	0.4932	0.2702
23	NEG US	-0.3730	-0.3017	-0.3044	-0.3065	-0.2843	-0.3451	-0.3068	-0.0078	-0.2529	0.1160	-0.2626	-0.1602
24	TPER US	-0.2546	-0.2150	-0.2202	-0.2274	-0.2151	-0.2132	-0.2059	0.0026	-0.1887	0.0859	-0.1491	-0.0786

TABLE 20 cont'd-

17 SOVIET AND CHINESE NATIONAL ATTRIBUTES AND 7 US PERCEPTION VARIABLES														36 CASES 1950 - 1967				
CORRELATIONS																		
NO. VARIABLE	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24						
	FIGHTERS	ARMED FORCE	SUBMARINE	TREATIES	STRG	WEAK	ACTV	PASS	JUST	NEG	TPER							
13	FIGHTERS	1.0000																
14	ARMED FORCE	0.4742	1.0000															
15	SUBMARINE	0.1462	-0.1847	1.0000														
16	TREATIES	-0.0042	-0.1554	0.8896	1.0000													
17	STRG	-0.6605	-0.6223	-0.4853	-0.3682	1.0000												
18	WEAK	-0.0892	0.0039	0.0004	0.0490	0.1166	1.0000											
19	ACTV	0.1470	0.2274	-0.4563	-0.3631	0.1160	-0.0749	1.0000										
20	PASS	0.0193	0.0940	-0.0008	-0.0203	0.0223	0.3875	-0.3344	1.0000									
21	JUST	0.4615	0.3244	-0.0386	-0.1138	-0.3750	-0.5061	0.4134	-0.4803	1.0000								
22	NEG	0.3529	-0.2267	0.5579	0.3962	-0.2562	-0.0103	-0.2456	-0.2756	0.0624	1.0000							
23	TPER	-0.3051	0.3261	-0.1134	-0.0765	-0.0479	0.3152	0.0418	0.0729	-0.0806	-0.3642	1.0000						
24		-0.2190	0.2174	-0.0900	-0.0522	0.0516	0.7378	-0.1654	0.6193	-0.4571	-0.3273	0.7421	1.0000					

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TABLE 21

## Soviet and Chinese Attributes - 36 Cases

TABLE OF POSITIVE EIGENVALUES

NO.	EIGENVALUE	PERCENT OF COMMUNALITY ALL ( 24 ) FACTORS	Each Cumulative
1	10.807	45.0	45.0
2	5.130	21.4	66.4
3	2.983	12.4	78.8
4	1.267	5.3	84.1
5	0.951	4.0	88.1
6	0.765	3.2	91.3
7	0.583	2.4	93.7
8	0.410	1.7	95.4
9	0.362	1.4	96.8
10	0.242	1.0	97.8
11	0.166	0.7	98.5
12	0.119	0.5	99.0
13	0.077	0.3	99.3
14	0.059	0.2	99.5
15	0.041	0.2	99.7
16	0.034	0.1	99.9
17	0.019	0.1	99.9
18	0.007	0.0	100.0
19	0.005	0.0	100.0
20	0.002	0.0	100.0
21	0.001	0.0	100.0
22	0.001	0.0	100.0
23	0.000	0.0	100.0
24	0.000	0.0	100.0

TRACE OF ORIGINAL MATRIX = 24.000  
 COMMUNALITY OVER 24 FACTORS = 24.000

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## 17 SOVIET AND CHINESE NATIONAL ATTRIBUTES AND 7 US PERCEPTION VARIABLES

36 CASES 1950 - 1967

VARIABLE NO. NAME	COMMUNALITY 4 FACTORS	ROTATED FACTOR MATRIX			
		1*	2**	3***	4****
SUM SQUARES OVER VARIABLES		8.880	6.568	2.705	2.034
PERCENT OF TOTAL VARIANCE		37.002	27.365	11.272	8.473
1 ECONAID	0.605	[0.696]	-0.068	-0.030	0.338
2 GNP	0.985	[0.875]	-0.430	-0.041	0.178
3 EXPORTS	0.989	[0.955]	-0.231	-0.022	0.151
4 IMPORTS	0.982	[0.947]	-0.236	-0.023	0.172
5 IMPT/GNP	0.687	[0.542]	[0.595]	-0.018	0.196
6 EXPT/GNP	0.875	[0.541]	[0.715]	0.052	0.261
7 ENERGY	0.966	[0.889]	-0.373	-0.023	0.191
8 AGRICPRO	0.922	[0.327]	[0.903]	0.015	0.003
9 STEEL PR	0.989	[0.887]	-0.429	-0.033	0.127
10 POPULIN	0.568	-0.467	[0.862]	0.032	-0.072
11 DEFENCHO	0.970	[0.691]	[0.678]	0.002	0.183
12 DEFC/GNP	0.966	[0.316]	[0.919]	-0.001	0.150
13 FIGHTERS	0.917	0.258	-0.827	-0.095	0.396
14 ARNFORCE	0.802	-0.226	-0.854	-0.019	-0.318
15 SUBMARIN	0.967	[0.975]	0.019	0.027	-0.121
16 ICRMS	0.780	[0.844]	0.078	0.024	-0.248
17 TREATIES	0.836	-0.501	[0.735]	0.121	0.173
18 STRG US	0.594	-0.005	-0.004	-0.184	-0.184
19 WEAK US	0.446	-0.454	-0.224	-0.435	-0.018
20 ACTV US	0.744	-0.048	-0.138	[0.845]	0.096
21 PASS US	0.735	0.010	-0.424	-0.745	0.002
22 POST US	0.502	0.673	-0.015	-0.104	0.344
23 NEG US	0.872	-0.193	-0.062	0.199	[0.890]
24 TPER US	0.928	-0.152	-0.076	[0.776]	[0.545]

## Factor Names:

\* Industrialization and Nuclear Capability

\*\* Conventional Force/Defense Commitment

\*\*\* Perception of US as Active and as a Threat

\*\*\*\* Negative Perception of US

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High Loading Variables

Submarines	.97
Exports	.95
Energy Consumption	.89
Steel Production	.89
ICBM's	.84




FIGURE 18

TWENTY-FOUR SOVIET AND CHINESE ATTRIBUTES: FACTOR I  
INDUSTRIALIZATION AND NUCLEAR CAPABILITY

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High Loading Variables  
 Defense Budget as a Ratio of GNP .92  
 Fighter Aircraft .83  
 Armed Forces .85  
 Agricultural Production -.90




FIGURE 19

TWENTY-FOUR SOVIET AND CHINESE ATTRIBUTES: FACTOR 2  
 CONVENTIONAL FORCE DEFENSE COMMITMENT

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We intercorrelated 24 variables including the 17 attribute variables of the previous two analyses and of the perception variables of the US for the two countries. Tables 19 and 20 present the statistics and correlations. The ICBM variable for the Chinese is included in this study since the absence of ICBM's in China becomes important in light of their presence in the Soviet Union. Excluded from this analysis was the Chinese perceptions of the Soviets and the Soviet perceptions of the Chinese, both of which are included in the interaction portion of the analysis. The positive eigenvalues are presented in Table 21 and the rotated factor matrix in Table 22. We found four factors accounted for 84.1% of total variance. The first factor called Industrialization and Strategic Capability accounts for 37% of the total variance. The second factor called the Commitment to Conventional Defense accounts for another 27% of the total variance. The scores for the two factors are plotted in Figures 18 and 19. Since there are two cases for each of the 18 years, we can plot two separate lines representing the Soviets and Chinese locations as measured by the factor. Standardizing both the Soviets and Chinese on a single variable maintains the relative differences between them while making comparisons between variables possible. The results are startling: more than 64% of our attribute variance as contained in these two summary dynamic patterns shows a gap between the Soviet pattern and the Chinese pattern. Between 1950 and 1967, the Chinese consistently fell behind in industrialization and nuclear capability, while closing the gap in conventional warfare commitment. The conventional military gap in 1967 was the narrowest it had been in any year while the industrialization and nuclear gap was the widest.

(U) These two gaps--both with stable patterns suggest a highly frustrating and potentially destabilizing situation for the Chinese. The Chinese committed increasing portions of their national resources to conventional defense apparently to maintain a stable pattern of growth vis-a-vis the Soviets. This, however, cannot be maintained in the face of ever increasing gaps in industrial and nuclear capability. It is important to note here that the patterns we found were not perceived gaps--that is, measured by our perception variables but were actual gaps measured by "physical" variables. The extent to which the Soviets and Chinese clearly perceived the patterns is unknown. The most recent Soviet arms build-up may indicate that the Soviets indeed have perceived the closing conventional gap and have moved to strengthen their own conventional force capability.

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(U) The scores for factors three and four are plotted in Figures 20 and 21. Both factors represent patterns of perception variables. The third factor is defined by Soviet and Chinese perceptions of the United States as strong, active and threatening. From the plot, it is clear that a marked dissimilarity in perceptions of the US existed between the Soviets and Chinese during the period 1950-1967. It is also clear, however, that no clear-cut pattern emerged. Over the period as a whole, the Chinese perceived the US as more threatening than the Soviets did about as often as the Soviets perceived the US as more threatening than the Chinese did. It would appear from this that the Chinese did not rely on the Soviets for their interpretation or perceptions of US intentions.

(U) The fourth factor is defined by a negative perception of the US. Although the Soviets and Chinese differed in the degree of their negativity their pattern of perceptions from 1957, exhibited a striking similarity, i. e., their negative perception of the US increased and decreased at the same time.

4. Difference Between the Soviets and Chinese on the National Attributes

(U) The joint attribute analysis yielded some interesting hypotheses concerning the gaps between the Soviet and Chinese attributes. In this section we develop a method of measuring and patterning these gaps which allows the prediction of interaction patterns from them.

(U) The first impulse, of course, would be to subtract the Chinese factor scores from the Soviet factor scores in each of the four plots in Figure 18 through 21. We took a different tact, however, arguing that these patterns might indeed best describe the common attribute patterns for the two nations, but that what we really wanted were those patterns representing the dynamic differences between the Soviet and Chinese attributes. The point may appear subtle, but it acutally is a rather major change of perspective. In the joint analysis, for example, we found an industrialization factor which just happened to reflect the difference in growth rates between the Soviets and Chinese. But it is more central to our hypotheses that the differences in Chinese and Soviet growth rates predict to the conflictual interaction patterns between them. To obtain these differences, the actual variable by variable differences were calculated. These differences, give us a way to examine the dynamics of the gaps between the Soviets and Chinese during this eighteen year period. We can again use factor analysis as a way of patterning the dynamics across time. These factors patterns will reflect the situation shown in Figures 18 through 21 but will be more detailed and more sensitive to the shifts in gap from one year to the next.

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High Loading Variables  
 Perception of US as Active .84  
 Perception of US as a Threat .78




FIGURE 20

TWENTY-FOUR SOVIET AND CHINESE ATTRIBUTES: FACTOR 3  
 PERCEPTION OF US AS ACTIVE AND AS A THREAT

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High Loading Variables  
Perception of US as Negative .89




FIGURE 21

TWENTY-FOUR SOVIET AND CHINESE ATTRIBUTES: FACTOR 4  
NEGATIVE PERCEPTION OF US

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(U) Before the analyses were run the variable "economic aid to less developed countries" was dropped. The distribution of the variable is badly skewed, and clearer patterns emerged from the analysis without it. The difference matrix consists, therefore, of 23 variables; 16 physical variables and the 7 US perception variables.

(U) Tables 23 and 24 present the statistics and correlations for the matrix. These correlations are factored four times: first, for the 23 variables, secondly, for the 17 "physical" variables, thirdly, for the 9 economic variables, and fourthly, for the 6 military variables. The different groupings are examined so that in the next section they can be used to discover the set of variables that will best predict to the interactions.

a. Sino-Soviet Differences--23 Attributes

(U) The table of positive eigenvalues for the 23 variables is shown in Table 25. Three factors explain 75.1 percent of the total variance in these 23 variables. The first three factors, therefore, were rotated to an orthogonal simple structure. The rotated factor matrix is shown in Table 26.

(U) As expected, the predominant factor shows a widening gap between the Soviets and Chinese in Industrialization and Nuclear Capability. This factor accounts for 49.6 percent of total variance and is plotted in Figure 22. This gap steadily and rapidly increased since the year 1957, which it might be noted, marked the beginning of the disastrous "Great Leap" in China. As can be seen from Figure 18 in which the individual Chinese and Soviet growth rates are plotted, the widening gap was due to a combination of slow economic and nuclear growth by the Chinese and rapid economic and nuclear growth by the Soviets. It is also interesting to note the high negative loading of population. An increasingly large gap in population is occurring as the industrialization gap widens. However, on this variable, the Chinese are increasing rapidly while the Soviets are experiencing nominal population growth. The reason is due less to differences in population growth rates than it is to the differences in the absolute sizes of the population.

(U) The second and third factors are both indexed by perception variables. The second, plotted in Figure 23, is called the Gap in US Threat Perception. The difference between Soviet and Chinese perceptions of the US as a threat has varied considerably over time although there seems to be a trend since 1962 for the gap to decrease.

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TABLE 23

DIFFERENCES IN SOVIET AND CHINESE NATIONAL ATTRIBUTES AND CONTENT ANALYSIS 24 VARIABLES 1950 - 1967

## STATISTICS

VARIABLE NO. NAME	MEAN	SE	ST DEV	SE	SKEW	KURTOSIS
1 POPULATION	291,500	75,549	326,467	65,023,875	1.325*	0.182
2 GNP	171,167	12,978	55,061	18717,543	0.551	0.107
3 EXPORTS	3571,389	458,598	1945,669	23372256,000	0.561	0.096
4 IMPORTS	3406,722	445,403	1889,687	22046640,000	0.330	0.082
5 LABOR/POP	-1,111	1,071	4,545	127,519	0.919	0.116
6 LABOR/POP	-1,556	0,669	2,753	46,800	-0.404	0.119
7 ENERGY	450652,375	30492,859	129,170,250	103331332096,000	0.736	0.143
8 AGRICULTURE	-70891,625	2855,339	12114,176	906047232,000	0.768	0.123
9 STEEL PR	52212,055	4603,613	19786,035	2417021952,000	0.393	0.105
10 POPULATN	-442453,312	12190,293	51719,039	16514441216,000	-0.227	0.110
11 DEFENSE/POP	10463,087	246,440	1045,558	6749305,000	0.546	0.116
12 DEFENSE/POP	710,000	36,493	156,825	147993,625	0.646	0.113
13 FIGHTERS	8023,941	735,314	3119,674	60087120,000	-0.801	0.134
14 AIRCRAFT	1119,778	159,981	674,500	2808844,000	1.646**	0.209
15 SUBMARIN	23,333	6,657	28,245	4925,437	0.936	0.118
16 TANKS	105,656	45,214	191,825	227162,250	2.586**	0.378
17 TREATIES	-53,111	4,922	20,880	2691,770	0.077	0.128
18 SING US	-48,889	157,837	609,645	2708552,000	-1.389**	0.188
19 SING US	-22,222	74,564	316,348	617865,250	1.525**	0.267
20 ACTIV US	63,611	173,280	735,165	3336020,000	0.252	0.168
21 PASS US	211,889	91,104	366,522	922386,125	0.353	0.108
22 JUST US	375,500	97,769	414,799	1062278,000	0.088	0.129
23 NEW US	-210,222	123,584	524,747	1700054,000	0.375	0.226
24 TPER US	-3576,833	3471,877	14729,926	1339566336,000	-0.168	0.100

SE - SKEW = 0.536

SE - KURTOSIS = 1.030

\* SIGNIFICANT AT .05 LEVEL

\*\* SIGNIFICANT AT .01 LEVEL

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TABLE 24

24 VARIABLES 1950 - 1967

DIFFERENCES IN SOVIET AND CHINESE NATIONAL ATTRIBUTES AND CONTENT ANALYSIS

## CORRELATIONS

NO. VARIABLE	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
	ECONAID	GNP	EXPORTS	IMPORTS	IMPT/GNP	EXPT/GNP	ENERGY	AGRICPRO	STEEL	PR	POPUL TN	DEFNCBUD
												DEFC/GNP
1 ECONAID	1.0000											
2 GNP	C.4979	1.0000										
3 EXPORTS	0.4868	C.9855	1.0000									
4 IMPORTS	0.5280	C.9643	0.9768	1.0000								
5 IMPT/GNP	0.3843	0.6315	C.6773	C.7988	1.0000							
6 EXPT/GNP	0.2630	C.6705	0.7535	0.7640	0.7055	1.0000						
7 ENERGY	C.5434	C.9444	0.9135	0.8693	C.4625	0.4896	1.0000					
8 AGRICPRO	0.4686	0.3778	0.3738	0.3286	0.1799	C.3228	0.2996	1.0000				
9 STEEL PR	0.5372	C.9942	0.9824	0.9607	0.6342	0.6536	0.9505	0.3332	1.0000			
10 POPUL TN	-0.5559	-0.5843	-0.9676	-0.9496	-0.0002	-0.6175	-0.9539	-0.3142	-0.9897	1.0000		
11 DEFNCBUD	0.4037	0.7783	0.8122	C.7637	0.5107	0.6463	C.7298	0.2526	0.7806	-0.7349	1.0000	
12 DEFC/GNP	-0.6201	-0.8950	-0.8470	-0.8703	-0.6387	-0.4925	-0.8569	-0.3740	-0.8895	0.9195	-0.4689	1.0000
13 FIGHTERS	-0.2109	-0.7260	-0.7510	-0.6695	-0.3807	-0.6218	-0.6678	-0.5692	-0.6911	0.6224	-0.7419	0.4356
14 ARMFORCE	-0.3721	-0.5353	-0.5479	-0.5605	-0.5362	-0.3271	-0.5043	-0.4552	-0.5130	0.5407	-0.3942	0.5957
15 SUBMARIN	0.4446	0.9655	0.9781	C.9382	0.6092	0.7268	0.9007	0.4524	0.9565	-0.9288	C.8181	-0.7935
16 ICMS	C.2909	0.8244	C.8097	C.6028	0.1658	0.4676	0.8580	C.4264	0.8039	-0.7897	C.7392	-0.5857
17 TREATIES	-0.5621	-0.3573	-0.3668	-0.5255	-0.6816	-0.4823	-0.2466	0.0038	-0.3902	0.3831	-0.3489	0.4074
18 STRG US	0.3095	-0.0321	-0.0273	-0.0715	-0.2457	-0.0902	0.1712	0.2120	-0.0077	0.0212	C.0761	0.0433
19 WEAK US	-0.1427	-0.3472	-0.3924	-0.3561	-0.2899	-0.5439	-0.2249	-0.4681	-0.2861	0.3179	-0.2402	0.3246
20 ACTV US	-0.0548	0.0111	0.0355	-0.0111	-0.0110	0.0801	C.8969	0.1588	-0.0278	0.0403	0.0822	0.0825
21 PASS US	-0.0318	-0.1867	-0.2284	-0.1855	-0.0447	-0.2819	-0.2071	-0.2348	-0.1914	0.1643	-0.2546	0.0652
22 PUST US	C.1978	0.2475	C.2491	0.2358	0.0675	0.1547	0.1369	0.1193	0.2516	-0.2730	C.1571	-0.2640
23 NEG US	0.2289	0.3312	0.2517	0.2397	-0.0002	-0.0601	0.4411	0.1793	0.3642	-0.3264	0.0328	-0.4031
24 TPER US	0.2640	0.1051	0.0729	0.0208	-0.1865	-0.1185	0.2891	0.2805	0.1113	-0.0796	0.0203	-0.1055

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TABLE 24 - cont'd -

DIFFERENCES IN SOVIET AND CHINESE NATIONAL ATTRIBUTES AND CONTENT ANALYSIS 24 VARIABLES 1950 - 1967

## CORRELATIONS

NO. VARIABLE	13	14	15	15	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24
	FIGHTERS	ARMFORCE	SUBMAKIN	ICBMS	TREATIES	STRG	US WEAK	US ACTV	US PASS	US POST	US NEG	US TPER
13 FIGHTERS	1.0000											
14 ARMFORCE	0.4422	1.0000										
15 SUBMAKIN	-0.8506	-0.5463	1.0000									
16 ICBMS	-0.8485	-0.4058	0.8739	1.0000								
17 TREATIES	0.0379	0.0346	-0.3051	0.0733	1.0000							
18 STRG US	-0.2050	-0.1504	0.0479	0.2547	0.2372	1.0000						
19 WEAK US	0.3862	0.5622	-0.4057	-0.3229	0.0455	-0.0375	1.0000					
20 ACTV US	-0.3426	-0.3970	0.1075	0.1761	0.2374	0.2055	-0.5170	1.0000				
21 PASS US	0.4931	0.4526	-0.3260	-0.4044	-0.2869	-0.5413	0.4135	-0.5818	1.0000			
22 POST US	-0.0700	0.0346	0.2563	0.2109	-0.2098	-0.0765	-0.0802	-0.5395	0.0909	1.0000		
23 NEG US	-0.1644	0.0788	0.2464	0.2979	0.1023	0.2987	0.3537	-0.1726	0.0337	-0.0836	1.0000	
24 TPER US	-0.3354	-0.2174	0.1562	0.3372	0.3336	0.7719	-0.0982	0.5418	-0.5227	-0.3626	0.5796	1.0000

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TABLE 25

Differences in Soviet and Chinese Attributes

## TABLE OF POSITIVE EIGENVALUES

NO.	EIGENVALUE	PERCENT OF COMMUNALITY	
		ALL ( 18 ) FACTORS	Each Cumulative
1	11.405	49.6	49.6
2	3.591	15.6	65.2
3	2.284	9.9	75.1
4	1.333	5.8	80.9
5	1.076	4.7	85.6
6	0.914	4.0	89.6
7	0.776	3.4	93.0
8	0.502	2.2	95.1
9	0.445	1.9	97.1
10	0.296	1.3	98.4
11	0.173	0.8	99.1
12	0.124	0.5	99.6
13	0.044	0.2	99.8
14	0.021	0.1	99.9
15	0.010	0.0	100.0
16	0.005	0.0	100.0
17	0.001	0.0	100.0
18	0.000	0.0	100.0

TRACE OF ORIGINAL MATRIX = 23.000  
 COMMUNALITY OVER 18 FACTORS = 23.000

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TABLE 26

## DIFFERENCES IN SOVIET AND CHINESE NATIONAL ATTRIBUTES AND CONTENT ANALYSIS

VARIABLE NO. NAME	COMMUNALITY 3 FACTORS	ROTATED FACTOR MATRIX			23 VARIABLES 1950 - 1967
		1*	2**	3***	
SUM SQUARES OVER VARIABLES		10.934	3.275	3.070	
PERCENT OF TOTAL VARIANCE		47.540	14.240	13.346	
1 GNP	0.985	0.989	-0.037	0.078	
2 EXPORTS	0.986	0.978	-0.087	0.155	
3 IMPORTS	0.976	0.960	-0.191	0.133	
4 IMPT/GNP	0.691	0.829	-0.491	0.232	
5 EXPT/GNP	0.719	0.658	-0.339	0.413	
6 ENERGY	0.933	0.947	0.187	-0.018	
7 AGRICPRO	0.322	0.394	-0.216	0.347	
8 STEEL PR	0.986	0.982	-0.030	0.026	
9 POPULIN	0.955	0.976	-0.053	-0.022	
10 DEFNCROD	0.655	0.778	-0.071	0.212	
11 DEFC/GNP	0.789	0.885	-0.073	0.032	
12 FLIGHTERS	0.748	0.720	-0.251	-0.409	
13 ARMFORCE	0.586	-0.497	-0.058	-0.579	
14 SUBMARIN	0.571	0.961	0.016	0.217	
15 ICBMS	0.810	0.813	0.352	0.159	
16 TREATIES	0.550	-0.391	0.425	0.084	
17 STRG US	0.586	0.648	-0.752	0.118	
18 WEAK US	0.716	-0.266	0.105	-0.797	
19 ACTV US	0.749	-0.066	0.377	0.776	
20 PASS US	0.678	-0.176	-0.484	-0.642	
21 POST US	0.239	0.285	-0.311	-0.267	
22 NEG US	0.786	0.400	0.574	-0.543	
23 TPER US	0.861	0.141	0.902	0.167	

Factor Names:

\* Industrialization and Nuclear Capability Gap

\*\* Gap in US Threat Perception

\*\*\* Gap in Perception of US as Active

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# High Loading Variables

Difference in GNP	.99
Difference in Exports	.98
Difference in Steel Production	.99
Difference in Submarines	.96
Difference in ICBM's	.81

Factor  
Scores




FIGURE 22

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE SOVIETS AND CHINESE ON 23 ATTRIBUTES: FACTOR  
INDUSTRIALIZATION AND NUCLEAR CAPABILITY GAP

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High Loading Variables  
Difference in Perception of US  
as Threat .90




FIGURE 23

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE SOVIETS AND CHINESE ON 23 ATTRIBUTES: FACTOR 2  
GAP IN US THREAT PERCEPTION

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(U) The third factor, plotted in Figure 24, is called the Gap in Perception of US as Active. It evidences a fluctuating but generally upward trend since 1956; that is, the gap between Soviet and Chinese perceptions of the US being active has increased. The differences between the Soviets and Chinese in their perceptions of the US has been mentioned as an important element infringing upon the increasing Sino-Soviet hostility. This hypothesis is further examined in Section VI of the report where the results of the gap analysis are related to the interaction patterns.

b. Sino-Soviet Differences - 16 "Physical" Attributes

(U) The table of positive eigenvalues for the differences in 16 variables is shown in Table 27. Variable statistics and correlations are shown in Tables 23 and 24. The first three factors explain 86.4 percent of the total variance in the 16 variables. We rotated these three factors to an orthogonal simple structure. The rotated factor matrix is shown in Table 28.

(U) The predominant factor here, as in the 23 variable solution, is the Industrialization and Nuclear Capability Gap. The scores for the factor are plotted in Figure 25. The difference between the Soviets and the Chinese in measures of economic growth and nuclear capability is rapidly widening. The population variable again loaded negatively indicating the increasingly wide disparity between the size of the populations in each country.

(U) With the perception variables eliminated, the second factor describes a pattern of Treaties and Trade Gap. The scores for the factor are plotted in Figure 26. The gap between the number of treaties that the Soviets and Chinese each signed with the world increased to a high in 1964 and decreased rapidly to a low in 1967. The Chinese consistently signed more treaties than the Soviets every year and essentially caused the shape of the pattern. In 1967, the Chinese signed less treaties than in any previous year except 1951. The indexing trade variable is the "ratio of imports to GNP." From 1950 to 1960, the gap fluctuated but the Chinese ratio was consistently higher. The Soviet ratio was larger from 1961 to 1965. The two countries were even in 1966 with the Chinese gaining again in 1967. By 1967, the treaties gap was decreasing, and the trade dependence gap was increasing: The Chinese were nearing a low in treaties signed and were at a high in trade dependency.

(U) The third factor describes the pattern of the gap between the Soviets and Chinese in agricultural production and conventional military forces. The factor scores are plotted in Figure 27. The gap between the two countries in agricultural production has varied considerably over time with the Soviets consistently behind. The gap between the Soviets and Chinese in conventional forces has also fluctuated over time with the Chinese tending to close the gap since 1961.

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


FIGURE 24

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE SOVIETS AND CHINESE ON 23 ATTRIBUTES: FACTOR 3  
 GAP IN PERSPECTIVE OF US AS ACTIVE

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TABLE 27

Differences in Soviet and Chinese Attributes  
16 Variables

TABLE OF POSITIVE EIGENVALUES		PERCENT OF COMMUNALITY ALL 16 FACTORS	
NO.	EIGENVALUE	Each	Cumulative
1	10.992	68.7	68.7
2	1.785	11.2	79.9
3	1.054	6.6	86.4
4	0.960	6.0	92.4
5	0.553	3.5	95.9
6	0.328	2.0	98.0
7	0.166	1.0	99.0
8	0.101	0.6	99.6
9	0.039	0.2	99.9
10	0.010	0.1	99.9
11	0.006	0.0	100.0
12	0.003	0.0	100.0
13	0.002	0.0	100.0
14	0.001	0.0	100.0
15	0.000	0.0	100.0
16	0.000	0.0	100.0
TRACE OF ORIGINAL MATRIX =		16.000	
COMMUNALITY OVER 16 FACTORS =		16.000	

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TABLE 28

DIFFERENCES IN SOVIET AND CHINESE NATIONAL ATTRIBUTES		16 VARIABLES 1950-1967 3 FACTORS			
		ROTATED		MATRIX	
		1 *	2 **	3 ***	
SUM SQUARES OVER VARIABLES	8.184	3.389	2.257		
PERCENT OF TOTAL VARIANCE	51.152	21.184	14.106		

VARIABLE NO.	NAME	COMMUNALITY	3 FACTORS
1	GNP	0.983	
2	EXPORTS	0.990	
3	IMPORTS	0.992	
4	IMPORT/GNP	0.913	
5	EXPORT/GNP	0.935	
6	ENERGY	0.922	
7	AGRICULTURE	0.791	
8	STEEL OR	0.981	
9	POPULATION	0.950	
10	DEFENSE	0.699	
11	OFFICERS	0.756	
12	FIGHTERS	0.782	
13	ARMY	0.656	
14	SUBMARINE	0.912	
15	ICBMS	0.982	
16	TREATIES	0.818	

Factor Names:

\* Industrialization and Nuclear Capability Gap

\*\* Treaties and Trade Dependence Gap

\*\*\* Agricultural Production and Conventional Forces Gap

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


FIGURE 25

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE SOVIETS AND CHINESE ON 16 ATTRIBUTES: FACTOR 1  
INDUSTRIALIZATION AND NUCLEAR CAPABILITY GAP

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High Loading Variables  
 Difference in Ratio of Imports  
 to GNP . 87  
 Difference in Treaties -. 89




FIGURE 26

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE SOVIETS AND CHINESE ON 16 ATTRIBUTES: FACTOR 2

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High Loading Variables  
 Differences in Agricultural Production .87  
 Differences in Armed Forces -.71  
 Difference in Fighter Aircraft -.51




FIGURE 27

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE SOVIETS AND CHINESE ON 16 ATTRIBUTES: FACTOR 2  
 AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION AND CONVENTIONAL FORCES GAP

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c. Sino-Soviet Differences - 9 Economic Attributes

(U) A factor analysis was performed on the 9 economic attributes. Variable statistics and correlations are presented in Tables 23 and 24. The table of positive eigenvalues for the variables is shown in Table 29. Three of these factors explain 96.1 percent of total variance. The three factors were rotated to an orthogonal simple structure. The rotated factor matrix is presented in Table 30.

(U) The first factor explains 77.0 percent of the variance and is appropriately labeled the Industrialization Gap. Here again, the dominant pattern is the difference between the Soviets and Chinese in economic growth. The factor scores are plotted in Figure 28.

(U) The second factor explains 9.8 percent of total variance and is called the Soviet and Chinese Agricultural Production Gap. The factor scores are plotted in Figure 29. The Soviets have consistently lagged behind the Chinese in total agricultural production.

(U) The third factor, the Trade Dependence Gap explains 9.3 percent of total variance and describes the difference between the Soviets and Chinese in terms of world trade dependency. The pattern shows the dynamics of this factor across time with the final downswing---from 1962 on---representing decreased Soviet dependency and increased Chinese dependency on external trade. The factor scores are plotted in Figure 30.

d. Sino-Soviet Differences - 6 Military Attributes

(U) Only the 6 military variables were factor analyzed in this analysis. The variable statistics and correlations are presented in Tables 23 and 24. The table of positive eigenvalues for the variables is shown in Table 31. Three factors explain 92.8 percent of total variance. These three factors were rotated to an orthogonal simple structure. The rotated factor matrix is shown in Table 32.

(U) The predominant factor is the Nuclear Capability Gap. The factor explains 70.8 percent of total variance and therefore describes the major pattern existing between the Soviets and Chinese in differences on their military attributes. The factor scores are plotted in Figure 31. The pattern describes the Soviet's rapidly increasing nuclear capability---as measured by the total number of ICBM's deployed and submarines with nuclear missile launching capability---while the Chinese were making only slow progress. Also included in this pattern was the decreasing gap between the Soviets and Chinese in fighter aircraft. The Soviets decreased their conventional aircraft as they passed into the nuclear age, while the Chinese continued to rapidly expand theirs.

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TABLE 29

Differences in Soviet and Chinese  
Economic Attributes - 9 Variables

TABLE OF POSITIVE EIGENVALUES

NO.	EIGENVALUE	PERCENT OF COMMUNALITY	
		ALL 9 FACTORS	Each Cumulative
1	6.928	77.0	77.0
2	0.884	9.8	86.8
3	0.837	9.3	96.1
4	0.287	3.2	99.3
5	0.037	0.4	99.7
6	0.016	0.2	99.9
7	0.006	0.1	99.9
8	0.003	0.0	100.0
9	0.002	0.0	100.0
TRACE OF ORIGINAL MATRIX =		9.000	
COMMUNALITY OVER 9 FACTORS =		9.000	

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TABLE 30

DIFFERENCES IN SOVIET AND CHINESE ECONOMIC ATTRIBUTES 1950 - 1967 9 VARIABLES

## ROTATED FACTOR MATRIX

FACTOR NUMBER		1 *	2 **	3 ***
SUM SQUARES OVER VARIABLES		50.015	1.126	2.507
PERCENT OF TOTAL VARIANCE		55.722	12.511	27.860

VARIABLE NO.	NAME	COMMUNALITY 3 FACTORS
1	GNP	0.994
2	EXPORTS	0.988
3	IMPORTS	0.993
4	IMPT/GNP	0.879
5	EXPT/GNP	0.848
6	ENERGY	0.974
7	AGRICPRO	0.902
8	STEEL PR	0.995
9	POPUL TN	0.986

0.897	0.185	0.392
0.847	0.185	0.496
0.782	0.125	0.596
0.324	-0.003	0.679
0.339	0.214	0.629
0.967	0.116	0.161
0.174	0.975	0.109
0.910	0.136	0.385
-0.926	-0.119	-0.340

Factor Names:

- \* Industrialization Gap
- \*\* Agricultural Production Gap
- \*\*\* Trade Dependency Gap

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High Loading Variables  
 Difference in Energy Consumption .97  
 Difference in Steel Production .91  
 Difference in Population -.93




FIGURE 28

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE SOVIETS AND CHINESE ON 9 ECONOMIC ATTRIBUTES: FACTOR 1  
INDUSTRIALIZATION GAP

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High Loading Variables  
Difference in Agricultural  
Production

.97

Factor  
Scores




FIGURE 29

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE SOVIETS AND CHINESE ON 9 ECONOMIC ATTRIBUTES: FACTOR 2  
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION GAP

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High Loading Variables  
 Difference in Imports as a .88  
 Ratio of GNP  
 Difference in Exports as a .83  
 Ratio of GNP




FIGURE 30

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE SOVIETS AND CHINESE ON 9 ECONOMIC ATTRIBUTES: FACTOR 3  
TRADE DEPENDENCY GAP

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TABLE 31  
Differences in Soviet and Chinese Military Attributes

TABLE OF POSITIVE EIGENVALUES		
NO.	EIGENVALUE	PERCENT OF COMMUNALITY
		ALL 6 FACTORS
1	4.246	Each Cumulative
2	0.869	70.8
3	0.451	14.5
4	0.294	85.2
5	0.130	7.5
6	0.011	92.8
		97.7
		99.8
		100.0
TRACE OF ORIGINAL MATRIX =		6.000
COMMUNALITY OVER 6 FACTORS =		6.000

TABLE 32

DIFFERENCES IN SOVIET AND CHINESE MILITARY ATTRIBUTES 1950 - 1967

SUM SQUARES OVER VARIABLES PERCENT OF TOTAL VARIANCE	FACTOR NUMBER		
	1 *	2 **	3 ***
	3.060	1.117	1.388
	50.997	18.622	23.141

VARIABLE COMMUNALITY  
NO. NAME 3 FACTORS

1 DEFCRUD	0.801	-0.160	-0.193
2 DEFC/GNP	0.956	+0.306	0.909
3 FIGHTERS	0.909	+0.233	0.115
4 ARMFURCE	0.997	+0.534	0.277
5 SUBMARIN	0.983	+0.243	-0.551
6 ICHMS	0.880	-0.113	-0.364

Factor Names:

\* Nuclear Capability Gap

\*\* Armed Forces Gap

\*\*\* Defense Allocation as a Percent of GNP

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High Loading Variables  
 Difference in Fighter Aircraft    -.92  
 Difference in Defense Budget    .86  
 Difference in ICBM's    .86




FIGURE 31  
 DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE SOVIETS AND CHINESE  
 ON 6 MILITARY ATTRIBUTES: FACTOR 1:  
NUCLEAR CAPABILITY GAP



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(U) The second factor, the Armed Forces Gap is primarily a pattern of the gap between the Soviets and Chinese in total number of men under arms over time. This factor explains 14.5 percent of total variance. The factor scores are plotted in Figure 32. The first part of the pattern is explained by the demobilization of Chinese forces after the Korean War at the same time that the Soviets were increasing the total size of their armed forces. Since 1956, the pattern was mainly one of a narrowing gap as the Soviets decreased the numerical size of their armed forces.

(U) The third factor explains 7.5 percent of total variance and describes the gap between the Soviets and Chinese in Defense Allocation as a Percentage of GNP. The factor scores are plotted in Figure 33. The Soviets allocated their greatest percentage for defense in 1952 but spent increasingly less---percentage wise---through 1967. The Chinese, however, fluctuated till 1957 but slowly increased their defense allocation percentage through 1967. The result was a decrease in the gap between the Soviets and Chinese. It should be noted that the increase in Chinese defense allocation was due not only to a slightly increasing defense budget but also to an erratic and sometimes decreasing GNP.

C. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL ATTRIBUTE ANALYSIS

(U) The major findings from the analyses of Soviet and Chinese national attributes are summarized as follows:

1. Industrialization is the most significant dynamic attribute pattern for both the Soviets and Chinese. It occurs in each analysis as the first and strongest factor, always characterized by a pattern of industrial growth over time.
2. The Nuclear Transition factor appears as the second strongest factor for the Soviets. It is characterized by diplomatic and conventional military behavior--for example, increasing numbers of bilateral treaties signed and rising fighter aircraft production--until 1960 when both proceed to fall off. Coupled with the decrease in Soviet conventional development after 1960 is an increase in their strategic development priorities as indexed by submarine and ICBM production.

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


FIGURE 32

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE SOVIETS AND CHINESE ON 6 MILITARY ATTRIBUTES: FACTOR 2  
ARMED FORCES GAP

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High Loading Variables  
Difference in Defense Budget  
as a Ratio of GNP .91




FIGURE 33

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE SOVIETS AND CHINESE ON 6 MILITARY ATTRIBUTES -FACTOR 3:  
DEFENSE ALLOCATION AS PERCENTAGE OF GNP GAP

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3. When Soviet perceptions of the Chinese (derived from content analysis) were included in the analysis of their national attributes, a new pattern emerged. This new pattern evidenced a changing Soviet view of the Chinese as indexed by the weak, active, negative and threat potential variables. Moscow's perceptions of the Chinese were generally of a decreasing magnitude or intensity as measured by these variables until about 1957 when a transitional period lasting until 1960 occurs. In the post-1960 period a sharp upswing in magnitude is evidenced by all of the variables. This factor we call the Paper Tiger Syndrome. This pattern contradicts the hypothesis that as one nation perceives another nation as negative, he will also perceive that nation as stronger and more active -- this being a rationalization for his negative feelings. The analyses carried out in this study indicate that while the Soviets did perceive the Chinese as negative and active they did not at the same time perceive them as stronger.
4. A similar "paper tiger" pattern also appears in the analyses of the Chinese national attributes. The Chinese simultaneously perceived the Soviets as negative, threatening and weak. An interesting divergence in the two patterns is that while 1959 marked the point at which the Chinese perceptions of the USSR began an upswing in magnitude, the Soviets did not exhibit a similar pattern toward China until 1960.
5. The difference analysis and the 36 case analyses reveal that generally Soviet perceptions of the United States are independent of--that is not related to--Chinese views of the US across identical time frames. Furthermore, the attribute analysis revealed that changing Soviet perceptions of the CPR formed a pattern through the years quite unrelated to Soviet perceptions of the US. It should be noted that this finding contradicts our interpretation of Newcomb's model of interactive behavior which when applied to the Sino-Soviet relationship would hypothesize that the Soviet perception of China on the positive-negative dimensions should be related--either positively or negatively--to their view of the United States. A reason for the lack of support for the model may be due to the fact that we aggregated values per year over an 18-year period. We did not in this study examine Soviet perceptions of the US and China at critical points in time and at differing levels of tension--e.g., during periods of detente as compared to periods of high crisis. This caveat notwithstanding, it is extremely significant that at least in the long run there exists little relationship between Soviet and Chinese perceptions of each other and their perceptions of the US.

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6. In the analyses of the absolute differences existing between the Soviets and Chinese on each of the national attribute variables, several relevant patterns emerged. The factors which emerged identified gaps between the two Communist powers in three areas: industrialization, nuclear capability, and in their perceptions of the United States. The gaps in two of these areas--industrialization and nuclear capability--are ever widening and have been steadily and rapidly increasing since 1957. On the other hand, the gap between Moscow's and Peking's perceptions of the US as indexed by the active and potential threat variables exhibit no consistent trend; rather it varies considerably over time.

1  
1  
1

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SECTION V

SINO-SOVIET INTERACTION ANALYSIS

A. DESCRIPTION OF DATA

(U) The analysis of national attributes of the Soviet Union and Communist China and their differences on these attributes was reported in Section IV, and their dynamic patterns were delineated. We turn now to the analysis of the Sino-Soviet relationship as indexed by interactions across the same time period, 1950-1967. As noted earlier, it is our ultimate objective to predict from Soviet and Chinese national attributes to their interactions. It is therefore necessary that the dependent variable, fluctuations and patterns in interactions, be described for this period.

(U) The types of interactions between nations cover a wide spectrum of activity. A process of selection was therefore undertaken to choose the most important and relevant indicators of this type of behavior. The process was mainly influenced by three factors: (1) those variables that had been identified in earlier research as important indicators; (2) those variables considered important by virtue of the uniqueness of the dyadic relationship of the Soviets and Chinese itself; and (3) those variables which have high importance to policy planners.

(U) In a survey of previous research concerned with the interactions between nations, Rummel's work was found to be the most advanced and most relevant to this study. Through four factor analyses of four different samples of data, he determined that eight dimensions of dyadic behavior existed for 1955: salience, emigration and communication, UN voting, exports, foreign students, international organizations, official conflict behavior and diplomatic representation.<sup>56</sup> The indexing variables of these dimensions, that is, the measure that was central to the cluster of behaviors defined by a dimension, were considered an important element to include in the study. All of these variables that were applicable to an analysis of Sino-Soviet relations were included in our data set.

(U) Several variables that Rummel did not use were added to the study because of their special significance in providing a better understanding of Soviet and Chinese relations. For example, broadcasts by the Soviet Union to China and vice versa have been used by these countries as a media for accusations and bitter polemics. Soviet and Chinese broadcasts were, therefore, included as

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<sup>56</sup>See Rummel, "Indicators of Cross-national and International Patterns," op. cit.

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measures of hostility. It should be noted that a few variables deemed important to the analysis were not included due to the unavailability of data. In all, within the space of all behavior and a subspace of all Soviet and Chinese relations a set of 31 Sino-Soviet behavioral variables were finally selected.

(U) In addition to the 31 behavioral variables, 14 perceptual variables were included in the data set. As stated in Section IV, perceptual variables were added because of the important role that verbal and written communications have played in the Sino-Soviet relationship and because of the generally held belief that the perceptions of a nation's leadership influence the foreign policy of that nation.

(U) Data were collected for all of these 45 interaction variables by year for the period 1950 to 1967. Table 33 lists the 45 variable names and the 8 character computer acronyms for each. These 45 variables have been labeled the Sino-Soviet Interaction Set.

B. ANALYSES OF SINO-SOVIET INTERACTIONS

(U) Two factor analyses are performed on the data in this section. The complete set of 45 variables is first analyzed, the dimensions examined and plotted. The 14 perception variables are then deleted and the 31 remaining variables are re-analyzed and their dimensions examined and plotted.

1. Sino-Soviet Interaction Analysis - 45 Variables

(U) Statistics for the 45 Sino-Soviet interactions are presented in Table 34. The majority of the measures had an approximately normal distribution across time from 1950-1967, although measures of Soviet economic aid (Variables 1 and 2), types of Sino-Soviet treaties signed (Variables 8-13), measures of Sino-Soviet official visits (Variables 13-16), Sino-Soviet broadcasts (Variables 17 and 18) and a few perception variables are skewed. Table 35 shows the Pearson product-moment correlations between these 45 measures.

The correlations among the perception variables and the correlations between the perception variables and the other interactions are the most interesting. Several relationships are worthy of note:

- (1) There are high correlations between Soviet perceptions of the Chinese as being active, negative and weak. There are also high correlations between Chinese perceptions of the Soviets as being active, negative and weak;

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TABLE 33

SOVIET AND CHINESE INTERACTION AND PERCEPTION VARIABLES:  
ACRONYM TABLE

<u>Variable Name</u>	<u>Eight Character Computer Code Name</u>
Soviet Economic Aid to China	SUECAID
Soviet Relative Economic Aid to China	RSUECAID
Soviet Civil Technicians in China	SUCTCPR
Chinese Civil Technicians Trained in Soviet Union	CPRCTSU
Soviet Military Aid to China	SUMILAI
Chinese Students in the Soviet Union	CPRSTSU
Sino-Soviet Treaties	SSTREATY
Sino-Soviet Economic Treaties	S\$ECONTR
Sino-Soviet Scientific and Technical Treaties	S\$\$-TTR
Sino-Soviet Diplomatic and Political Treaties	SSD-PTR
Sino-Soviet Cultural Treaties	SSCULTR
Sino-Soviet Communications Treaties	SSCOMMTR
Soviet Official Visits to China	SUOFVCPR
Chinese Official Visits to the Soviet Union	CPROFVSU
Soviet Official Visit Days to China	SUOVDCPR
Chinese Official Visit Days to the Soviet Union	CPROVDSU
Soviet Broadcast Hours Per Week to China	SUBRCCPR
Chinese Broadcast Hours Per Week to the Soviet Union	CPRBRCSU
Soviet Cultural Delegations to China	SUCLDCPR
Chinese Cultural Delegations to the Soviet Union	CPRCLDSU
Soviet Exports to China	SUEXPCPR
Soviet Imports from China	SUIMPCPR
Relative Soviet Exports to China	RSUEXCPR
Relative Soviet Imports from China	RSUIMCPR
Relative Chinese Exports to the Soviet Union	RCPREXSU
Relative Chinese Imports from the Soviet Union	RCPRIMSU
Soviet Export of Petroleum to China	SUPETCPR
Relative Soviet Export of Petroleum to China	RSUPTCPR
Soviet Military Forces in Border Area	SUFORBOR
Chinese Military Forces in Border Area	CPRFORBR
Border Incidents	BORINCID
China Perceived as Strong by the Soviet Union	SU ST CC
China Perceived as Weak by the Soviet Union	SU WK CC
China Perceived as Active by the Soviet Union	SU AC CC

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TABLE 33 (CONTINUED)

SOVIET AND CHINESE INTERACTION AND PERCEPTION VARIABLES:  
ACRONYM TABLE (CONTINUED)

<u>Variable Name</u>	<u>Eight Character Computer Code Name</u>
China Perceived as Passive by the Soviet Union	SU PA CC
China Perceived as Positive by the Soviet Union	SU PO CC
China Perceived as Negative by the Soviet Union	SU NG CC
Perceived Threat from China by the Soviet Union	SU TP CC
Soviet Union Perceived as Strong by China	CC ST SU
Soviet Union Perceived as Weak by China	CC WK SU
Soviet Union Perceived as Active by China	CC AC SU
Soviet Union Perceived as Passive by China	CC PA SU
Soviet Union Perceived as Positive by China	CC PO SU
Soviet Union Perceived as Negative by China	CC NG SU
Perceived Threat from the Soviet Union by China	CC TP SU

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## STATISTICS

VARIABLE NO.	NAME	MEAN	SE	ST DEV	SE	SKEW	KURTOSIS
1	SUSCAID	224.000	103.688	439.913	1194803.000	2.563**	0.375
2	SUSFCAID	19.167	8.208	34.822	7406.426	1.919**	0.214
3	SUCTCPR	0.611	0.115	0.687	1.467	-0.543	0.067
4	CPACTSU	0.667	0.111	0.471	1.372	-0.842	0.083
5	SUMILAI	0.556	0.117	0.497	1.524	-0.266	0.058
6	CPUSTSU	2054.944	506.935	2150.320	28547568.000	0.765	0.092
7	SSIKREAY	11.611	1.395	5.917	216.184	0.605	0.106
8	SSCONTR	3.722	0.532	2.256	31.422	1.070*	0.169
9	SSS-TTR	2.278	0.470	1.995	24.562	1.742**	0.262
10	SSS-PIR	1.000	0.324	1.374	11.662	1.682**	0.247
11	SSCULTR	1.778	0.389	1.652	16.845	1.306*	0.197
12	SSCUMTR	2.444	0.410	1.739	18.674	1.130*	0.197
13	SULFVCPK	0.444	0.180	0.762	3.582	1.571**	0.167
14	CPMUFVSU	0.833	0.252	1.067	7.031	1.053*	0.130
15	SULVDCPR	2.667	1.336	5.567	198.252	3.130**	0.523
16	CPXOVVSU	5.809	4.469	18.959	2219.115	2.940**	0.472
17	SOURCCPR	44.500	8.247	75.988	7557.770	2.839**	0.490
18	CPKBRCSU	37.556	17.867	75.803	35475.656	3.233**	0.559
19	SUCLDCPR	21.278	3.476	14.749	1343.045	0.633	0.106
20	CPRLCDSU	36.778	5.829	24.729	3775.409	0.143	0.093
21	SUETPCPR	486.278	60.897	258.364	412124.750	0.092	0.092
22	SUIMPCPR	550.444	55.631	236.021	343926.625	0.653	0.149
23	RSUEXCPR	12.889	2.044	8.672	464.342	-0.212	0.075
24	RSUIMCPR	13.333	1.552	6.583	267.530	-0.402	0.090
25	RCPRXVSU	37.111	2.995	12.706	996.677	-0.864	0.123
26	RCPRINSU	38.111	5.141	21.812	2937.355	-0.070	0.092
27	SUPTCPR	1870.444	171.797	728.872	3279941.000	0.011	0.114
28	RSUPTCPR	13.111	2.446	10.376	664.652	1.167*	0.164
29	SUFORCPR	8.556	0.568	2.409	35.824	-0.110	0.089
30	CPAFURBR	2.776	0.201	0.853	4.497	0.526	0.084
31	LCRINCID	C.889	0.247	1.048	6.784	0.955	0.128
32	SU ST CC	3844.222	81.073	343.962	730441.187	0.476	0.130
33	SU RK CC	239.556	22.818	90.807	57859.691	0.776	0.147
34	SU AC CC	3134.885	78.120	331.437	678212.312	0.383	0.129
35	SU PA CC	877.000	46.006	169.730	177859.750	1.619**	0.284
36	SU PO CC	3035.833	149.487	634.219	2483370.000	-0.808	0.127
37	SU NG CC	566.000	123.534	524.112	1695942.000	0.779	0.106
38	SU TP CC	11739.164	1581.634	6710.305	278061920.000	0.867	0.121
39	CC ST SU	3769.611	76.936	326.411	657797.125	C.100	0.139
40	CC WK SU	281.833	32.885	139.520	120180.312	0.764	0.125
41	CC AC SU	2998.270	84.150	357.018	786945.125	-0.590	0.125
42	CC PA SU	817.389	35.061	148.753	136614.375	-0.335	0.104
43	CC PU SU	3044.500	198.459	799.564	3947018.000	-0.799	0.160
44	CC NG SU	590.944	157.183	666.073	2745672.000	1.525**	0.185
45	CC TP SU	11248.441	1833.817	7780.227	373721688.000	1.546**	0.204

SE - SKEW = 0.536

SE - KURTOSIS = 1.038

\* SIGNIFICANT AT .05 LEVEL  
\*\* SIGNIFICANT AT .01 LEVEL

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TABLE 35

Soviet and Chinese Interactions with Content Analysis 1950-1967 45 Variables

NO. VARIABLE	CORRELATIONS											
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
1 SUECAID												
2 RSUECAID	1.0000											
3 SUCICPR	0.2772	0.4162	1.0000									
4 CPRCISU	0.3601	0.3892	0.8864	1.0000								
5 SUMILCAID	0.2237	0.3542	0.8919	0.7406	1.0000							
6 CPRSTSU	0.3101	0.1618	0.5859	0.6039	0.4708	1.0000						
7 SSTREATY	0.0606	0.1284	0.4868	0.6108	0.5458	0.4922	1.0000					
8 SSECONTR	0.1080	0.3415	0.3059	0.4874	0.4350	0.0428	0.7784	1.0000				
9 SSS-TTR	0.0909	0.1233	0.4539	0.5121	0.5169	0.7188	0.5269	0.1900	1.0000			
10 SSD-PTR	-0.1067	-0.0836	0.5004	0.5145	0.5694	0.3170	0.7924	0.5555	0.2837	1.0000		
11 SSCULTR	-0.0833	-0.2099	-0.0383	0.2616	-0.1203	0.5870	0.4516	0.1176	0.3391	0.0979	1.0000	
12 SSCONTR	-0.0895	-0.0333	0.1383	0.0452	0.1643	-0.0070	0.5026	0.3208	-0.2438	0.4881	0.1117	1.0000
13 SUDVFCPR	-0.1429	-0.1033	0.1662	0.1031	0.2283	0.4009	0.3218	0.0718	0.7478	0.2653	0.3876	0.2283
14 CPRFVSU	-0.1603	-0.2773	-0.0178	0.2209	-0.1397	0.1989	0.4736	0.2808	-0.1348	0.3798	0.4723	0.4590
15 SUDVFCPR	-0.1293	-0.1016	0.2547	0.2089	0.3025	0.5056	0.4518	0.0971	0.1655	0.3923	0.5025	0.5111
16 CPRFVSU	-0.0583	-0.1621	0.2473	0.2880	0.0891	0.0415	0.4049	0.3539	-0.1123	0.7242	0.1074	0.3739
17 SUDVFCPR	-0.1753	-0.1855	-0.5228	-0.6501	-0.4154	-0.4356	-0.5494	-0.4740	-0.3363	-0.3374	-0.4018	-0.1360
18 CPRFVSU	-0.2523	-0.2727	-0.6211	-0.7037	-0.5539	-0.4558	-0.5588	-0.4611	-0.3405	-0.3605	-0.3123	-0.2206
19 SUDVFCPR	0.2416	0.1441	0.5791	0.5806	0.4338	0.9516	0.4214	0.0391	0.6432	0.2686	0.5544	-0.0460
20 CPRFVSU	0.2324	0.3004	0.8177	0.8277	0.7606	0.8975	0.5959	0.2787	0.7041	0.4561	0.4150	0.0462
21 SUDVFCPR	0.5126	0.5263	0.8649	0.8401	0.7055	0.7375	0.4489	0.2635	0.6247	0.3556	0.2015	-0.0894
22 SUDVFCPR	0.2224	0.1197	0.4394	0.4542	0.2902	0.8656	0.3143	-0.0353	0.6083	0.1209	0.5684	-0.1067
23 RSUECAID	0.4591	0.5727	0.9359	0.8742	0.5910	0.3962	0.4906	0.4698	0.4482	0.5034	-0.1762	0.0733
24 SUDVFCPR	0.7897	0.3937	0.9233	0.8772	0.5775	0.7471	0.5453	0.3205	0.6276	0.4483	0.1754	0.0890

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TABLE 35 Cont'd.

1950 - 1967 45 VARIABLES												
NO. VARIABLE	CORRELATIONS											
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
SUECALD	45UECALD	SUCTCPR	CPRCTSU	SUMILALD	CPRSTSU	SSIREATY	SSECONTR	SSS-JTR	SSD-PTR	SSCULTR	SSCCMTR	
25 KCPREXSU	0.3990	0.4545	0.8411	0.8503	0.7822	0.6343	0.5200	0.3868	0.4920	0.3245	0.2156	0.1838
26 KCPREXSU	0.3755	0.4772	0.8870	0.8519	0.8452	0.2073	0.5599	0.5629	0.3339	0.6042	-0.1612	0.1876
27 SUPPTCPR	0.0413	-0.0202	0.5444	0.7288	0.3719	0.4440	0.3743	0.2983	0.3041	0.2800	0.4377	-0.0744
28 SUPPTCPR	-0.2281	-0.2837	-0.3105	-0.0947	-0.3137	0.0815	0.1699	0.1675	-0.0176	-0.1364	0.4844	0.1358
29 SUPPTCPR	-0.2453	-0.1051	-0.3437	-0.4729	-0.3043	-0.9024	-0.5461	-0.1965	-0.6334	-0.2349	-0.6950	-0.0955
30 SUPPTCPR	-0.3291	-0.4212	-0.8753	-0.8745	-0.8879	-0.4925	-0.5891	-0.4937	-0.4206	-0.5210	-0.0350	-0.2329
31 SUPPTCPR	-0.3084	-0.3907	-0.6454	-0.7495	-0.8414	-0.4017	-0.5175	-0.4124	-0.3838	-0.5399	0.0820	-0.2472
32 SUPPTCPR	0.2264	0.4147	0.6386	0.6179	0.6357	0.1029	0.1568	0.2900	0.2407	0.1341	-0.1795	-0.0928
33 SUPPTCPR	-0.2715	-0.2950	-0.7265	-0.8505	-0.6266	-0.4612	-0.3127	-0.2766	-0.3581	-0.1800	-0.2542	0.1167
34 SUPPTCPR	-0.1779	-0.0970	-0.5407	-0.6534	-0.4176	-0.6640	-0.5205	-0.3012	-0.3106	-0.3916	-0.5367	-0.2039
35 SUPPTCPR	-0.0851	-0.1779	-0.6310	-0.7186	-0.6034	-0.2347	-0.2058	-0.2160	-0.3512	-0.2610	0.0186	0.2430
36 SUPPTCPR	0.1512	0.1939	0.6490	0.7909	0.5306	0.4766	0.4762	0.3519	0.2615	0.2965	0.4395	0.2986
37 SUPPTCPR	-0.3685	-0.4001	-0.7756	-0.8967	-0.6442	-0.6470	-0.4476	-0.2993	-0.4243	-0.2464	-0.3866	-0.0600
38 SUPPTCPR	-0.3457	-0.3537	-0.7422	-0.8674	-0.6040	-0.6717	-0.4844	-0.3192	-0.4227	-0.2698	-0.4360	-0.0910
39 SUPPTCPR	0.0524	-0.0137	0.2466	0.4021	0.0931	0.3224	0.2282	0.1077	0.1509	0.1116	0.3834	-0.0247
40 SUPPTCPR	-0.2139	-0.2258	-0.7157	-0.7433	-0.5909	-0.3745	-0.4102	-0.3727	-0.1252	-0.3764	-0.1918	-0.2401
41 SUPPTCPR	0.0141	-0.1680	-0.5414	-0.5005	-0.5066	0.1953	-0.3254	-0.5052	0.1612	-0.4700	0.3005	-0.3507
42 SUPPTCPR	-0.4416	-0.2819	-0.3033	-0.4743	-0.1442	-0.2184	-0.1743	-0.2288	-0.0343	-0.0530	-0.2580	0.0985
43 SUPPTCPR	0.2984	0.3219	0.6681	0.7345	0.5821	0.3188	0.4091	0.4361	0.1436	0.2549	0.1612	0.2617
44 SUPPTCPR	-0.3523	-0.3316	-0.7651	-0.8405	-0.6776	-0.5654	-0.5709	-0.4639	-0.3956	-0.4039	-0.2943	-0.1881
45 SUPPTCPR	-0.3469	-0.3477	-0.7950	-0.8599	-0.7155	-0.5121	-0.5859	-0.4971	-0.3696	-0.4477	-0.2563	-0.2039

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TABLE 35 Cont'd.

SOVIET AND CHINESE INTERACTIONS WITH CONTENT ANALYSIS 1950 - 1967 45 VARIABLES

## CORRELATIONS

NO. VARIABLE	13	14	15	15	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24
13 SUDEFVCPR	1.0000											
14 CPROFVSU	0.0911	1.0000										
15 SUUVDCPR	0.8452	0.3583	1.0000									
16 CPROVDSU	-0.0427	0.6361	0.1186	1.0000								
17 SUBKCCPR	-0.1209	-0.3831	-0.1317	-0.2776	1.0000							
18 CPROKCSU	-0.0870	-0.2957	-0.1517	-0.2316	0.9604	1.0000						
19 SUCLODCPR	0.4341	0.2077	0.4850	0.0164	-0.5465	-0.5258	1.0000					
20 CPROCLDSU	0.3710	0.1312	0.4728	0.0504	-0.5764	-0.6303	0.8906	1.0000				
21 SUEXPCPR	0.2455	-0.0085	0.2353	0.0359	-0.5782	-0.6062	0.7645	0.8732	1.0000			
22 SUJMPCCPR	0.4019	0.1695	0.4341	-0.1100	-0.5012	-0.4620	0.9488	0.7807	0.7249	1.0000		
23 RSUEXCPR	-0.0009	-0.1161	0.0332	0.1898	-0.5147	-0.6194	0.3777	0.6897	0.8186	0.2622	1.0000	
24 RSUJMPCCPR	0.2585	0.0158	0.3232	0.0519	-0.6305	-0.7225	0.7492	0.9291	0.9092	0.6558	0.8609	1.0000
25 RCPREXSU	0.2015	0.0915	0.2675	-0.0255	-0.6979	-0.7787	0.6775	0.8508	0.8612	0.6289	0.8174	0.9468
26 PCPRINSU	-0.0565	0.0557	0.0179	0.3656	-0.5690	-0.6541	0.2715	0.5941	0.7163	0.1395	0.9643	0.7852
27 SUPETCPR	0.6742	0.4557	0.0782	0.2392	-0.7803	-0.6936	0.5762	0.5957	0.6376	0.5690	0.4874	0.6108
28 RSUPTCPR	-0.1749	0.5335	-0.0258	0.0613	-0.4261	-0.2923	0.1915	-0.0103	-0.1842	0.1876	-0.3283	-0.1022
29 SJEXROR	-0.4979	-0.2882	-0.5318	0.0014	0.5287	0.5003	-0.9176	-0.7860	-0.6069	-0.9010	-0.2204	-0.6248
30 CPROFURR	-0.0190	-0.1017	-0.1761	-0.2041	0.5656	0.6820	-0.4453	-0.7552	-0.6931	-0.2598	-0.8890	-0.8570
31 BPRINCIO	-0.1460	0.0828	-0.2494	-0.1971	0.5453	0.6797	-0.3969	-0.6632	-0.6902	-0.3099	-0.8386	-0.8159
32 SJ SF CC	0.0779	-0.2570	-0.0934	-0.2308	-0.4045	-0.4788	0.1739	0.4420	0.6398	0.2220	0.7404	0.6265
33 SJ SA CC	-0.1186	-0.0658	-0.1294	-0.0327	0.7235	0.7511	-0.4871	-0.6709	-0.6984	-0.3087	-0.7065	-0.7474
34 SJ AC CC	-0.4665	-0.5115	-0.4934	-0.3022	0.7599	0.6885	(-0.7576)	(-0.7094)	-0.6496	-0.6857	-0.4332	-0.6666
35 SJ PA CC	0.0941	0.1718	0.0400	-0.0355	0.3173	0.3896	-0.2132	-0.4944	-0.5319	-0.1308	-0.6490	-0.5504
36 SJ PU CC	0.2335	0.4118	0.3173	0.1725	(-0.7505)	(-0.7476)	0.5232	0.6568	0.6264	0.4268	0.5934	0.6869

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TABLE 35. Cont'd.

SUIET AND COMFSE INTERACTIONS WITH CONTENT ANALYSIS 1950 - 1957 45 VARIABLES

## CORRELATIONS

NO. VARIABLE	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24
	SUJFVCPR	CPRDFVSU	SUUVDCPR	CPKGVDSU	SUBKCCPK	CPRKCSU	SUCLODCPR	CPRCLOSU	SUEXPCPR	SUIMPCPR	KSUEXCPR	RSUIMCPR
37 SU NG CC	-0.0792	-0.2833	-0.2510	-0.0864	(0.7354)	(0.7762)	-0.6732	(-0.8190)	(-0.8134)	-0.5703	(-0.7266)	(-0.8423)
38 SU TP CC	-0.1064	-0.3577	-0.2840	-0.1468	(0.7876)	(0.8015)	(-0.7109)	(-0.8138)	(-0.7863)	-0.5962	-0.6783	-0.8230
39 CC ST SU	-0.2147	0.5136	-0.0979	0.1234	-0.5814	-0.4962	0.3958	0.3304	0.3116	0.3354	0.2228	0.3319
40 CC BR SU	-0.0829	-0.3841	-0.2173	-0.2476	(0.7735)	(0.7674)	-0.4777	-0.6068	-0.6549	-0.3003	-0.6695	(-0.7182)
41 CC AC SU	0.1188	-0.1234	0.0458	-0.4329	0.5195	0.5314	0.1097	-0.1468	-0.2388	0.2406	-0.6105	-0.3556
42 CC PA SU	0.2863	-0.4430	0.2395	-0.2136	0.4941	0.4754	-0.2199	-0.2670	-0.4008	-0.1959	-0.3694	-0.3447
43 CC PJ SU	-0.0841	0.2666	0.0522	0.0846	(0.1563)	(-0.7335)	0.3888	0.5691	0.6053	0.3072	0.6871	(0.7150)
44 CC NG SU	-0.0274	-0.3328	-0.1894	-0.2113	(0.8547)	(0.8860)	-0.6075	(-0.7541)	(-0.7586)	-0.4948	(-0.7476)	(-0.8386)
45 CC TP SU	-0.1077	-0.2946	-0.2200	-0.2423	(0.8637)	(0.9001)	-0.5460	(-0.7288)	(-0.7552)	-0.4319	(-0.7882)	(-0.8350)

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TABLE 35 Cont'd.

1950 - 1967 45 VARIABLES												
CORRELATIONS												
NO. VARIABLE	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36
25 RCPREXSU	1.0000											
26 RCPRIASU	0.7562	1.0000										
27 SUPETCPR	0.6910	0.5235	1.0000									
28 RSUPTCPR	0.0420	-0.2185	0.3568	1.0000								
29 SUFURBOR	-0.6010	-0.1302	-0.4765	-0.3248	1.0000							
30 CPRFORBR	-0.8323	-0.8280	-0.5120	0.0906	0.3303	1.0000						
31 BORINCIO	-0.7066	-0.8086	-0.3978	0.2361	0.3105	0.7176	1.0000					
32 SU ST CC	(0.7049)	0.6743	0.5162	-0.3557	-0.0354	-0.5946	-0.5631	1.0000				
33 SU WK CC	(-0.7635)	-0.6684	(-0.7341)	0.0199	0.3746	(0.7311)	0.6280	-0.6469	1.0000			
34 SU AC CC	-0.6856	-0.4575	(-0.7715)	-0.3034	(0.7019)	0.5697	0.3393	-0.2969	0.6420	1.0000		
35 SU PA CC	-0.4933	-0.5768	-0.4646	0.3198	0.0735	0.5212	0.6801	-0.5813	0.7227	0.1092	1.0000	
36 SU PJ CC	(0.7705)	0.6192	(0.7950)	0.1972	-0.4473	(-0.7462)	-0.4413	0.5563	-0.8577	-0.8456	-0.4037	1.0000
	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36
37 SU NG CC	(-0.8789)	-0.6870	(-0.7743)	-0.1277	(0.5481)	(0.7977)	(0.6244)	-0.5609	(0.8774)	(0.7370)	0.5891	-0.8787
38 SU TP CC	(-0.8575)	-0.6558	(-0.7951)	-0.2402	(0.5996)	(0.7804)	(0.5789)	-0.4705	0.8525	0.8110	0.4919	-0.8956
39 CC ST SU	0.5931	0.3322	0.6741	0.5061	-0.2888	-0.4004	-0.0095	0.0927	-0.3506	-0.6219	0.0794	0.5808
40 CC WK SU	(-0.7671)	(-0.7379)	(-0.8129)	-0.2420	0.3253	(0.7462)	0.5613	-0.5681	(0.7494)	0.7934	0.3599	-0.8702
41 CC AC SU	-0.4220	(-0.7359)	-0.4254	-0.0325	-0.2132	0.5897	0.5676	-0.4623	0.5191	0.3320	0.4042	-0.5403
42 CC PA SU	-0.4177	-0.4535	-0.5844	-0.2144	0.1371	0.4562	0.0548	-0.3591	0.4357	0.4956	0.0380	-0.5628
43 CC PO SU	(0.8448)	(0.7359)	(0.7495)	0.2022	-0.3129	(-0.7814)	(-0.5974)	0.6324	-0.7579	-0.6507	-0.3983	0.8346
44 CC NG SU	(-0.8658)	(-0.7752)	(-0.7825)	-0.2502	0.5117	(0.8239)	(0.6730)	-0.5295	(0.7978)	(0.7594)	0.4576	-0.8358
45 CC TP SU	(-0.8575)	(-0.8216)	(-0.7572)	-0.1413	0.4506	(0.8443)	(0.7080)	-0.5939	(0.8479)	0.7651	0.4917	-0.8693

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TABLE 35 Cont'd.

SOVIET AND CHINESE INTERACTIONS WITH CONTENT ANALYSIS		1950 - 1967 45 VARIABLES												
		CORRELATIONS												
NO.	VARIABLE	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45				
37	SU NG CC	1.0000												
38	SU TP CC	0.9862	1.0000											
39	CC ST SU	-0.5272	-0.6067	1.0000										
40	CC WK SU	0.8294	0.8574	-0.6431	1.0000									
41	CC AC SU	0.4043	0.4151	-0.2517	0.6796	1.0000								
42	CC PA SU	0.5395	0.5568	-0.7754	0.6184	0.1984	1.0000							
43	CC PU SU	-0.8173	-0.8123	0.5815	-0.9229	-0.6650	-0.6115	1.0000						
44	CC NG SU	0.9146	0.5340	-0.5939	0.9145	0.5404	0.6045	-0.8977	1.0000					
45	CC TP SU	0.5464	0.9096	-0.5260	0.9160	0.6175	0.5856	-0.8868	0.5804	1.0000				

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- (2) There are high correlations between Soviet perceptions of the Chinese as negative and threatening and Chinese views of the Soviets as negative and threatening;
- (3) There are fairly high correlations between Chinese perceptions of the Soviets as negative and threatening, deployment of Chinese military forces to the Sino-Soviet border, and border incidents;
- (4) There are only moderate correlations between Soviet perceptions of the Chinese as negative and threatening and actual deployment of Soviet troops to the border and border incidents. Moscow's behavior thus would not seem to correspond as highly to their perceptions as does that of the Chinese. Indeed, there is a higher correlation between Soviet perceptions of the Chinese as threatening and Chinese deployment of troops to the border.

(U) A factor analysis was performed on the 45 variable correlation matrix. The table of positive eigenvalues is presented in Table 36. Five factors are sufficient to explain 83.8 percent of the total variance in these 45 variables. These five factors were rotated to an orthogonal simple structure. The rotated factor matrix is shown in Table 37.

(U) The predominant factor, which we named Sino-Soviet Cooperation, Mutual Threat Perception and Conflict, accounts for almost 34 percent of the total variance. This factor has negative loadings of "relative Soviet exports from China" and "Soviet civil technicians in China" and positive loadings of "Soviet and Chinese threat perceptions" of each other and "border incidents." The plot of scores for this factor is presented in Figure 34. A positive slope in the pattern indicates increased hostility and decreased cooperation.

(U) Note the period between 1954 and 1958. This peak in hostility may have been caused by Soviet and Chinese differences over the handling of the Taiwan Straits incidents. Between 1958 and 1959, the hostility temporarily decreased, but over all from 1959 onward the conflict has gradually increased. This pattern basically describes that phenomenon we have called the Sino-Soviet dispute, those interactions between the Soviets and Chinese which manifest the steady trend of decreasing cooperation and increasing hostility.

(U) Included in "decreasing cooperation" are measures of Chinese trade dependency on the Soviet Union. The growing Chinese independency from the Soviet Union has been mentioned as an important element in the dispute. This generalization is

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TABLE 36  
Sino-Soviet Interactions - 45 Variables  
TABLE OF POSITIVE EIGENVALUES

NO.	EIGENVALUE	PERCENT OF COMMUNALITY ALL 18 FACTORS	Each Cumulative
1	22.210	49.4	49.4
2	5.589	12.4	61.8
3	4.417	10.0	71.7
4	3.290	8.0	79.7
5	1.861	4.1	83.8
6	1.612	3.6	87.4
7	1.274	2.8	90.3
8	0.866	2.2	92.4
9	0.837	1.9	94.3
10	0.762	1.7	95.0
11	0.452	1.1	97.1
12	0.409	0.9	98.0
13	0.232	0.6	98.6
14	0.224	0.5	99.1
15	0.164	0.4	99.5
16	0.151	0.3	99.8
17	0.094	0.2	100.0
18	0.030	0.0	100.0

TRACE OF ORIGINAL MATRIX = 45.000  
COMMUNALITY OVER 18 FACTORS = 45.000

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TABLE 37

SOVIET AND CHINESE INTERACTIONS WITH CONTENT ANALYSIS 1950 - 1967 45 VARIABLES

VARIABLE U. NAME	COMMUNITY 5 FACTORS	ROTATED FACTOR MATRIX					Factor Names:
		1 *	2 **	3 ***	4 ****	5 *****	
1. SUICAD	0.836	-0.205	-0.126	+0.047	-0.068	<u>+0.876</u>	* Sino-Soviet Cooperation, Mutual Threat Perceptions and Conflict Initiatives Chinese Perceptions of Soviets Treaties Soviet Economic Aid
2. SUICAD	0.787	-0.354	-0.027	-0.083	-0.026	<u>+0.809</u>	
3. SUICPE	0.924	-0.267	-0.303	+0.012	+0.208	+0.191	
4. CACTSU	0.904	-0.615	-0.319	+0.263	+0.174	+0.112	
5. SUICAD	0.902	-0.854	-0.260	+0.160	+0.257	+0.112	
6. CACTSU	0.931	-0.254	-0.894	+0.176	+0.033	+0.172	** Soviet Initiatives *** Chinese Perceptions of Soviets **** Treaties ***** Soviet Economic Aid
7. STREATH	0.848	-0.306	-0.409	+0.153	+0.747	+0.079	
8. SUICETR	0.595	-0.330	-0.037	+0.151	-0.632	+0.225	
9. SUICETR	0.585	-0.334	-0.077	+0.077	-0.060	+0.128	
10. SUICETR	0.839	-0.372	-0.186	-0.668	+0.807	-0.101	
11. SUICETR	0.789	+0.194	-0.653	+0.524	+0.117	-0.190	
12. SUICETR	0.618	+0.009	-0.001	+0.043	+0.776	-0.102	
13. SUICETR	0.655	-0.033	-0.659	-0.221	+0.221	-0.354	
14. SUICETR	0.860	-0.197	-0.155	+0.587	+0.544	-0.174	
15. SUICETR	0.747	-0.033	-0.665	+0.237	+0.532	-0.328	
16. SUICETR	0.626	-0.023	0.117	+0.641	-0.196	-0.040	
17. SUICETR	0.786	+0.523	0.235	-0.525	-0.218	-0.086	
18. SUICETR	0.770	+0.620	-0.674	+0.279	-0.035	+0.083	
19. SUICETR	0.934	-0.292	-0.730	+0.150	+0.102	+0.129	
20. SUICETR	0.950	-0.611	-0.541	+0.135	-0.023	+0.333	
21. SUICETR	0.918	-0.704	-0.877	+0.265	-0.158	+0.062	
22. SUICETR	0.906	-0.907	-0.098	-0.006	+0.192	+0.348	
23. SUICETR	0.980	-0.790	-0.519	+0.131	+0.101	+0.209	
24. SUICETR	0.964	-0.773	-0.421	+0.203	+0.077	+0.213	
25. SUICETR	0.900	-0.200	-0.035	+0.118	+0.355	+0.293	
26. SUICETR	0.974	-0.562	-0.250	+0.684	-0.020	-0.158	
27. SUICETR	0.697	+0.309	-0.075	+0.754	+0.069	-0.150	
28. SUICETR	0.935	+0.103	-0.910	-0.280	-0.090	-0.100	
29. SUICETR	0.863	+0.809	0.164	-0.196	-0.290	-0.242	
30. SUICETR	0.827	+0.826	0.204	+0.122	-0.289	-0.119	
31. SUICETR	0.739	-0.834	0.041	+0.016	-0.186	+0.084	
32. SUICETR	0.865	-0.827	0.211	-0.363	+0.115	+0.021	
33. SUICETR	0.850	+0.369	0.536	-0.595	-0.236	+0.049	
34. SUICETR	0.868	+0.800	0.036	+0.112	+0.135	+0.120	
35. SUICETR	0.861	-0.643	-0.260	+0.591	+0.133	-0.687	
36. SUICETR	0.919	+0.720	0.379	-0.484	-0.006	-0.149	
37. SUICETR	0.937	+0.655	0.408	+0.561	-0.062	-0.135	
38. SUICETR	0.791	-0.136	-0.076	+0.668	+0.044	+0.106	
39. SUICETR	0.897	+0.697	0.103	-0.697	-0.193	-0.007	
40. SUICETR	0.896	+0.648	-0.434	-0.219	-0.413	+0.125	
41. SUICETR	0.880	+0.241	-0.069	-0.713	+0.017	-0.423	
42. SUICETR	0.780	-0.713	-0.024	+0.584	+0.124	+0.125	
43. SUICETR	0.843	+0.706	0.271	-0.553	-0.196	-0.179	
44. SUICETR	0.951	+0.705	0.228	-0.484	-0.236	-0.141	
45. SUICETR							

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


FIGURE 34

FORTY-FIVE SINO-SOVIET INTERACTIONS: FACTOR 1  
SINO-SOVIET COOPERATION, MUTUAL THREAT PERCEPTIONS

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confirmed here as measures of Soviet and Chinese hostility. As Chinese independence from the Soviet Union increased, Sino-Soviet hostility also increased.

(U) It should also be noted that Chinese perceptions of the Soviets as threatening and negative loaded on the same factor as Chinese deployment of troops to the border. However, Soviet deployment of troops to the border was independent of their perceptions of the Chinese as negative and threatening. It appears, therefore, that the Chinese perceptions corresponded more closely to their behavior than did Soviet perceptions and that the Soviets consciously avoided revealing their true perceptions of the Chinese during this period. The Chinese increased their troops at the border in 1959 and 1963. The Soviets increased their troops in 1960 and 1962. The Chinese started a trend of increasingly negative statements in 1959 and accelerated considerably in 1963. The Soviets, however, decreased their negative statements in 1960 and did not increase them substantially until 1962. The Soviets appear to have been quite cautious in their verbal behavior--a probable attempt to avoid public attacks on the Chinese in hopes that the trend of increasing hostility between the two states might be reversed. Nevertheless, Moscow did take military actions to bolster the forces in the border area in case the conflict accelerated. In a case such as this, where the Soviets saw an advantage in masking their true perceptions of the Chinese, it is difficult to deduce a country's behavior from its perceptions.

(U) The second orthogonally rotated factor from Table 37 accounts for 18 percent of the total variance. This factor is named Soviet Initiatives and is characterized primarily by Soviet actions. The plot of scores for this factor is presented in Figure 35 and shows a rise in cooperative Soviet initiatives until 1957. A short transition period occurred until 1959 when a trend of decreased cooperative Soviet behavior and a trend of increased hostile Soviet behavior, e.g., "Soviet forces at the border," began.

(U) The third factor accounts for 16 percent of the total variance and is called Chinese Perceptions of the Soviets. The plot of scores for this factor are shown in Figure 36. A positive slope in this pattern designates a Chinese perception of the Soviets as stronger while a negative slope designates a Chinese perception of the Soviets as more passive. The latter half of the pattern is most interesting in that 1959 marks a period of increased perceptions of the Soviets as strong until 1962 when a dramatic falling off occurred.

(U) The fourth factor is characterized by "treaties and agreements between the Soviet Union and China." It should be noted that these variables are not cumulative over time but rather only measure the number of treaties signed each year. A somewhat erratic pattern is therefore expected. The plot of scores for this factor is presented in Figure 37. The pattern changes by 1958 with the years 1959-1967 marking a more steady and less active period than that experienced in 1950-1958.

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High Loading Variables  
Chinese Students in the Soviet Union -.90  
Soviet Cultural Delegations in China -.87  
Soviet Imports from China -.88  
Soviet Forces at the Border .91





FIGURE 35

FORTY-FIVE SINO-SOVIET INTERACTIONS: FACTOR 2  
SOVIET INITIATIVES



**CHINESE PERCEPTIONS OF SOVIETS**

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


FIGURE 37

FORTY-FIVE SINO-SOVIET INTERACTIONS: FACTOR 4  
TREATIES



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(U) The fifth factor is called Soviet Economic Aid. The plot of scores is presented in Figure 38. The pattern reached a high point in 1955 and generally decreased thereafter. "Soviet economic aid to China" actually ended in 1961, but the other variables loading on the factor carried the pattern to 1967.

2. SINO-SOVIET INTERACTION ANALYSIS - 31 VARIABLES

(U) The 14 perceptual variables were removed and a factor analysis was performed on the remaining 31 interactions. The table of positive eigenvalues is presented in Table 38. The five factors explain 85.1 percent of the total variance.

(U) The rotated factor matrix is presented in Table 39. Even with the exclusion of the perceptual variables, the patterns which emerged are quite similar to the factors derived from the 45 variables.

(U) The first factor is labeled Sino-Soviet Cooperation-Conflict and is similar to the first factor from the 45 solution with the exception of the missing perception variables. The plot of scores for this factor is presented in Figure 39. The pattern is less erratic than before and shows a gradual change from cooperation to conflict. As was noted in the attribute study, the perception variables show more variance and thus cause a less stable pattern when they are included.

(U) The second factor, Soviet Initiatives, is almost identical to the second factor from the 45 solution. Perceptions did not load on the earlier factor and therefore their absence here is not noticed. The plot of scores for this factor is presented in Figure 40.

(U) The third factor is very similar to factor 4 of the 45 variable solution, and is again called Treaties. The plot of scores for this factor is shown in Figure 41.

(U) Factor 4, Soviet Trade of Petroleum, is similar to factor 3 from the 45 variable study despite the fact that the earlier factor was primarily a perceptual factor. "Soviet trade of petroleum to China" loaded only moderately on the earlier factor, but in the 31-variable study it is now the indexing variable. The plot of scores for this factor is presented in Figure 42.

(U) Factor 5 is called Soviet Economic Aid and is similar to factor five of the 45 variable study. Again, without the perceptual variables, the plot in Figure 43 is less erratic.

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


FIGURE 38

FOR TY-FIVE SINO-SOVIET INTERACTIONS: FACTOR 5  
SOVIET ECONOMIC AID

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TABLE 38

## Sino-Soviet Interactions - 31 Variables

## TABLE OF POSITIVE EIGENVALUES

NO.	EIGENVALUE	PERCENT OF COMMUNALITY ALL ( 18 ) FACTORS	Each Cumulative
1	14.366	46.3	46.3
2	4.610	14.9	61.2
3	3.582	11.6	72.8
4	2.368	7.6	80.4
5	1.452	4.7	85.1
6	1.053	3.5	88.6
7	1.043	3.4	92.0
8	0.685	2.2	94.2
9	0.559	1.8	96.0
10	0.328	1.1	97.1
11	0.252	0.8	97.9
12	0.206	0.7	98.5
13	0.167	0.5	99.1
14	0.122	0.4	99.5
15	0.071	0.2	99.7
16	0.069	0.2	99.9
17	0.024	0.1	100.0
18	0.000	0.0	100.0
TRACE OF ORIGINAL MATRIX =		31.000	
COMMUNALITY OVER 18 FACTORS =		31.000	

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TABLE 39

## Sino-Soviet Interaction:

FACTOR NUMBER	1 *	2 **	3 ***	4 ****	5 *****
SUM SQUARES OVER VARIABLES	10.902	6.406	3.533	3.351	2.193
PERCENT OF TOTAL VARIANCE	35.168	20.664	11.398	10.810	7.074

VARIABLE COMMUNALITY  
NO. NAME 5 FACTORS

1 SUFCAID	0.829	-0.282	-0.067	-0.096	-0.011	+0.858
2 RSUECAID	0.920	-0.376	0.026	-0.039	-0.125	+0.073
3 SUICPCPR	0.948	-0.932	-0.241	0.097	-0.071	+0.081
4 CPRCTSU	0.899	-0.868	-0.253	0.121	0.233	+0.100
5 SUMILAIID	0.821	-0.902	-0.196	0.155	-0.214	+0.024
6 CPRSTSU	0.895	-0.394	-0.845	-0.022	0.143	+0.089
7 SSTREATY	0.823	-0.466	-0.372	-0.574	0.229	-0.001
8 SSECDYTR	0.648	-0.408	0.112	-0.583	0.259	+0.249
9 SSE-TTR	0.604	-0.481	-0.573	-0.195	0.024	-0.093
10 SSD-PTR	0.875	-0.550	-0.099	-0.576	-0.040	-0.321
11 SSCULTR	0.933	+0.173	-0.678	0.221	-0.537	-0.076
12 SSCCVTR	0.716	-0.004	-0.022	-0.943	-0.022	+0.065
13 SUPEVCPR	0.740	+0.035	-0.719	-0.336	-0.308	-0.121
14 CPPOFVSU	0.827	+0.107	-0.596	-0.596	-0.638	-0.175
15 SUPWACPR	0.877	-0.005	-0.716	-0.556	-0.214	-0.098
16 CPOVVSU	0.627	-0.226	0.193	-0.631	0.257	-0.273
17 SUHRCPR	0.825	+0.547	0.229	-0.151	-0.069	-0.091
18 CPHRCVSU	0.796	+0.637	0.205	-0.173	-0.540	-0.161
19 SUCLDCPR	0.937	-0.391	-0.845	-0.085	0.243	+0.041
20 CPHCLVSU	0.962	-0.603	-0.678	0.035	0.113	+0.068
21 SUHPCPR	0.917	-0.771	-0.486	-0.106	0.082	+0.255
22 SUHPCPR	0.922	-0.263	-0.867	-0.176	0.256	+0.068
23 RSUEACPR	0.991	-0.965	-0.018	0.066	-0.050	+0.223
24 RSUICPR	0.975	-0.856	-0.465	0.011	0.074	+0.145
25 RCPPEXSU	0.893	-0.783	-0.396	0.036	0.224	+0.266
26 RCPRIVSU	0.978	-0.043	0.112	0.222	0.065	+0.149
27 SUPEICPR	0.845	-0.557	-0.254	-0.056	-0.657	-0.160
28 RSUPTCPR	0.780	+0.279	-0.104	0.075	-0.824	-0.060
29 SUFOROOR	0.936	+0.202	-0.878	-0.078	-0.315	-0.137
30 CPHFOROR	0.852	+0.877	0.110	-0.198	-0.099	-0.148
31 ADRINCIO	0.787	+0.061	0.136	-0.201	0.077	-0.127

## Factor Names:

\* Sino-Soviet Cooperation-Conflict

\*\* Soviet Initiatives

\*\*\* Treaties

\*\*\*\* Soviet Trade of Petroleum

\*\*\*\*\* Soviet Economic Aid

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High Loading Variables  
 Relative Soviet Exports to China -.97  
 Soviet Civil Technicians in China -.93  
 Border Incidents .82




FIGURE 39

THIRTY-ONE SINO-SOVIET INTERACTIONS: FACTOR 1  
SINO-SOVIET COOPERATION-CONFLICT

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High Loading Variables  
 Chinese Students in the Soviet Union -.84  
 Soviet Cultural Delegations in China -.84  
 Soviet Imports from China -.87  
 Soviet Forces at the Border .88




FIGURE 40

THIRTY-ONE SINO-SOVIET INTERACTIONS: FACTOR 2  
SOVIET INITIATIVES

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


FIGURE 41

THIRTY-ONE SINO-SOVIET INTERACTIONS: FACTOR 3  
TREATIES

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


FIGURE 42

THIRTY-ONE SINO-SOVIET INTERACTIONS: FACTOR 4  
SOVIET TRADE OF PETROLEUM



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


FIGURE 43

THIRTY-ONE SINO-SOVIET INTERACTIONS: FACTOR 5

SOVIET ECONOMIC AID

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C. FINDINGS FROM SINO-SOVIET INTERACTION ANALYSIS

(U) The major findings derived from the analysis of the direct Sino-Soviet interaction variables are summarized as follows:

- . The dominant factor derived from an analysis of the 45 variables used to measure direct interactions between China and the Soviet Union delineates a pattern of decreasing Soviet and Chinese co-operation and increasing Soviet and Chinese hostility. This pattern is indexed by those Soviet and Chinese interactions which have been labeled by many as the major manifestations of the Sino-Soviet dispute; e.g., decreasing trade and increasing border incidents and negative perceptions of each other.
2. Measures of Chinese trade dependency on the Soviet Union are negatively and highly correlated with measures of Soviet and Chinese hostility. This seems to confirm the hypothesis that as Chinese independence from the Soviet Union increased so did Sino-Soviet hostility.
3. A pattern of Soviet and Chinese perceptions of each other as negative and threatening but also as weak appeared in the analysis. This again appears to be the familiar "paper tiger" theme. Each country perceived the other negatively and as a threat, but at the same time it dismissed their actual strength or potential to disrupt.
4. A major difference between the two Communist powers in their interactive behavior was found. Chinese perceptions were highly related to their physical behavior, but this was not so in the Soviet case. Chinese perceptions of the Soviets as threatening and negative related positively to increased Chinese deployment of troops to the Sino-Soviet border. However, over the same period the Soviet deployment of troops to the border was found to be independent of Moscow's changing perceptions of the Chinese on these two variables. When the Soviets initiated measures to strengthen their border with China they concurrently reduced rather than increased the intensity of their verbal pronouncements about the Chinese. The Soviets thus appear to have resisted attacking the Chinese in public as long as possible, perhaps in hope that the problems causing the increased tension might be solved.

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5. A major pattern of Soviet Chinese interaction describes a rise in cooperative Soviet-Chinese behavior until 1957, a transition period lasting until 1959, and then a trend which exhibits increasing hostile Soviet behavior toward Peking until the present. This is the Soviet Initiatives dimension.
6. In conclusion, the addition of the 14 perceptual variables to the "physical" interaction variables does not greatly change the basic patterns of the "physical" variables. In some cases the perception variables do cause a more erratic pattern, but generally the change is small.

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SECTION VI

CANONICAL ANALYSIS OF ATTRIBUTES AND INTERACTIONS

A. ATTRIBUTES AND INTERACTIONS

(U) We now come to the heart of the study, but before we proceed, a short review of the analysis to this point is in order.

(U) The analysis of attributes used factor analysis as a descriptive device to define the patterns of attribute variation for the Soviets and for the Chinese. A joint factor analysis was then used to combine the descriptions of the two countries for comparative purposes. The joint study showed that the Soviets were growing faster than the Chinese industrially and that the Soviets had moved from conventional to nuclear defense planning during the period under study while the Chinese increased their conventional force commitments. The joint study also suggested that these comparative differences between the Soviets and Chinese might be important as predictors of the patterns of interaction during the period under study. The differences between the Soviets and Chinese on the major attributes were, therefore, calculated and analyzed.

(U) The difference analysis consisted of factor analyses of the difference matrix (24 variables) and three sub-matrices (16 attributes, 9 attributes, and 6 attributes). The analysis of Sino-Soviet differences on 23 attributes identified three major dynamic patterns: Industrialization and Nuclear Capability Gap, a Gap in Perception of US as a Threat, and a Gap in Perception of the US as Active. Of these, the major pattern delineated was the industrialization and nuclear capability gap.

(U) The perception variables were then removed, leaving 16 variables. The factor analysis of these 16 variables also revealed three major patterns, the first factor being similar to the first factor in the 23 variable solution.

(U) These 16 variables, when broken into 9 economic and 6 military variables, again revealed three patterns of differential growth, indicating that the two small subsets of attributes still retained fairly complex inter-relationships.

(U) The Sino-Soviet interaction analysis revealed five patterns of interactions for 45 variables. When the 14 mutual perception variables were removed, we still found a very similar structure for five patterns of interaction. Soviet and Chinese behavior and perceptions seem to follow basically the same patterns. Since the patterns for the 45 and 31 variable analyses were so similar, only the 45 variable interaction analysis is used in this section.

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B. CANONICAL REGRESSION AND CORRELATION ANALYSIS

(U) As stated in the introduction, canonical regression and correlation is a particular type of factor analysis that maximizes the linear relationships between observed variables from two sets of data. The variables within these sets of data must be independent of each other. By using component factor analysis on the attributes and interactions, we not only reduced the mass of data to a few dynamic patterns, but also achieved orthogonality among these patterns. We can, therefore, use the factor scores from the patterns that were delineated as input variables into the canonical program. We used the factor scores from the Soviet and Chinese differences in attributes as predictor variables to the factor scores of Sino-Soviet interactions. Therefore, the factor scores of the three patterns (factors) derived from each subset (4 subsets in all) of attributes constitutes one set of data (4 sets in all). Each of these sets of data are canonically regressed separately against the set of data comprised of the factor scores from the five factors from the interaction variables. (See Figure 44).

(U) Canonical analysis is a rotation of these two sets of factor scores to a new orthogonal solution. The new solution consists of orthogonal variates, three of which were obtained from each canonical analysis.

(U) A canonically rotated factor loading matrix is presented for each set of data. These matrices represent the loadings of the original variables on the new canonical variates. There is a separate set of canonical variates for each matrix. Thus, Variate 1 from the attribute matrix is maximally related to Variate 1 of the interaction matrix. Both of these variates are independent of all other variates. The variable loadings are interpreted the same as in component factor analysis. The square of the loading times one-hundred equals the percent variation that a variable has in common with that pattern. The communality estimates are also given in the matrices. The communality estimates record the percent of variance for each variable which is accounted for by all the canonical variates.

(U) In addition to the canonically rotated factor loading matrix, the canonical correlation, a statistic which ascertains the degree of pattern similarity for the corresponding variates, is also presented. This correlation is the square root of the eigenvalue that scales both variates; i.e., the correlation between variate scores from each set of data. The significance of the canonical correlation is given but must be treated with caution because the distribution underlying the population is unknown.

(U) Factor scores for the attributes and the interactions on the variates are also obtained and plotted for each canonical analysis.

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


FIGURE 44  
CANONICAL REGRESSION ANALYSIS

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1. Canonical Analysis of Differences in 23 Attributes and 45 Interactions

(U) A canonical rotation was performed on the factor scores of the three factors derived in the 23 variable difference analysis and the factor scores of the five factors derived from the analysis of the 45 interactions. The canonically rotated factor loading matrix for the 23 attributes is presented in Table 40 and the canonically rotated factor loading matrix for the 45 interactions is presented in Table 41.

(U) Variate 1 in Table 40 (attribute matrix) is still characterized by the Sino-Soviet gap in industrialization and nuclear capability. Variate 1 in Table 41 (interaction matrix) is still one of increasing mutual threat perception and border hostility and decreasing economic and political cooperative behavior. It is this factor which we believe best describes the phenomenon called the "Sino-Soviet dispute." The canonical correlation between the two is .979. The scores on variate 1 are plotted in Figure 45.

(U) The differences in the 23 attributes in this pattern predict very highly to the 45 interactions across time. By knowing the differences in Soviet and Chinese attribute factor scores for the 18 year time period, 93 percent of the variation in the 45 Sino-Soviet interaction factors scores for that same period can be predicted. This is a very important finding and one which confirms R. J. Rummel's field theory notions: that differences between nations on attributes are related to the interactions between them. This is further enhanced by canonical rotations of the other subsets of attribute data that follow.

(U) Canonical variate 1 is identified as Sino-Soviet Industrialization and Strategic Gaps Predict to Increasing Mutual Threat Perception and Border Hostility and Decreasing Economic and Political Cooperative Behavior. As the industrialization and nuclear capability gap widens between the Soviets and Chinese, the Sino-Soviet conflict increases.

(U) Variate 2's attributes are predominantly a gap in Soviet and Chinese perceptions of the US as active. Variate 2's interactions are primarily Soviet initiatives. The canonical correlation between the two is .765. The scores on Variate 2 are plotted in Figure 46.

(U) The differences in the 23 attributes on this variate are moderately related to the interactions in the same year. The variate is named Sino-Soviet Differences in Perception of US Activeness and Sino-Soviet Differences in Conventional Military Strength Relate to Changing Soviet Military and Cultural Responses Vis-à-Vis China. In terms of direction, as the gap in conventional military strength decreased, and the gap in their perceptions of the US as active increased. Soviet cooperative responses toward China decreased and Soviet hostile acts increased. The difference

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TABLE 40

CANONICAL ROTATION OF 45 INTERACTION AND 23 ATTRIBUTE VARIABLES: Attribute Matrix

VARIABLE COMMUNALITY		ROTATED FACTOR MATRIX			
VARIABLE NO.	NAME	3 FACTORS	1	2	3
SUM SQUARES OVER VARIABLES			8.920	5.327	3.033
PERCENT OF TOTAL VARIANCE			38.781	23.160	13.185
1	GNP	0.985	+0.842	0.388	0.199
2	EXPORTS	0.988	+0.881	0.443	0.125
3	IMPORTS	0.976	+0.907	0.392	0.034
4	IMPT/GNP	0.691	+0.687	0.303	-0.357
5	EXPT/GNP	0.719	+0.618	0.513	-0.272
6	ENERGY	0.933	+0.794	0.339	0.423
7	AGRICPRO	0.322	+0.200	0.498	0.185
8	STEEL PR	0.986	+0.905	0.343	0.223
9	POPULIN	0.555	+0.490	-0.328	-0.200
10	DEFNCRUD	0.655	+0.681	0.433	0.069
11	CEFC/GNP	0.789	+0.835	-0.244	-0.176
12	FIGHTERS	0.748	+0.469	-0.670	-0.280
13	ARMFORCE	0.506	-0.294	-0.706	0.008
14	SUBMARIN	0.971	+0.815	0.518	0.194
15	ICONS	0.810	+0.571	0.497	0.479
16	TREATIES	0.550	+0.591	0.697	0.437
17	CSIRG US	0.586	-0.246	0.303	0.658
18	DWEAK US	0.716	-0.090	-0.791	0.289
19	GACTV US	0.749	-0.375	-0.717	0.069
20	DPASS US	0.678	+0.160	-0.760	-0.274
21	DPDST US	0.239	+0.425	-0.206	-0.126
22	UNFC US	0.786	+0.292	-0.228	0.805
23	DTNPR US	0.861	-0.225	0.414	0.800

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TABLE 41

## CANONICAL ROTATION OF 45 INTERACTION AND 23 ATTRIBUTE VARIABLES; Interaction Matrix

## ROTATED FACTOR MATRIX


VARIABLE NO. NAME	COMMUNALITY 3 FACTORS	FACTOR NUMBER			PERCENT OF TOTAL VARIANCE		
		1	2	3	19.904	4.704	4.635
1 SUECAID	0.458	-0.390	-0.361	-0.420	44.231	10.453	10.300
2 RSUECAID	0.371	-0.476	-0.319	-0.207			
3 SUCTCPR	0.917	-0.917	-0.264	+0.122			
4 CPCRISU	0.875	-0.927	-0.147	-0.085			
5 SUMILAI	0.900	-0.851	-0.288	+0.304			
6 CPASISU	0.771	-0.414	-0.273	-0.377			
7 SSINEATY	0.402	-0.601	-0.208	-0.096			
8 SSECUYR	0.320	-0.504	+0.084	-0.042			
9 SSS-TTK	0.513	-0.352	-0.212	-0.084			
10 SSO-PRK	0.364	-0.549	-0.078	+0.247			
11 SSCULTK	0.337	-0.014	-0.188	-0.549			
12 SSCG-ATR	0.664	-0.208	+0.116	+0.386			
13 SUCFVCPK	0.288	-0.032	-0.563	+0.181			
14 CPRR-FVSU	0.372	-0.125	+0.327	-0.499			
15 SUCVDCPR	0.218	-0.130	-0.434	+0.095			
16 CPROVDSU	0.165	-0.284	+0.286	-0.047			
17 SUBRCCPR	0.662	-0.706	-0.146	+0.375			
18 CPRR-CCSU	0.704	-0.706	-0.074	+0.283			
19 SUCLEDCPR	0.684	-0.430	-0.580	-0.405			
20 CPH-CLDSU	0.824	-0.718	-0.539	-0.164			
21 SUEXPCPR	0.603	-0.767	-0.363	-0.181			
22 SUIMPCPK	0.627	-0.300	-0.594	-0.429			
23 RSUEXCPK	0.941	-0.941	-0.161	+0.130			
24 KSUIACPK	0.912	-0.868	-0.392	-0.013			
25 KCPREXSU	0.849	-0.872	-0.242	-0.173			
26 PCPA-14SU	0.936	-0.964	+0.037	+0.100			
27 SUPLTCPK	0.576	-0.643	+0.200	-0.340			
28 KSUPTCPR	0.536	0.101	+0.369	-0.624			
29 SUEFHDR	0.687	0.307	+0.617	+0.474			
30 CPROFUREK	0.862	0.925	+0.075	+0.016			
31 HURLINCIO	0.825	0.813	+0.274	-0.278			
32 SU ST CC	0.545	-0.706	+0.013	+0.217			
33 SU WK CC	0.648	-0.603	-0.027	+0.069			
34 SU AC CC	0.560	-0.674	+0.086	+0.433			
35 SU PA CC	0.535	-0.622	+0.043	+0.302			
36 SU P0 CC	0.672	-0.707	+0.141	-0.259			
37 SU NG CC	0.759	-0.837	+0.093	+0.309			
38 SU TP CC	0.613	-0.617	+0.067	+0.289			
39 CC ST SU	0.734	-0.374	+0.349	-0.667			
40 CC WK SU	0.818	-0.834	-0.248	+0.247			
41 CC AC SU	0.876	-0.710	-0.543	-0.274			
42 CC PA SU	0.749	-0.477	-0.292	-0.014			
43 CC PU SU	0.846	-0.842	+0.258	-0.266			
44 CC NG SU	0.901	-0.886	-0.034	+0.332			
45 CC 1P SU	0.900	-0.829	-0.052	+0.429			

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SINO-SOVIET INDUSTRIALIZATION AND STRATEGIC GAPS PREDICT TO INCREASING MUTUAL THREAT PERCEPTION AND BORDER HOSTILITY AND DECREASING ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR

Canonical Correlation, .979

Significant at .0001



Canonical Correlation:

Differences between the Soviet Union and China on 23 Attributes and 45 Soviet Interactions.


Factor Loadings

High-Loading Attributes	High-Loading Interactions
Steel Production .90	China Threat .92
Imports .91	Perception of the Soviet Union
Submarines .82	Soviet Threat .81
Energy .80	Perception of China
	Border Incidents .83
	Relative Chinese Imports from the Soviet Union -.96
	Chinese Students in the Soviet Union -.92

FIGURE 45

2

Significant at .005



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in Soviet and Chinese perceptions of the West has been suggested as a possible contributor to the Sino-Soviet dispute. Note, however, that although this perceptual gap is not related to the dominant factor of cooperation and hostility, it does relate to a decline in Soviet cooperative responses toward China.

(U) Variate 3 of the attribute study is characterized by a gap in Soviet and Chinese perceptions of the US as negative and threatening. Variate 3 in the interaction study is indexed by China's perception of the Soviet Union as strong. The canonical correlation between the two is .716. The scores on variate 3 are plotted in Figure 47.

(U) The pattern is called Difference in Sino-Soviet Threat Perception of the US is Related Inversely to Chinese Perceptions of Soviet Strength. That is, as the gap between Soviet and Chinese perception of the US as a threat increased, the Chinese perception of the Soviets as strong decreased.

2. Canonical Analysis of Differences in 16 Attributes and 45 Interactions

(U) In this section, we discuss a canonical rotation of the factor scores of the three factors derived in the 16 variable difference analysis and the factor scores of the five factors derived from the analysis of the 45 interactions. The canonically rotated factor loading matrix for the 16 attributes is shown in Table 42 and the canonically rotated factor loading matrix for the 45 interactions is presented in Table 43.

(U) Variate 1 for the attributes is characterized by the Sino-Soviet gap in industrialization and nuclear capability--the same as in the 23 variable study. Variate 1 for the interactions is characterized by cooperation and conflict between the Soviets and Chinese-- the factor which always appears as the first factor for the 45 interactions. The canonical correlation between the two is .983. The scores on variate 1 are plotted in Figure 48.

(U) The pattern here is almost identical to variate 1 between the 23 variables and 45 interactions. The gap between the Soviets and Chinese in industrialization and nuclear capability predict to increasing mutual threat perception and hostility. In fact, the predictive value of the 16 attribute study is a bit better than the 23 attribute study. The canonical correlation for the 23-45 was .979. The 16 attributes apparently form a slightly more stable pattern due to the absence of the perception variables.

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DIFFERENCE IN SINO-SOVIET THREAT PERCEPTION OF THE UNITED STATES RELATES INVERSELY  
TO CHINESE PERCEPTIONS OF SOVIET STRENGTH

Canonical Correlation .716

Significant at .02




FIGURE 47

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TABLE 42

CANONICAL ROTATION OF 45 INTERACTION AND 16 ATTRIBUTE VARIABLES: Attribute Matrix

VARIABLE NO. NAME	COMMUNALITY 3 FACTORS	ROTATED FACTOR MATRIX		
		1	2	3
SUM SQUARES OVER VARIABLES		10.803	1.218	1.809
PERCENT OF TOTAL VARIANCE		67.921	7.613	11.307
1 GNP	0.983	-0.991	+0.020	-0.027
2 EXPORTS	0.990	-0.991	+0.058	-0.067
3 IMPORTS	0.992	-0.958	+0.109	-0.249
4 IMPT/GNP	0.913	-0.615	+0.363	-0.634
5 EXPT/GNP	0.635	-0.692	+0.237	-0.300
6 ENERGY	0.922	-0.948	-0.117	0.101
7 AGRICPRO	0.751	-0.365	+0.730	0.355
8 STEEL PR	0.981	-0.988	-0.024	-0.066
9 POPULIN	0.950	0.972	+0.033	0.070
10 DEFENDID	0.058	0.033	-0.066	0.009
11 DEFC/GNP	0.756	0.837	-0.151	0.178
12 FIGHTERS	0.782	0.775	-0.222	-0.364
13 ARMFORCE	0.656	0.775	-0.222	-0.074
14 SUMMARIN	0.982	-0.529	+0.094	0.067
15 ICRMS	0.982	-0.984	-0.096	0.489
16 TREATIES	0.018	0.354	-0.037	0.831

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CANONICAL ROTATION OF 45 INTERACTION AND 16 ATTRIBUTE VARIABLES: Interaction Matrix

TABLE 43

VARIABLE NO. NAME	COMMUNALITY 3 FACTORS	ROTATED FACTOR MATRIX		
		1	2	3
SUM SQUARES OVER VARIABLES		20.079	4.188	6.462
PERCENT OF TOTAL VARIANCE		44.620	9.307	14.361
1 SUECAID	0.554	-0.346	0.650	-0.153
2 RSUECAID	0.554	-0.432	0.604	0.055
3 SUCTCPR	0.892	-0.907	-0.251	0.079
4 CPKCTSU	0.686	-0.921	-0.137	-0.142
5 SUMILALD	0.835	-0.847	-0.234	0.250
6 CPKSTSU	0.691	-0.425	0.461	-0.546
7 SSTREATY	0.424	-0.623	0.115	-0.151
8 SSECONTR	0.369	-0.578	0.177	0.056
9 SSS-ITR	0.411	-0.358	-0.485	-0.217
10 SSS-PTR	0.440	-0.584	0.255	0.186
11 SSCULTR	0.605	-0.649	0.113	-0.768
12 SSCU4TR	0.240	-0.245	0.415	0.086
13 SUOFVCPR	0.020	-0.061	-0.092	-0.088
14 CPKUFVSU	0.714	-0.173	0.594	-0.575
15 SUCVCCPR	0.055	-0.169	0.033	-0.159
16 CPROVDSU	0.349	-0.319	0.498	-0.006
17 SUPRCPCR	0.779	0.724	-0.191	0.467
18 CPKRCSU	0.766	0.798	-0.100	0.346
19 SUCLDCPR	0.707	-0.438	-0.381	0.608
20 CPKCLDSU	0.769	-0.722	-0.372	-0.329
21 SUEXPCR	0.884	-0.773	-0.481	-0.234
22 SUIMPCR	0.679	-0.306	-0.419	-0.640
23 RSUEXPCR	0.976	-0.931	-0.272	0.189
24 RSUIMPCR	0.894	-0.863	-0.349	-0.165
25 RCPKXSU	0.875	-0.868	-0.243	-0.243
26 RCPKIMSU	0.946	-0.955	-0.047	0.179
27 SUPETCPR	0.747	-0.666	0.222	-0.504
28 RSUPTCPR	0.687	0.672	0.449	-0.693
29 SUFURQDR	0.657	0.322	0.338	0.662
30 CPKFUNRR	0.862	0.823	0.098	0.006
31 BUKINGID	0.784	0.832	0.179	-0.243
32 SU ST CC	0.544	-0.685	-0.185	0.200
33 SU WK CC	0.676	0.799	0.053	0.187
34 SU AC CC	0.772	0.631	-0.104	0.602
35 SU PA CC	0.469	0.612	0.124	-0.282
36 SU PI CC	0.804	-0.782	0.187	-0.396
37 SU NG CC	0.869	0.834	0.125	0.398
38 SU TP CC	0.907	0.817	0.084	0.486
39 CC ST SU	0.712	-0.388	-0.284	-0.634
40 CC WK SU	0.568	0.847	-0.228	0.313
41 CL AC SU	0.860	0.724	-0.489	-0.312
42 CC PA SU	0.499	0.468	-0.057	0.526
43 CC PO SU	0.814	0.846	0.151	-0.275
44 CC NG SU	0.943	0.892	-0.019	0.376
45 CC TP SU	0.946	0.931	-0.046	0.276

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SINO-SOVIET INDUSTRIALIZATION AND STRATEGIC GAPS PREDICT TO INCREASE MUTUAL THREAT PERCEPTION AND BORDER HOSTILITY AND DECREASING ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR.




FIGURE 48



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(U) Variate 2 for the attributes describes the pattern of the Sino-Soviet gap in agricultural production and armed forces. Variate 2 for the interactions is indexed by "Soviet economic aid to China and by Chinese official visits to the Soviet Union." The canonical correlation between the two is .849. The scores for variate 2 are plotted in Figure 49. The changing Sino-Soviet armed forces gap is positively related to the pattern of Soviet economic aid to China and negatively related to the pattern of Chinese official visits to the Soviet Union. The difference in Soviet and Chinese agricultural production relates to the same interactions but in opposite directions. A negative slope in the plot indicates that the Sino-Soviet gap in armed forces was closing, the agricultural gap was widening, Chinese official visits to the Soviet Union were decreasing, and, prior to 1962--when Soviet economic aid to China ended--Soviet economic aid was increasing.

(U) In the earlier canonical analysis of the differences on 23 national attributes, the perception patterns on the second and third variate dominated the factors and predicted to the interactions. Soviet initiatives were predicted on the second variate and Chinese perceptions were predicted on the third variate. In this canonical analysis without the perception variables among the attributes, we have other attributes emerging and predicting to Sino-Soviet interactions. As described in the second variate, the armed forces gap and the agricultural production gap predicted to Soviet economic and Chinese official visits, none of which appeared in the 23 study. In the third variate in the 16 analysis, the Sino-Soviet trade and treaty gap relates to Soviet initiatives. The canonical correlation on the third variate was .578 but was not considered significant enough to present here.

(U) It is interesting to note that higher canonical correlations appeared between the 16 attributes and 45 interactions. In terms of Sino-Soviet relations, the differences between the Soviets and Chinese on attributes and perceptions do not relate to Sino-Soviet interactions as well as their differences on the physical attributes alone. In other words, the addition of perceptual variables slightly reduces the predictive power of the canonical regression.

### 3. CANONICAL ANALYSIS OF DIFFERENCES IN 9 ECONOMIC ATTRIBUTES AND 45 INTERACTIONS

(U) A canonical rotation was performed on the factor scores of the three factors derived in the 9 variable difference analysis and the factor scores of the five factors derived from the analysis of the 45 interactions. The purpose here is to determine how well the differences between the Soviets and Chinese on just the economic attributes relate to Sino-Soviet interactions.

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CHANGING SINO-SOVIET ARMED FORCES GAP DIRECTLY RELATES TO THE PATTERN OF SOVIET ECONOMIC AID TO CHINA BUT INVERSELY RELATES TO THE PATTERN OF CHINESE OFFICIAL VISITS TO THE SOVIET UNION. DIFFERENCE IN SOVIET AND CHINESE AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION RELATES TO SAME INTERACTIONS BUT IN OPPOSITE DIRECTION.

Canonical Correlation .849

Significant at .0038




FIGURE 49

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(U) The canonically rotated factor loading matrix for the 9 attributes is shown in Table 44 and the canonically rotated factor loading matrix for the 45 interactions is presented in Table 45.

(U) Only the first variate related at a significant enough level to be presented. But this first variate related at a higher canonical correlation, .989, than any of the others achieved. Variate 1 for the attributes is characterized by the Sino-Soviet gap in industrialization. Variate 1 for the interactions is indexed by measures of Soviet and Chinese cooperation and conflict. The scores on Variate 1 are plotted in Figure 50.

(U) The pattern shows that the large and growing gap between the Soviets and Chinese in industrialization predicts very well to the growing Sino-Soviet dispute. At almost any point from 1950 to 1967, the difference between the Soviets and Chinese on their economic attributes relates quite closely to the amount of hostility the Soviets and Chinese are experiencing in that year.

(U) Over the whole time period, the differences between the Soviets and Chinese on the economic attribute factor scores predict over 97 percent of the variation in the 45 Sino-Soviet interaction factor scores.

#### 4. Canonical Analysis of Differences in 6 Military Attributes and 45 Interactions

(U) A canonical rotation was performed on the factor scores of the three factors derived in the 6 variable difference analysis and the factor scores of the five factors derived from the analysis of the 45 interactions.

(U) The canonically rotated factor loading matrix for the 6 attributes is shown in Table 46 and the canonically rotated factor loading matrix for the 45 interactions is presented in Table 47. The canonical correlations for all three variates are significantly high.

(U) Variate 1 on the military attributes is characterized by the Sino-Soviet strategic gap. Variate 1 on the interactions is characterized by the usual Sino-Soviet cooperation and conflict pattern. The canonical correlation between the two is .976. The scores in variate 1 are plotted in Figure 51.

(U) The canonical regression shows that the Sino-Soviet gap in nuclear capability predicts quite well to the decrease in Soviet and Chinese cooperation and the increase in their hostility.

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TABLE 44

CANONICAL ROTATION OF 45 INTERACTION AND 9 ATTRIBUTE VARIABLES: Attribute Matrix

	ROTATED FACTOR MATRIX		
	1	2	3
SUM SQUARES OVER VARIABLES	6.630	1.141	0.877
PERCENT OF TOTAL VARIANCE	73.671	12.682	9.739

VARIABLE NO.	NAME	COMMUNALITY 3 FACTORS	1	2	3
1	GNP	0.993	0.991	-0.092	0.058
2	EXPORTS	0.588	0.978	-0.177	-0.003
3	IMPORTS	0.993	0.959	-0.243	-0.123
4	IMPT/GNP	0.879	0.619	-0.533	-0.458
5	EXPT/GNP	0.848	0.433	-0.620	-0.251
6	ENERGY	0.574	0.966	0.143	0.144
7	AGRICPRO	0.992	0.284	-0.590	0.750
8	STEEL PR	0.995	0.996	-0.054	0.024
9	POPULTN	0.986	0.592	0.004	-0.038

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## CANONICAL ROTATION OF 45 INTERACTION AND 9 ATTRIBUTE VARIABLES; Interaction Matrix

TABLE 45

ROTATED FACTOR MATRIX

FACTOR NUMBER  
SUM SQUARES OVER VARIABLES 18.128 5.403 6.216  
PERCENT OF TOTAL VARIANCE 40.284 12.006 13.813

VARIABLE COMMUNALITY  
NO. NAME 3 FACTORS

	1	2	3
1 SUECAID	-0.320	0.424	-0.382
2 RSUECAID	-0.428	0.414	-0.181
3 SUCTCPR	-0.873	0.386	0.006
4 CPRCTSU	-0.876	0.254	-0.208
5 SUMILAI	-0.827	0.403	0.199
6 CPRSTSU	-0.286	0.647	-0.479
7 SSTREATY	-0.569	0.104	-0.059
8 SSECONTR	-0.590	0.126	0.026
9 SSS-TTR	-0.261	0.640	-0.190
10 SSC-PTR	-0.374	-0.005	0.200
11 SSCULTR	0.067	-0.660	-0.594
12 SSCDMATR	-0.255	-0.259	0.200
13 SUCFVCPR	0.026	0.413	0.125
14 CPROFVSU	-0.135	-0.492	-0.436
15 SUCVDCPR	-0.080	0.307	0.070
16 CPROVDSU	-0.339	-0.406	0.063
17 SUBKCCPR	-0.675	0.103	0.476
18 CPMKRCSU	-0.756	0.015	0.382
19 SUCCLDCPR	-0.299	0.570	-0.535
20 CPMCLDSU	-0.615	0.577	-0.308
21 SUEXPCPR	-0.693	0.570	-0.317
22 SUIMPCPR	-0.164	0.586	-0.565
23 RSUEXCPK	-0.928	0.314	0.040
24 RSUIMCPR	-0.790	0.497	-0.215
25 RCPREXSU	-0.805	0.353	-0.312
26 RCPRI4SU	-0.570	0.086	0.044
27 SUPETCPR	-0.817	-0.122	-0.501
28 RSUPTCPR	-0.109	-0.467	-0.612
29 SUFORRUR	-0.177	-0.533	0.554
30 CPROFORR	-0.904	-0.180	0.099
31 RUKINGID	-0.819	-0.331	-0.189
32 SU ST CC	-0.699	0.198	0.060
33 SU WK CC	-0.765	-0.140	0.258
34 SU AC CC	-0.539	-0.069	0.533
35 SU PA CC	0.620	-0.230	-0.215
36 SU PQ CC	-0.735	-0.064	-0.400
37 SU NG CC	-0.847	-0.205	0.462
38 SU TP CC	-0.776	-0.151	0.530
39 CC ST SU	-0.350	-0.347	-0.730
40 CC WK SU	-0.824	0.156	0.362
41 CC AC SU	-0.798	0.443	-0.245
42 CC PA SU	-0.454	0.235	-0.680
43 CC PJ SU	-0.833	-0.141	-0.375
44 CC NG SU	-0.847	-0.050	0.443
45 CC LP SU	-0.893	-0.041	0.341

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SINO-SOVIET INDUSTRIALIZATION GAP PREDICTS TO INCREASING MUTUAL  
THREAT PERCEPTION AND BORDER HOSTILITY AND DECREASING SINO-  
SOVIET ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR.

Canonical Correlation .989

Significant at .0001




FIGURE 50

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TABLE 46

CANONICAL ROTATION OF 45 INTERACTION AND 4 ATTRIBUTE VARIABLES; Attribute Matrix

ROTATED FACTOR MATRIX

	1	2	3
SUM SQUARES OVER VARIABLES	4.103	0.676	0.787
PERCENT OF TOTAL VARIANCE	68.382	11.261	13.117

VARIABLE NO.	NAME	COMMUNALITY
3	FACTORS	

1	DEFNCROUD	0.801	0.820	-0.356	0.052
2	DEFNC/GRP	0.956	-0.811	-0.518	0.221
3	FIGHTERS	0.909	-0.834	0.462	0.007
4	ARMFORCE	0.957	-0.522	0.025	0.851
5	SUBMARIN	0.983	0.990	-0.036	-0.042
6	ICBMS	0.880	0.909	-0.210	0.099

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TABLE 47

ROTATED FACTOR MATRIX

SUM SQUARES OVER VARIABLES PERCENT OF TOTAL VARIANCE	FACTOR NUMBER		
	1	2	3
	21.033	6.272	3.651
	46.740	13.937	8.114

VARIABLE COMMUNALITY  
NO. NAME 3 FACTORS


1	SUECAID	0.739	-0.345	+0.156	0.772
2	HSUECAID	0.745	-0.412	-0.035	0.758
3	SUCICPR	0.847	0.902	-0.009	0.183
4	CPRCISU	0.891	-0.534	+0.113	0.069
5	SUMILAI	0.727	0.828	-0.117	0.163
6	CPRCISU	0.856	-0.492	0.141	0.141
7	SSYICATY	0.506	0.638	+0.239	-0.205
8	SSYICENTR	0.335	0.561	-0.127	-0.061
9	SSS-TIK	0.425	0.393	+0.466	0.230
10	SSD-PIR	0.417	0.568	-0.079	-0.298
11	SSCULTR	0.783	0.133	+0.784	-0.308
12	SSCUMTR	0.204	-0.233	-0.076	-0.379
13	SUUFVCPR	0.248	-0.093	+0.422	-0.247
14	CPRCIVSU	0.563	-0.223	+0.360	-0.619
15	SUCVUCPR	0.365	-0.204	+0.450	-0.348
16	CPLVDSU	0.263	-0.309	-0.112	-0.393
17	SUCRCPR	0.719	0.766	-0.265	0.247
18	CPRCISU	0.738	0.826	0.185	0.138
19	SUCRCPR	0.870	0.512	0.778	0.051
20	CPRCISU	0.847	0.766	+0.497	0.115
21	SUCRCPR	0.862	0.800	-0.533	0.334
22	SUMVCPR	0.821	0.384	+0.818	0.074
23	HSUFVCPR	0.960	-0.908	-0.185	0.319
24	HSUFVCPR	0.888	-0.705	+0.259	0.194
25	RCPRCISU	0.875	0.894	+0.239	0.139
26	RCPRCISU	0.956	0.928	-0.267	0.154
27	SUPICPR	0.697	0.716	+0.277	-0.328
28	RSUPICPR	0.393	0.011	+0.412	-0.472
29	SUPICPR	0.894	0.400	-0.857	-0.006
30	CPRCISU	0.859	0.919	0.044	-0.110
31	BJRINCID	0.699	0.812	+0.144	-0.136
32	SU ST CC	0.554	0.666	-0.261	0.207
33	SU WK CC	0.676	0.820	-0.069	0.029
34	SU AC CC	0.843	0.674	-0.528	0.289
35	SU PA CC	0.421	0.592	+0.256	-0.069
36	SU PO CC	0.795	-0.821	-0.214	-0.275
37	SU NG CC	0.848	0.873	-0.293	-0.024
38	SU TP CC	0.877	0.863	-0.361	0.045
39	CC ST SU	0.377	-0.443	+0.344	-0.250
40	CC X SU	0.816	0.872	-0.069	0.227
41	CC AC SU	0.878	0.683	+0.569	0.297
42	CC PA SU	0.288	0.499	-0.173	-0.093
43	CC PO SU	0.755	0.863	+0.008	-0.099
44	CC NG SU	0.905	0.926	-0.210	0.053
45	CC-IP-SU	0.929	0.933	-0.123	0.071

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SINO-SOVIET STRATEGIC GAP PREDICTS TO INCREASING MUTUAL THREAT  
PERCEPTION AND BORDER HOSTILITY AND DECREASING ECO-  
NOMIC AND POLITICAL COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR.

Canonical Correlation .976  
Significant at .0001



Canonical Correlation:  
Differences between the Soviet Union  
and China on 6 Military Attributes  
and 45 Sino-Soviet Interactions.  
Factor Loadings

High-Loading Attributes	High-Loading Interactions
Submarines .99	Chinese Threat .95
ICBM's .91	Perception of Soviets
	Soviet Threat .86
	Perception of China
	Border Incidents .81
	Relative Chinese --.93 Imports from the Soviet Union

FIGURE 51

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(U) Variate 2 on the military attributes is characterized by the gap in Soviet and Chinese percentage of GNP allocated for defense. Variate 2 on the interactions is indexed by measures of Soviet initiatives or responses to China. The canonical correlation between the two is .862. The scores on Variate 2 are plotted in Figure 52. The plot shows that from 1953 on, the changing Sino-Soviet defense allocation gap is highly related to the changing Soviet military and cultural responses to China.

(U) Variate 3 on the military attributes is characterized by the Sino-Soviet gap in armed forces. Variate 3 on the interactions is characterized by "Soviet economic aid to China" and "Chinese official visits to the Soviet Union." The canonical correlation between the two is .808. The scores on variate 3 are plotted in Figure 53. The gap in Sino-Soviet armed forces relates quite highly to the economic aid extended to China by the Soviet Union. Both patterns are quite erratic. It should be noted again that Soviet aid to China ceased in 1962.

C. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS FROM THE CANONICAL CORRELATION AND REGRESSION ANALYSIS

(U) The major findings of the canonical correlation and regression analyses are summarized as follows:

1. The differences between the Soviets and Chinese on their national attributes from 1950 to 1967 are the best predictors of Sino-Soviet interaction. The highest canonical correlations were derived when only the differences on the physical attributes were used as predictor variables. The inclusion of perception variables as predictor variables increased in fluctuation in the patterns and resulted in reducing the size of the correlations.
2. Over the time period 1950-1967, the differences between the Soviets and Chinese on the economic attribute factor scores predicted over 97 percent of the variation in the 45 Sino-Soviet interaction scores. The differences on the economic attributes were, thus, the best predictor variables to the pattern of Sino-Soviet cooperation and conflict. This is not an economic interpretation of the Sino-Soviet dispute but rather an observation that as the gap between Soviet and Chinese industrial capability increased, the hostility between them also increased. It would seem that the Chinese were not only aware that they were having serious industrialization problems, but that also the sudden withdrawal of Soviet aid and technicians in 1960 further alienated the Chinese from the Soviets. The Chinese perceived the Soviets as a revisionist, status quo power, more concerned with establishing a détente with the West than in helping the development of a fellow Communist country.

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CHANGING SINO-SOVIET DEFENSE ALLOCATION GAP RELATES TO CHANGING SOVIET  
MILITARY AND CULTURAL RESPONSES VIS A VIS CHINA





FIGURE 52

THE CHANGING SINO-SOVIET ARMED FORCES GAP RELATES TO THE PATTERN OF  
SOVIET ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO CHINA AND CHINESE OFFICIAL VISITS TO THE  
SOVIET UNION.



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3. The strongest factor in the interaction analysis and one which appeared in every canonical regression is a pattern of increasing mutual threat perception and border hostility and decreasing economic and political cooperative behavior. This pattern best describes the Sino-Soviet dispute. It is made up of those interactions which indicate a steady trend of decreasing cooperation and increasing hostility. We found that the first factor of each subset of national attributes predicted very highly to this interaction factor with the economic subset--as described above--predicting the best.
4. The difference between the Soviets and the Chinese in their perceptions of the United States was found to be related to certain patterns of Sino-Soviet interactions. A difference in their perception of the US on the active dimension related to a changing pattern of Soviet responses to China. As the gap in their perceptions of the US on the dimension increased, Soviet cooperative behavior toward China decreased and Soviet hostile acts increased.

The differences in the perception of the US as negative and threatening were also found to relate to China's perception of the Soviet Union as strong. Here for the first time we have a difference in perceptions of the US relating to China's perception of the Soviet Union.

It has often been suggested that the increasing differences in Soviet and Chinese perceptions of the US were a major element in escalating the Sino-Soviet dispute. The results of this study, however, do not seem to support this contention. The Soviet and Chinese difference in perception of the US as active is related to Soviet behavior vis-à-vis China but it is not associated with the major pattern of Sino-Soviet cooperation and hostility. The same is true of their difference in perceptions of the US as indexed by the negative and threat variables. These two perceptions of the US which one would most expect to relate to their increasing mutual hostility instead relate only to the Chinese perception of the Soviet Union as being strong.

(U) An examination of the raw content data indicates that Sino-Soviet perceptions of the US were equally shared on all dimensions except the negative-positive dimension. Here the Chinese consistently viewed the US as more negative than did the Soviets. This, of course, could be due to an idiosyncrasy of the Chinese to verbalize in this manner, but it is interesting to note that if this is the case, it occurs only on this dimension. However, even though the Chinese consistently viewed the US as more negative than the Soviets, it appears to be unrelated to the increasing Sino-Soviet hostility.

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5. The six military national attributes also predicted quite well to Soviet and Chinese interactions. The Sino-Soviet gap in nuclear capability is highly related to the decrease in Soviet and Chinese cooperation and the increase in their hostility. It is not as highly related as the "industrialization" gap but the canonical correlation is still .976.

The gap between the Soviets and Chinese in percentage of GNP allocated for defense is also highly related to the changing Soviet military and cultural responses to China. This pattern describes a trend in which, as the defense allocation gap widens, the Soviets decrease cooperative behavior and increase military measures.

6. The canonical analysis has shown that the differences between the Soviets and Chinese on their national attributes from 1950 to 1967 predict quite highly to their interactions for the same period of time. This is an encouraging finding but one which still needs further study and expansion. Certainly the two most important aspects to investigate now are whether Sino-Soviet interactions in one year can be predicted from Sino-Soviet differences in attributes in the previous year. Furthermore, we need to disaggregate the predictions--which are in factor scores--to values on the original variables.

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SECTION VII

COMPARISON OF FINDINGS

(U) This section compares the findings of this study to some of the findings from relevant prior research. Section II outlined some of the previous studies concerned either with the interaction of nations in general or with Sino-Soviet relations in particular. We compare our results with three of these studies.

1. The most important finding from this study confirms R. J. Rummel's social field theory<sup>57</sup> that the difference between nations on their attributes are related to their behavior towards each other. The results of the canonical analysis indicates that the Soviet and Chinese differences on national attributes predict quite highly over time to their interactions. Our research supports Rummel's conception of nation differences as social distances which act like forces on behavior, affecting both the nature and magnitude of behavior. This is an important finding, but one which, of course, still needs additional confirmation and expansion.
2. Holsti's study<sup>58</sup> of Soviet and Chinese perceptions of the US examined the hypothesis that Chinese and Soviet attitudes toward the United States will tend to be similar in periods of high interbloc conflict, whereas during periods of decreasing tensions, attitudes toward American policy will diverge. He found that during three periods of high East-West tension (June 1950; April 1961; October 22-25, 1962; and February 1965) both Chinese and Soviet perceptions of American policy were overwhelmingly negative, strong and active. During the three selected periods of lower East-West tension (September 1959, October 26-31, 1962; and July-August 1963) differences between Chinese and Soviet perceptions were greater than in the high tension periods on all three dimensions.

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<sup>57</sup>See R. J. Rummel, The DON Project: A Five Year Research Program, op. cit., "Indicators of Cross-National and International Patterns," op. cit.

<sup>58</sup>Ole Holsti, "External Conflict and Internal Consensus: The Sino-Soviet Case," The General Inquirer, op. cit.



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It is somewhat difficult to compare the results of this study with Holsti's work because Holsti did his analysis on short selected time periods while this study aggregated data by year for the years 1950-1967. The results of this study showed that over the 18-year period the differences between Soviet and Chinese perceptions of the US fluctuated a great deal. Examination of the raw data by years shows that the years in which the difference was the least in the Soviet and Chinese perception of the US as active were 1952, 1965, 1963, and 1964; as strong, 1960, 1952, 1953, 1956, and as negative, 1951, 1965, 1967, and 1954. According to Holsti's hypothesis, these would be years marked by high East-West tension.

It is difficult to talk in terms of "East-West high tension years." Almost every year from 1950 to 1968 experienced an East-West incident. Are the high tension years those in which more than one incident occurred or in which the incident lasted a longer period of time?

However, Holsti's concern with Soviet and Chinese perceptions of the US was the result of his operationalization of the hypothesis that "a high level of intercoalition conflict tends to increase intra-coalition unity and more relaxed relations between blocs tend to magnify differences within the alliance." Basing his operationalization on literature relating to cognitive balance, Holsti assumed that a comparison of Soviet and Chinese perceptions of the US would be an indication of the degree of unity or tension existing between themselves. The assumption is that there is always a strain toward balance; that is, if the Soviet and Chinese both view the US as negative or positive, there will be a positive relationship between them, but if they differ in their views of the US there will be a negative relationship between them. (See Section III for a more complete explanation.)

The results of our factor analysis of Soviet and Chinese attributes over the 18-year period showed that Soviet and Chinese perceptions of the United States were unrelated to their perceptions of each other. It does not appear that their perceptions of the US contributed to their mutual perceptions. In effect, our results disconfirm Holsti's basic hypothesis that out-group pressure (resulting from East-West conflict), tends to reduce in-group (Sino-Soviet) dissonance over a period of time.

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3. As mentioned in Section II, Thomas Robinson examined Sino-Soviet relations, 1949-1964, in terms of Morgenthau's national interest and power formulations.<sup>59</sup> Robinson viewed the element of power as an important factor in Soviet-Chinese relations. In fact he stated that "the most singular change in Sino-Soviet relations has been a relative increase in Chinese power." Robinson (as is Morgenthau) was very unclear as to the meaning of the word "power." Two possible definitions could be derived from his discussion. The first implies that "power" is the degree of Chinese independence of the Soviet Union. The second equates power to nuclear and industrial capability. However it is defined, Robinson states that "although Soviet power...increased during the period (1950-1964) and in absolute terms is probably much greater than Chinese power, it is the relative increase (in Chinese power) that matters."

In order to examine and test Robinson's hypothesis, we included measures of both interpretations of "power." Variables measuring the nuclear and industrial capabilities of the Soviets and Chinese were included in the national attribute study, and variables measuring the relative dependence of the Chinese on the Soviets were included in the interaction study.

The results of our study showed that the differences between the Soviets and Chinese in industrial and nuclear capabilities increased over time in an ever-widening gap. The Chinese have not experienced a relative increase in capability vis-à-vis the Soviets. If power is therefore defined in these terms, our study does not support Robinson's contention.

Measures of Chinese trade dependency were used to measure Chinese dependence on the Soviet Union. Examination of the data shows that the earlier years were characterized by a relatively high percentage of Chinese trade with the Soviet Union. However, the trend over time is marked by an almost linear decrease in Chinese trade dependency to a minimal amount in 1967. If "power" is defined, therefore, in terms of independence, Robinson is quite correct in stating that the Chinese have gained a relative increase in power vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.

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<sup>59</sup>Thomas W. Robinson, "A National Interest Analysis of Sino-Soviet Relations," op. cit.

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Robinson also states that "the relative growth of Chinese power is positively correlated with pursuit of existing Chinese national interests as well as with discovery of new interests." Robinson implies that the Chinese pursuit of national interests over time has been an important factor in Sino-Soviet relations, or in other words with their increasing hostility. He states that "one important reason why China has drawn away from the Soviet Union is because she has become increasingly independent of the Soviet Union."

In our factor analysis of the 45 Sino-Soviet interactions, the first factor is a pattern of decreasing Soviet and Chinese cooperative behavior and increasing Soviet and Chinese hostile behavior. It is interesting to note that the Chinese trade dependency variables load highly negative on the factor while the variables measuring hostility load highly positive. In other words, a decrease in Chinese dependency on the Soviet Union is related to an increase in Sino-Soviet hostility. Of course the question is unanswered whether the hostility caused the decrease in dependency or vice-versa. Nevertheless, Robinson's hypotheses concerning relative Chinese power and its relation to the conflict gets some support from this study.

Robinson also states that nuclear weapons are obviously a discordant issue between the Soviet Union and China. Geoffrey Hudson agrees that the issue of nuclear weapons is one of the most important contributions to the conflict between the Soviet Union and China.<sup>60</sup> Two measures of the nuclear capability of the Soviets and the Chinese were, therefore, included in this study.

In the canonical correlation of the differences between the Soviets and the Chinese on six military attributes with the 45 Sino-Soviet interactions it was found that the Sino-Soviet gap in nuclear capability predicts quite well to an increase in Soviet and Chinese hostile behavior. In other words, as the gap in nuclear capability between the Soviets and Chinese increased, Soviet and Chinese hostile behavior increased. This can be considered confirmation of Robinson's hypothesis concerning the role of nuclear weapons in the dispute.

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<sup>60</sup>Geoffrey Hudson, "Paper Tigers and Nuclear Teeth," The China Quarterly, No. 39, July-September 1969, p. 64.

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